When the mechanism is new, and especially if it’s somewhat complicated, you could imagine many people using it and accidentally committing to things that they didn’t quite realise they were signing up for, or otherwise becoming over-committed.
In a recent 80,000 hours podcast, Glen Weyl makes the point that some of his proposed mechanisms for changing how voting and public goods provision are designed under a self-interest assumption, which might not hold true for people in the context of e.g. voting, where they’re used to considering the good of the nation. As such, if this type of system were naively designed and initially deployed at significant scale, you could imagine weird problems like over-investment in public goods.
A couple of thoughts:
When the mechanism is new, and especially if it’s somewhat complicated, you could imagine many people using it and accidentally committing to things that they didn’t quite realise they were signing up for, or otherwise becoming over-committed.
In a recent 80,000 hours podcast, Glen Weyl makes the point that some of his proposed mechanisms for changing how voting and public goods provision are designed under a self-interest assumption, which might not hold true for people in the context of e.g. voting, where they’re used to considering the good of the nation. As such, if this type of system were naively designed and initially deployed at significant scale, you could imagine weird problems like over-investment in public goods.