The position I was presenting was that small good deeds should not be discouraged.
An inefficient small good deed is a negated greater good deed requiring the same effort. In this framing, the “small good deed” is actually a bad deed, and should be discouraged.
An inefficient small good deed is a negated greater good deed requiring the same effort.
False. Time isn’t fungible, and humans demonstrably don’t make decisions that way.
Among other things, when humans are faced with too many alternatives, we usuallly choose “none of the above”… which means that the moment you complicate the question by even considering what those “greater good deeds might be”, you dramatically reduce the probability that anything whatsoever will be accomplished.
False. Time isn’t fungible, and humans demonstrably don’t make decisions that way.
False (at least I reject the incorrect generalization you use to contradict Vladmir). People who do small goods are less inclined to do subsequent goods. Given that the instincts evaluate ‘good’ more or less independently of any achievement fake ‘good deeds’ can prevent subsequent good deeds that make a difference. (This has been demonstrated.)
(Incidentally, Vladimir did not mention time at all.)
He didn’t have to. If time were unlimited, one could do any number of good deeds, and it would literally not matter how many of them you did, you could always do more… and thus there would be no competition between choices of how to use that time.
The assumption that not doing something now lets you do more later is false, however, because the time is already passing—if you choose not to do something now, this doesn’t give you any more time to do it later. Thus, a real thing done now beats an imaginary thing to be done later (which, given human psychology, probably won’t actually be done).
People who do small goods are less inclined to do subsequent goods.
Oh really? What about the FITD effect?
On the other hand, see Doing your good deed for the day (presumably what wedrifid was referring to). Figuring out which effect dominates under which circumstances seems like an important open problem. (My first, simple, guess would be that altruism is depleted in the short term and strengthened in the long term by use, like willpower or muscular strength.)
Figuring out which effect dominates under which circumstances seems like an important open problem. (My first, simple, guess would be that altruism is depleted in the short term and strengthened in the long term by use, like willpower or muscular strength.)
Given evidence for both the FITD effect and the DITF effect, I wonder if both are merely special cases of a broader effect that makes people more likely to accede to a request if they’ve received previous requests from the same source. The low-ball effect would also fit that theory.
Either way, I don’t think those wikipedia pages are very good evidence of anything at all, given that they cite work by only one researcher and do nothing but restate his conclusions with a positive slant. I suspect on those grounds that those pages are the work of a sock-puppet or someone caught in an affective death spiral; even if they’re not, they’re certainly not up to wikipedia’s usual (fairly decent) standard.
He didn’t have to. If time were unlimited, one could do any number of good deeds, and it would literally not matter how many of them you did, you could always do more… and thus there would be no competition between choices of how to use that time.
You’ll note that what he did mention was effort, an entirely different resource, particularly as it applies to humans.
The assumption that not doing something now lets you do more later is false, however, because the time is already passing
This isn’t an assumption of Vladmir’s, it is yours. What we do know is that spending $10 now is $10 that you can not spend later. More importantly given what we know about how humans spend money, $10 you are spending right now on one (completely useless) charity is $10 you are unlikely to spend within this month on an altruistic act that is, in fact, useful.
I guessed wedrifid was referring to this story. There does seem to be some evidence for people feeling that a few virtuous acts give them license to behave badly.
A good example Matt, I hadn’t come across that one specifically but I do know that studies have reliably shown that people who have done one good act feel less obliged to do another one in the short term. This is exactly what we would expect based on signalling needs. I would be rather surprised if pj hadn’t encountered such studies given his chosen occupation.
As for the argument itself: it says nothing more than that the good is bad because it isn’t perfect. That is obviously wrong, because the good is better than nothing. It shouldn’t be discouraged; rather, the better should be (separately) encouraged.
An inefficient small good deed is a negated greater good deed requiring the same effort. In this framing, the “small good deed” is actually a bad deed, and should be discouraged.
False. Time isn’t fungible, and humans demonstrably don’t make decisions that way.
Among other things, when humans are faced with too many alternatives, we usuallly choose “none of the above”… which means that the moment you complicate the question by even considering what those “greater good deeds might be”, you dramatically reduce the probability that anything whatsoever will be accomplished.
False (at least I reject the incorrect generalization you use to contradict Vladmir). People who do small goods are less inclined to do subsequent goods. Given that the instincts evaluate ‘good’ more or less independently of any achievement fake ‘good deeds’ can prevent subsequent good deeds that make a difference. (This has been demonstrated.)
(Incidentally, Vladimir did not mention time at all.)
Oh really? What about the FITD effect?
He didn’t have to. If time were unlimited, one could do any number of good deeds, and it would literally not matter how many of them you did, you could always do more… and thus there would be no competition between choices of how to use that time.
The assumption that not doing something now lets you do more later is false, however, because the time is already passing—if you choose not to do something now, this doesn’t give you any more time to do it later. Thus, a real thing done now beats an imaginary thing to be done later (which, given human psychology, probably won’t actually be done).
On the other hand, see Doing your good deed for the day (presumably what wedrifid was referring to). Figuring out which effect dominates under which circumstances seems like an important open problem. (My first, simple, guess would be that altruism is depleted in the short term and strengthened in the long term by use, like willpower or muscular strength.)
That is my guess too.
Given evidence for both the FITD effect and the DITF effect, I wonder if both are merely special cases of a broader effect that makes people more likely to accede to a request if they’ve received previous requests from the same source. The low-ball effect would also fit that theory.
Either way, I don’t think those wikipedia pages are very good evidence of anything at all, given that they cite work by only one researcher and do nothing but restate his conclusions with a positive slant. I suspect on those grounds that those pages are the work of a sock-puppet or someone caught in an affective death spiral; even if they’re not, they’re certainly not up to wikipedia’s usual (fairly decent) standard.
You’ll note that what he did mention was effort, an entirely different resource, particularly as it applies to humans.
This isn’t an assumption of Vladmir’s, it is yours. What we do know is that spending $10 now is $10 that you can not spend later. More importantly given what we know about how humans spend money, $10 you are spending right now on one (completely useless) charity is $10 you are unlikely to spend within this month on an altruistic act that is, in fact, useful.
I guessed wedrifid was referring to this story. There does seem to be some evidence for people feeling that a few virtuous acts give them license to behave badly.
A good example Matt, I hadn’t come across that one specifically but I do know that studies have reliably shown that people who have done one good act feel less obliged to do another one in the short term. This is exactly what we would expect based on signalling needs. I would be rather surprised if pj hadn’t encountered such studies given his chosen occupation.
That was apparently not the argument that wedrifid was making after all.
As for the argument itself: it says nothing more than that the good is bad because it isn’t perfect. That is obviously wrong, because the good is better than nothing. It shouldn’t be discouraged; rather, the better should be (separately) encouraged.
Again, see this post.