coming back to this: I claim that when we become able to unify the attempted definitions, it will become clear that consciousness is a common, easily-achieved-by-accident information dynamics phenomenon, but that agency, while achievable in software, is not easily achieved by accident.
some definition attempts that I don’t feel hold up to scrutiny right now, but which appear to me to be low scientific quality sketches which resemble what I think the question will resolve to later:
“it boils down to, individual parts of the universe exist, consciousness is when they have mutual information” or so. you’re a big mind knowing about itself, but any system having predictive power on another system for justified reasons is real consciousness.
coming back to this: I claim that when we become able to unify the attempted definitions,
Will we? I don’t see why that is a given. A word can mean multiple things that just aren’t the same, and aren’t reliable. Calling a bunch of differerent things by the same word is a map feature (or rather, bug).
it will become clear that consciousness is a common, easily-achieved-by-accident
How do you test that you have achieved it by accident? One of the things consciousness means is qualia, and we don’t have qualiometers.
some definition attempts that I don’t feel hold up to scrutiny right now,
the one zahima linked is top of the list
The definition Zahima offers:
The meaning of consciousness discussed here is subjective internal experience, or the quality of there being “something that it is like to be something”.
...is quite normal. I suspect you are obecting to the *explanation*.
this one which has terrible epistemic quality and argues some things that are physically nonsensical, but which nevertheless is a reasonable high temperature attempt to define it in full generality imo
Again a theory , not a defintiion.
“it boils down to, individual parts of the universe exist, consciousness is when they have mutual information” or so. you’re a big mind knowing about itself, but any system having predictive power on another system for justified reasons is real consciousness.
How could you have rivalrous theories of the same thing , if the thing is definitely differently according to the theory, ie. Is nir a single thing , but only a single word?
coming back to this: I claim that when we become able to unify the attempted definitions, it will become clear that consciousness is a common, easily-achieved-by-accident information dynamics phenomenon, but that agency, while achievable in software, is not easily achieved by accident.
some definition attempts that I don’t feel hold up to scrutiny right now, but which appear to me to be low scientific quality sketches which resemble what I think the question will resolve to later:
the one zahima linked is top of the list
this one which has terrible epistemic quality and argues some things that are physically nonsensical, but which nevertheless is a reasonable high temperature attempt to define it in full generality imo
“it boils down to, individual parts of the universe exist, consciousness is when they have mutual information” or so. you’re a big mind knowing about itself, but any system having predictive power on another system for justified reasons is real consciousness.
Will we? I don’t see why that is a given. A word can mean multiple things that just aren’t the same, and aren’t reliable. Calling a bunch of differerent things by the same word is a map feature (or rather, bug).
How do you test that you have achieved it by accident? One of the things consciousness means is qualia, and we don’t have qualiometers.
The definition Zahima offers:
...is quite normal. I suspect you are obecting to the *explanation*.
Again a theory , not a defintiion.
Ditto.
a definition is an assertion that a name refers to a theory, is it not?
How could you have rivalrous theories of the same thing , if the thing is definitely differently according to the theory, ie. Is nir a single thing , but only a single word?