The only mention of categories I made is a brief aside about category theory, by which I meant the mathematical subject, as a formalisation of the concept of similarity of structure. (I have now edited that link in.) This does not have any connection with the ideas of the philosophers you mentioned.
Ok, I hadn’t noticed that. I think the diagram expresses no position about the question. But Korzybski was very much aware of relativity theory, which awakened the scientific world from Kant’s dogmatic slumber concerning our ideas of space and time.
WWES? What Would Eliezer Say? As I said in the OP, I regard The Sequences as a worthier successor to K’s magnum opus than any revision of the latter could be.
But Korzybski was very much aware of relativity theory, which awakened the scientific world from Kant’s dogmatic slumber concerning our ideas of space and time.
The general Kantian approach doesn’t stand or fall by his specific claims about space and time.
WWES? What Would Eliezer Say?
Why should I care? Is he an expert on Korzybski?
As I said in the OP, I regard The Sequences as a worthier successor to K’s magnum opus than any revision of the latter could be.
AFAICS, the issue is still being debated in the rationalshphere, eg Scott versus Zach, so it wasn’t settled in the sequences.
The issue here is not to be addressed by exegesis of Korzybski. As it happens, Korzybski, through Hayakawa’s popular exposition of his work, was one of many influences on Eliezer’s thinking, but The Sequences themselves stand on their own, to be judged on their own. History of philosophy is all very well, but the evolutionary history of trees has little relevance to the carpenter concerned to frame a barn that will stand up.
AFAICS, the issue is still being debated in the rationalshphere, eg Scott versus Zach, so it wasn’t settled in the sequences.
I am not clear what the issue even is, or why it (if there is an “it” there) matters.
Did you mean Zack? I recall both Scott and Zack going on and on about categories, for Zack usually in relation to transgender matters, but I was not even aware there was a “versus” between them.
As for Eliezer’s views, this and the entire sequence it comes from seem relevant.
As for Eliezer’s views, this and the entire sequence it comes from seem relevant.
But that’s not the a priori irrational part: The a priori irrational part is where, in the course of the argument, someone pulls out a dictionary and looks up the definition of “atheism” or “religion”. (And yes, it’s just as silly whether an atheist or religionist does it.) How could a dictionary possibly decide whether an empirical cluster of atheists is really substantially different from an empirical cluster of theologians? How can reality vary with the meaning of a word? The points in thingspace don’t move around when we redraw a boundary.
But people often don’t realize that their argument about where to draw a definitional boundary, is really a dispute over whether to infer a characteristic shared by most things inside an empirical cluster...
That’s very far from a complete answer.
Not every term denotes an empirical object. If you want to find out what an abstraction like “atheism” means you have to look at a definition.
Pure nominaliam doesn’t work. There has to be some metaphysical basis for the ways in which objects have properties and resemblances, even if there is a layer of arbitrary categorisation on top of it.The
“Clusters in thingspace” sounds like an Aristotelean territory-driven theory. “Bleggs” sounds like an arbitrary human made category. So it it not clear which theory he is backing here.
The issue here is not to be addressed by exegesis of Korzybski.
If the issue is what I thinks, what could be better?
I am not clear what the issue even is,
Whether the categories are made by Man or the World.
The Direction of the Map-Territory Arrow, or Who Makes the Categories?
In traditional philosophy, there’s a three way distinction between nominalism , conceptualism and realism. Those are (at least) three different theories intended to explain three sets of issues: the existence of similarities, differences and kinds in the world, the territory; the way concept formation does and should work in humans; and issues to done with truth and meaning, relating the map and territory.
But conceptualism comes in two varieties. So Gaul is divided into four parts.
One the one hand, there is the theory that correct concepts “carve nature at the joints” or “identify clusters in thingspace”, the theory Aristotle and Ayn Rand. On the other hand is the “cookie cutter” theory, the idea that the categories are made by (and for) man, Kant’s “Copernican revolution”.
In the first approach, the world/territory is the determining factor, and the mind/map can do no better than reflect it accurately. In the second approach, the mind makes its own contribution.
Which is not to say that it’s all map, or that the mind is entirely in the driving seat. The idea that there is no territory implies solipsism (other people only exist in the territory, which doesn’t exist) and magic (changing the map changes the territory, or at least, future observations). Even if concepts are human constructions, the territory still has a role, which is determining the truth and validity of concepts. Even if the “horse” concept” is a human construct, it is more real than the “unicorn” concept, because horses can be observed. In cookie cutter terms, the territory supplies the dough, the map supplies the shape.
So Kantianism isn’t a completely idealistic or all-in-the-map philosophy...in Kant’s own terminology it’s empirical realism as well as transcendental idealism. I’s not as idealistic as Hegel’s system, for instance. Similarly, Aristoteleanism isn’t as realistic as Platonism—Plato holds that there aren’t just mind-independent concepts, but they dwell in their own independent realm.
So, although the conceptualisms are different from each other, they are both somewhere in the middle
If the issue is what I thinks, what could be better?
Grappling with the issue, instead of cataloguing the various things that have been said about it by all the philosophers you mentioned. You have spoken of Aristoteleanism, Platonism, Hegel, Kant, Korzybski, and Eliezer. As categories of attribution to authors, they are of the World (each of these people was or is a definite individual), but as categories of ideas about categories, they are of Man, lines of no particular interest.
The answer that seems obvious to me is that some categories carve the world at its joints (chemical elements), some do not (shoe sizes), and some are in between (planet). What questions remain?
So are the categories derived (as per Aristotle and Rand) or imposed (as per Kant and Alexander)?
The only mention of categories I made is a brief aside about category theory, by which I meant the mathematical subject, as a formalisation of the concept of similarity of structure. (I have now edited that link in.) This does not have any connection with the ideas of the philosophers you mentioned.
They are on the diagram.
Ok, I hadn’t noticed that. I think the diagram expresses no position about the question. But Korzybski was very much aware of relativity theory, which awakened the scientific world from Kant’s dogmatic slumber concerning our ideas of space and time.
WWES? What Would Eliezer Say? As I said in the OP, I regard The Sequences as a worthier successor to K’s magnum opus than any revision of the latter could be.
The general Kantian approach doesn’t stand or fall by his specific claims about space and time.
Why should I care? Is he an expert on Korzybski?
AFAICS, the issue is still being debated in the rationalshphere, eg Scott versus Zach, so it wasn’t settled in the sequences.
The issue here is not to be addressed by exegesis of Korzybski. As it happens, Korzybski, through Hayakawa’s popular exposition of his work, was one of many influences on Eliezer’s thinking, but The Sequences themselves stand on their own, to be judged on their own. History of philosophy is all very well, but the evolutionary history of trees has little relevance to the carpenter concerned to frame a barn that will stand up.
I am not clear what the issue even is, or why it (if there is an “it” there) matters.
Did you mean Zack? I recall both Scott and Zack going on and on about categories, for Zack usually in relation to transgender matters, but I was not even aware there was a “versus” between them.
As for Eliezer’s views, this and the entire sequence it comes from seem relevant.
That’s very far from a complete answer.
Not every term denotes an empirical object. If you want to find out what an abstraction like “atheism” means you have to look at a definition.
Pure nominaliam doesn’t work. There has to be some metaphysical basis for the ways in which objects have properties and resemblances, even if there is a layer of arbitrary categorisation on top of it.The
“Clusters in thingspace” sounds like an Aristotelean territory-driven theory. “Bleggs” sounds like an arbitrary human made category. So it it not clear which theory he is backing here.
If the issue is what I thinks, what could be better?
Whether the categories are made by Man or the World.
The Direction of the Map-Territory Arrow, or Who Makes the Categories?
In traditional philosophy, there’s a three way distinction between nominalism , conceptualism and realism. Those are (at least) three different theories intended to explain three sets of issues: the existence of similarities, differences and kinds in the world, the territory; the way concept formation does and should work in humans; and issues to done with truth and meaning, relating the map and territory.
But conceptualism comes in two varieties. So Gaul is divided into four parts.
One the one hand, there is the theory that correct concepts “carve nature at the joints” or “identify clusters in thingspace”, the theory Aristotle and Ayn Rand. On the other hand is the “cookie cutter” theory, the idea that the categories are made by (and for) man, Kant’s “Copernican revolution”.
In the first approach, the world/territory is the determining factor, and the mind/map can do no better than reflect it accurately. In the second approach, the mind makes its own contribution.
Which is not to say that it’s all map, or that the mind is entirely in the driving seat. The idea that there is no territory implies solipsism (other people only exist in the territory, which doesn’t exist) and magic (changing the map changes the territory, or at least, future observations). Even if concepts are human constructions, the territory still has a role, which is determining the truth and validity of concepts. Even if the “horse” concept” is a human construct, it is more real than the “unicorn” concept, because horses can be observed. In cookie cutter terms, the territory supplies the dough, the map supplies the shape.
So Kantianism isn’t a completely idealistic or all-in-the-map philosophy...in Kant’s own terminology it’s empirical realism as well as transcendental idealism. I’s not as idealistic as Hegel’s system, for instance. Similarly, Aristoteleanism isn’t as realistic as Platonism—Plato holds that there aren’t just mind-independent concepts, but they dwell in their own independent realm.
So, although the conceptualisms are different from each other, they are both somewhere in the middle
Grappling with the issue, instead of cataloguing the various things that have been said about it by all the philosophers you mentioned. You have spoken of Aristoteleanism, Platonism, Hegel, Kant, Korzybski, and Eliezer. As categories of attribution to authors, they are of the World (each of these people was or is a definite individual), but as categories of ideas about categories, they are of Man, lines of no particular interest.
The answer that seems obvious to me is that some categories carve the world at its joints (chemical elements), some do not (shoe sizes), and some are in between (planet). What questions remain?