[Link] The Bayesian argument against induction.

In 1983 Karl Pop­per and David Miller pub­lished an ar­gu­ment to the effect that prob­a­bil­ity the­ory could be used to dis­prove in­duc­tion. Pop­per had long been an op­po­nent of in­duc­tion. Since prob­a­bil­ity the­ory in gen­eral, and Bayes in par­tic­u­lar is of­ten seen as res­cu­ing in­duc­tion from the stan­dard ob­jec­tions, the ar­gu­ment is sig­nifi­cant.

It is be­ing dis­cussed over at the Crit­i­cal Ra­tion­al­ism site.