The issue here is not to be addressed by exegesis of Korzybski.
If the issue is what I thinks, what could be better?
I am not clear what the issue even is,
Whether the categories are made by Man or the World.
The Direction of the Map-Territory Arrow, or Who Makes the Categories?
In traditional philosophy, there’s a three way distinction between nominalism , conceptualism and realism. Those are (at least) three different theories intended to explain three sets of issues: the existence of similarities, differences and kinds in the world, the territory; the way concept formation does and should work in humans; and issues to done with truth and meaning, relating the map and territory.
But conceptualism comes in two varieties. So Gaul is divided into four parts.
One the one hand, there is the theory that correct concepts “carve nature at the joints” or “identify clusters in thingspace”, the theory Aristotle and Ayn Rand. On the other hand is the “cookie cutter” theory, the idea that the categories are made by (and for) man, Kant’s “Copernican revolution”.
In the first approach, the world/territory is the determining factor, and the mind/map can do no better than reflect it accurately. In the second approach, the mind makes its own contribution.
Which is not to say that it’s all map, or that the mind is entirely in the driving seat. The idea that there is no territory implies solipsism (other people only exist in the territory, which doesn’t exist) and magic (changing the map changes the territory, or at least, future observations). Even if concepts are human constructions, the territory still has a role, which is determining the truth and validity of concepts. Even if the “horse” concept” is a human construct, it is more real than the “unicorn” concept, because horses can be observed. In cookie cutter terms, the territory supplies the dough, the map supplies the shape.
So Kantianism isn’t a completely idealistic or all-in-the-map philosophy...in Kant’s own terminology it’s empirical realism as well as transcendental idealism. I’s not as idealistic as Hegel’s system, for instance. Similarly, Aristoteleanism isn’t as realistic as Platonism—Plato holds that there aren’t just mind-independent concepts, but they dwell in their own independent realm.
So, although the conceptualisms are different from each other, they are both somewhere in the middle
If the issue is what I thinks, what could be better?
Grappling with the issue, instead of cataloguing the various things that have been said about it by all the philosophers you mentioned. You have spoken of Aristoteleanism, Platonism, Hegel, Kant, Korzybski, and Eliezer. As categories of attribution to authors, they are of the World (each of these people was or is a definite individual), but as categories of ideas about categories, they are of Man, lines of no particular interest.
The answer that seems obvious to me is that some categories carve the world at its joints (chemical elements), some do not (shoe sizes), and some are in between (planet). What questions remain?
If the issue is what I thinks, what could be better?
Whether the categories are made by Man or the World.
The Direction of the Map-Territory Arrow, or Who Makes the Categories?
In traditional philosophy, there’s a three way distinction between nominalism , conceptualism and realism. Those are (at least) three different theories intended to explain three sets of issues: the existence of similarities, differences and kinds in the world, the territory; the way concept formation does and should work in humans; and issues to done with truth and meaning, relating the map and territory.
But conceptualism comes in two varieties. So Gaul is divided into four parts.
One the one hand, there is the theory that correct concepts “carve nature at the joints” or “identify clusters in thingspace”, the theory Aristotle and Ayn Rand. On the other hand is the “cookie cutter” theory, the idea that the categories are made by (and for) man, Kant’s “Copernican revolution”.
In the first approach, the world/territory is the determining factor, and the mind/map can do no better than reflect it accurately. In the second approach, the mind makes its own contribution.
Which is not to say that it’s all map, or that the mind is entirely in the driving seat. The idea that there is no territory implies solipsism (other people only exist in the territory, which doesn’t exist) and magic (changing the map changes the territory, or at least, future observations). Even if concepts are human constructions, the territory still has a role, which is determining the truth and validity of concepts. Even if the “horse” concept” is a human construct, it is more real than the “unicorn” concept, because horses can be observed. In cookie cutter terms, the territory supplies the dough, the map supplies the shape.
So Kantianism isn’t a completely idealistic or all-in-the-map philosophy...in Kant’s own terminology it’s empirical realism as well as transcendental idealism. I’s not as idealistic as Hegel’s system, for instance. Similarly, Aristoteleanism isn’t as realistic as Platonism—Plato holds that there aren’t just mind-independent concepts, but they dwell in their own independent realm.
So, although the conceptualisms are different from each other, they are both somewhere in the middle
Grappling with the issue, instead of cataloguing the various things that have been said about it by all the philosophers you mentioned. You have spoken of Aristoteleanism, Platonism, Hegel, Kant, Korzybski, and Eliezer. As categories of attribution to authors, they are of the World (each of these people was or is a definite individual), but as categories of ideas about categories, they are of Man, lines of no particular interest.
The answer that seems obvious to me is that some categories carve the world at its joints (chemical elements), some do not (shoe sizes), and some are in between (planet). What questions remain?