Well, it doesn’t actually add up to honor. If you’re in a True Prisoner’s Dilemma and you predict that the paperclipper will cooperate out of honor, TDT says to defect and reap the benefits. It’s only when two TDT agents meet that mutual cooperation is on the table.
(Nitpick: TDT and UDT should cooperate as well. Etc.)
EDIT: This comment is mistaken. If by HonorBot we mean an agent that predicts what the other agent will do, and then cooperates with all cooperators and defects against all defectors, then TDT indeed cooperates with HonorBot. TDT does not cooperate with CooperateBot, though, so TDT is not HonorBot.
Reputation effects are one way to change the payoffs so it’s no longer a Prisoner’s Dilemma. But if this particular interaction is more important than the reputation effects, TDT still defects against an honorable paperclipper who isn’t TDT or higher.
TDT says: I cooperate iff (you will cooperate iff I cooperate).
Honorable says: I cooperate iff you will cooperate.
It seems to me that, although Honorable is suboptimal if it meets an unconditional cooperator, TDT will cooperate with it because it meets the condition that TDT cares about.
Well, it doesn’t actually add up to honor. If you’re in a True Prisoner’s Dilemma and you predict that the paperclipper will cooperate out of honor, TDT says to defect and reap the benefits. It’s only when two TDT agents meet that mutual cooperation is on the table.
(Nitpick: TDT and UDT should cooperate as well. Etc.)
EDIT: This comment is mistaken. If by HonorBot we mean an agent that predicts what the other agent will do, and then cooperates with all cooperators and defects against all defectors, then TDT indeed cooperates with HonorBot. TDT does not cooperate with CooperateBot, though, so TDT is not HonorBot.
Only if you try to act honorably to the honorable and dishonorably to the dishonorable do you have something like TDT.
And you must do this in a way that makes you appear honorable to others who use the same algorithm.
Reputation effects are one way to change the payoffs so it’s no longer a Prisoner’s Dilemma. But if this particular interaction is more important than the reputation effects, TDT still defects against an honorable paperclipper who isn’t TDT or higher.
TDT says: I cooperate iff (you will cooperate iff I cooperate).
Honorable says: I cooperate iff you will cooperate.
It seems to me that, although Honorable is suboptimal if it meets an unconditional cooperator, TDT will cooperate with it because it meets the condition that TDT cares about.
On reflection, your conclusion is obviously right: playing PD against Honorbot is simply playing Newcomb’s Dilemma, so TDT cooperates.
I was misled by the recent realization that TDT doesn’t actually work out to “I cooperate iff (you will cooperate iff I cooperate)”.