Luke lists “Why extrapolate the values of humans alone? What counts as a human? Do values converge if extrapolated?” as an open question in So You Want to Save the World.
Would the choice to extrapolate the values of humans alone be an unjustified act of speciesism, or is it justified because humans are special in some way — perhaps because humans are the only beings who can reason about their own preferences? And what counts as a human? The problem is more complicated than one might imagine (Bostrom 2006; Bostrom & Sandberg 2011). Moreover, do we need to scan the values of all humans, or only some? These problems are less important if values converge upon extrapolation for a wide variety of agents, but it is far from clear that this is the case (Sobel 1999, Doring & Steinhoff 2009).
Of course, the premise that “humans are the only beings who can reason about their own preferences” could only justify the conclusion that some human beings are special, since there are members of the human species who lack that ability. Similar objections could be raised against any other proposed candidate property. This has long been recognized by moral philosophers.
Of course, the premise that “humans are the only beings who can reason about their own preferences” could only justify the conclusion that some human beings are special, since there are members of the human species who lack that ability.
In our society we don’t really respect the volition of those human beings. We give them legal guardians who are supposed to decide in their interests instead of letting them make their own decisions. We don’t let them vote in our elections.
Of course, the premise that “humans are the only beings who can reason about their own preferences” could only justify the conclusion that some human beings are special, since there are members of the human species who lack that ability.
In our society we don’t really respect the volition of those human beings. We give them legal guardians who are supposed to decide in their interests instead of letting them make their own decisions. We don’t let them vote in our elections.
That is not because we don’t regard their preferences as valuable in themselves, but simply because these beings lack the means to do the kinds of things that would allow them to satisfy those preferences. In any case, CEV does not exclude such humans from the class of creatures whose volitions are to be coherently extrapolated.
Luke lists “Why extrapolate the values of humans alone? What counts as a human? Do values converge if extrapolated?” as an open question in So You Want to Save the World.
Thanks!
Of course, the premise that “humans are the only beings who can reason about their own preferences” could only justify the conclusion that some human beings are special, since there are members of the human species who lack that ability. Similar objections could be raised against any other proposed candidate property. This has long been recognized by moral philosophers.
In our society we don’t really respect the volition of those human beings. We give them legal guardians who are supposed to decide in their interests instead of letting them make their own decisions. We don’t let them vote in our elections.
In our society we don’t really respect the volition of those human beings. We give them legal guardians who are supposed to decide in their interests instead of letting them make their own decisions. We don’t let them vote in our elections.
That is not because we don’t regard their preferences as valuable in themselves, but simply because these beings lack the means to do the kinds of things that would allow them to satisfy those preferences. In any case, CEV does not exclude such humans from the class of creatures whose volitions are to be coherently extrapolated.