I’m not sure why “complexity of values” is itself valuable. I mean, it’s perhaps a confused framing to think of what values are valuable, but on a consequentialist account, it’s possible to compare one’s own values to another set of values. Assuming human values are complex (which I’m still not sure of), I’m not sure why one would in general think that complex value-sets are closer to human values than simple value-sets, since complex value-sets differ from each other.
I’m not sure why “complexity of values” is itself valuable. I mean, it’s perhaps a confused framing to think of what values are valuable, but on a consequentialist account, it’s possible to compare one’s own values to another set of values. Assuming human values are complex (which I’m still not sure of), I’m not sure why one would in general think that complex value-sets are closer to human values than simple value-sets, since complex value-sets differ from each other.
The intuitive concern that too simple a specification destroys things we might care about via lossy compression.