I don’t want to defend the Copenhagen interpretation, still I’d point out that Eliezer’s arguments are purely aesthetic rather than rational.
E.g. faster than light exchange may be required for state-collapse view, but it will always happen in a restricted way that does not allow for real faster than light communication or violation of causality. It may be ugly for you, but it does not mean it makes any difference mathematically.
If there would be a single objective mathematical problem with the Copenhagen interpretation that really requires MWI, then MWI would be undisputed by physicists by now (rather than just favored, as is the case now).
However, Eliezer (or rather Everett) has a strong philosophical case: So far in the history of science, more beautiful theories tended to be more correct as well.
This comment is moving us in the right direction. From an epistemic standpoint all a theory is is a function of some set of observation sentences (propositions about our own sensory experiences) to another set of observation sentences. This debate is merely about the best way to describe the function labeled “quantum mechanics” which takes observations about certain experimental circumstances as a domain and observations about certain experimental outcomes as a range. There are very likely an infinite number of cognitive expressions of this function.
Our problem is that there is no consensus on a Method of Theoretical Interpretation. It is relatively easy to pick the better of two theories when we have inductive evidence distinguishing them. But there is a lot of confusion about how to choose between functionally identical expressions of a theory. We have a number of candidates for criteria but those criteria have yet to be satisfactorily explicated and the relations between the criteria and the relative importance of each remain wholly undefined. Parsimony, Generality, Verifiability, Falsifiability, “cognitive intuitivity” (a human’s ability to grasp the theory), pragmatic usability etc. are all things various parties want taken into account.
In some debates over theory interpretation one interpretation might win according to all these criteria and the debate will end. But when the outcome is less straightforward it isn’t clear to me what the best way forward is. The argument in favor of MWI seems to be that it is better than single-world interpretations on grounds of parsimony and generality. This seems right to me, though I think this conclusion depends on a particular understanding of these criteria which might not be universally agreed upon (i.e. why doesn’t positing the existence of lot of worlds we can’t have causal connections to count as multiplying entities?). On the other hand, it still might be the case that something like the Copenhagen interpretation is easier to comprehend and yields more fruitful theorizing. Until a particular interpretation has been determined to be definitively better than the rest or until a General Method of Theoretical Interpretation is agreed to the best option seems to be interpretive pluralism.
However, Eliezer (or rather Everett) has a strong philosophical case: So far in the history of science, more beautiful theories tended to be more correct as well.
If this is true, why doesn’t this count as straight-forward induction? It certainly looks like induction and if it is, why is this a philosophical rather than scientific case? Also, if we think CI and MWI make the same predictions what does it mean to say “tended to be more correct”? Doesn’t that require experimental evidence falsifying one of the interpretations at a later date?
If this is true, why doesn’t this count as straight-forward induction? It certainly looks like induction and if it is, why is this a philosophical rather than scientific case? Also, if we think CI and MWI make the same predictions what does it mean to say “tended to be more correct”? Doesn’t that require experimental evidence falsifying one of the interpretations at a later date?
It is not scientific induction, since you can’t measure elegance quantitatively. However scientists have subjective intuition based on the successes and failures of past other physical theories. This is what I meant by “philosophical edge”.
Doesn’t elegance reduce to how elegant scientists feel the theory is? Can’t we quantify the opinions of scientists regarding how elegant some theory is? Or if elegance isn’t reduce-able that way then isn’t the correlation between correctness and elegance really a correlation between correctness and perceived elegance anyway?
What do you mean by subjective intuition? Are you distinguishing it from objective intuition?
I feel like I’m coming off like that jackass Socrates, but everyone seems to be taking loaded, technical terms for granted and applying them sloppily.
Sorry, I just tried to emphasize the subjective nature of intuition.
You can quantify the opinions of scientists to measure elegance, but I don’t think it’s a good idea: It would just further enforce groupthink at the expense of originality, IMO.
So far in the history of science, more beautiful theories tended to be more correct as well.
Theories are for a big part about insight, are tools for looking at the world, and simplicity is a major factor for their usability. What gets selected by usability doesn’t necessarily give a good picture of truth.
Come on, you don’t seriously believe that in physics simplicity always wins over correctness?
If you look at physicists, they work in both directions:
Make better approximations
Develop more complete theories
And physicists clearly distinguish between the above two.
Would you seriously believe that e.g. Kepler’s model of planetary orbits survived rather than that of Ptolemy just because his was simpler or because it was closer to truth?
Nothing wins over (the necessary extent of) correctness, but what wins within correctness is simple not because simplicity is necessary for correctness, but because it’s easier to work with (and often easier to find too).
There is a good rational reason why simpler theories are more probably true: they are less probably tuned for the already existing evidence.
For example: Even if Ptolemy’s circles made predictions that were equally predictive within that era’s achievable precision of measurement. Those circles were tailored for that specific situation. Even if Kepler’s law was quite ad hoc, Its simplicity could indicate that it had more substance, since it was not tuned to the given evidence in such a cumbersome way.
Special relativity, winning over the add-hoc rules of time dilation and length/mass transformations that were known beforehand (and essentially predicted the same thing).
Special relativity is an example of an equally correct theory winning over an earlier, somewhat entrenched theory, but I’m not sure how it won. When it first appeared, many people declared it obvious, some claiming that this was good, some bad. It was still unpopular when Einstein won the Nobel prize. One possibility is that it won because of his eminence, eg, because of the photo-electric effect, which is an extremely poor reason. The obvious answer is that it won because of GR. I guess that probably constitutes an example of winning because of usability.
I’m a little concerned about how we draw lines between theories, but I suppose that would apply to any answer to the question.
Saying that relativity is “the best theory” is not very different from saying that it won. Stuart says that it won because it was simpler than Lorentz contractions. It was not widely believed to be the best theory in 1915. What happened between then and now? Was it obviously better and the old guard just had to die? Or did something else that happened, like the Nobel or GR change people’s minds?
I’m not sure that Lorentz’s transformations were more ad hoc than Einstein’s, though Minkowski’s were a definite improvement. If Einstein’s principle lead to Minkowski’s work, that’s good, and meets Vladimir’s usability criterion; and probably counts as simplicity.
Lorentz contractions are special relativity. My understanding was that Einstein’s great role was unifying and putting under one roof the various add-hoc results.
While I fundamentally disagree with your claims I don’t object to you making them. I do note that the validity of Eliezer’s argument is not something that I’m claiming here. There are plenty of other comments (including others of mine) where this would be a more relevant reply.
I’d be really curious which specific claim don’t you agree with.
This is one of those times where ‘agreeing to disagree’ would save some frustration, but here is a list.
Eliezer’s arguments are purely aesthetic rather than rational.
If Eliezer’s claims are wrong his position is irrational, not merely an aesthetic preference. The “MW is more aesthetic” is a common position (as well as a politically appealing one) but Eliezer has made arguments that are quite clearly not aesthetic in nature.
E.g. faster than light exchange may be required for state-collapse view, but it will always happen in a restricted way that does not allow for real faster than light communication or violation of causality. It may be ugly for you, but it does not mean it makes any difference mathematically.
Is that what the dragon in your garage told you?
If there would be a single objective mathematical problem with the Copenhagen interpretation that really requires MWI, then MWI would be undisputed by physicists by now (rather than just favored, as is the case now).
I’d be surprised. I’d expect to have to wait till a generation (at least) died off or retired for that to occur on something that so violates entrenched intuitions. Even more so once a teaching tradition forms.
I also disagree with the embedded claim supported by the appeal to authority. I suspect our disagreement there could be traced to what we consider qualifies as ‘objective’.
Thanks for the reply. I found it much more interesting than frustrating.
I also have to admit that I generally tend to believe scientific authority on scientific matters, at least in mathematics and natural sciences. Could be a defect of mine.
OTOH, In my reading, Eliezer never argued that there is a clear mathematical flaw in the classical theory of QM. (besides the ugly and ad hoc nature of the state reduction, which still does not make the theory mathematically unsound).
I also have to admit that I generally tend to believe scientific authority on scientific matters, at least in mathematics and natural sciences. Could be a defect of mine.
No implication of fallacious appeal intended. Just a reference to the claim that you didn’t literally make.
I also rely on scientific expertise in scientific matters but have a different prediction on what it would take for new information on significant topics to become undisputed. It is possible that we also select scientific authorities in different manner. I tend to actively discount for the contributions of social dominance to scientific authority when I’m selecting expert opinions where there is disagreement.
OTOH, In my reading, Eliezer never argued that there is a clear mathematical flaw in the classical theory of QM. (besides the ugly and ad hoc nature of the state reduction, which still does not make the theory mathematically unsound).
I like the idea of de-emphasising distracting labels such as ‘Many Worlds’ and just sticking with the math and calling it QM. There are the (Born, etc.) equations behind quantum mechanics with which we can make our predictions and that’s that.
I assert that adding a claim such as ‘most of the information in the function is removed in way that allows the math to still work’ is an objective scientific mistake that is not merely aesthetic. I think you disagree with me there. Similar reasoning would also claim that including a mathematically irrelevant garage dragon in a theory makes it objectively unsound science. Likewise on ‘there gazillions of fairies who hack the quantum state constantly to make it follow Born predictions’.
I assert that adding a claim such as ‘most of the information in the function is removed in way that allows the math to still work’ is an objective scientific mistake that is not merely aesthetic. I think you disagree with me there.
My positivist personality disagrees, my Platonic personality agrees with you.
I would even go as far as saying that the ad-hoc state-reduction performed at seemingly arbitrary points is clearly a technical (not just philosophical) defect of the classical view.
On the other hand, the incompleteness of the MW description (not accounting for Born probabilities) is an even more serious practical issue (for the time being): it does not allow us to make any quantitative predictions. If we inject the Born “fairies”, back to the theory then we will arrive at the same problem as the classical formalism.
So I’d agree to some extent with the OP, that the most probable future resolution of the problem will be some brand new even more elegant math which will be more satisfactory than any of the above two options.
More details on just how those born probabilities work is the area of physics I would most like answers on. It could greatly clarify the foundations of my utility function!
I don’t want to defend the Copenhagen interpretation, still I’d point out that Eliezer’s arguments are purely aesthetic rather than rational.
E.g. faster than light exchange may be required for state-collapse view, but it will always happen in a restricted way that does not allow for real faster than light communication or violation of causality. It may be ugly for you, but it does not mean it makes any difference mathematically.
If there would be a single objective mathematical problem with the Copenhagen interpretation that really requires MWI, then MWI would be undisputed by physicists by now (rather than just favored, as is the case now).
However, Eliezer (or rather Everett) has a strong philosophical case: So far in the history of science, more beautiful theories tended to be more correct as well.
This comment is moving us in the right direction. From an epistemic standpoint all a theory is is a function of some set of observation sentences (propositions about our own sensory experiences) to another set of observation sentences. This debate is merely about the best way to describe the function labeled “quantum mechanics” which takes observations about certain experimental circumstances as a domain and observations about certain experimental outcomes as a range. There are very likely an infinite number of cognitive expressions of this function.
Our problem is that there is no consensus on a Method of Theoretical Interpretation. It is relatively easy to pick the better of two theories when we have inductive evidence distinguishing them. But there is a lot of confusion about how to choose between functionally identical expressions of a theory. We have a number of candidates for criteria but those criteria have yet to be satisfactorily explicated and the relations between the criteria and the relative importance of each remain wholly undefined. Parsimony, Generality, Verifiability, Falsifiability, “cognitive intuitivity” (a human’s ability to grasp the theory), pragmatic usability etc. are all things various parties want taken into account.
In some debates over theory interpretation one interpretation might win according to all these criteria and the debate will end. But when the outcome is less straightforward it isn’t clear to me what the best way forward is. The argument in favor of MWI seems to be that it is better than single-world interpretations on grounds of parsimony and generality. This seems right to me, though I think this conclusion depends on a particular understanding of these criteria which might not be universally agreed upon (i.e. why doesn’t positing the existence of lot of worlds we can’t have causal connections to count as multiplying entities?). On the other hand, it still might be the case that something like the Copenhagen interpretation is easier to comprehend and yields more fruitful theorizing. Until a particular interpretation has been determined to be definitively better than the rest or until a General Method of Theoretical Interpretation is agreed to the best option seems to be interpretive pluralism.
If this is true, why doesn’t this count as straight-forward induction? It certainly looks like induction and if it is, why is this a philosophical rather than scientific case? Also, if we think CI and MWI make the same predictions what does it mean to say “tended to be more correct”? Doesn’t that require experimental evidence falsifying one of the interpretations at a later date?
It is not scientific induction, since you can’t measure elegance quantitatively. However scientists have subjective intuition based on the successes and failures of past other physical theories. This is what I meant by “philosophical edge”.
You can formally via Kolmogorov complexity.
Doesn’t elegance reduce to how elegant scientists feel the theory is? Can’t we quantify the opinions of scientists regarding how elegant some theory is? Or if elegance isn’t reduce-able that way then isn’t the correlation between correctness and elegance really a correlation between correctness and perceived elegance anyway?
What do you mean by subjective intuition? Are you distinguishing it from objective intuition?
I feel like I’m coming off like that jackass Socrates, but everyone seems to be taking loaded, technical terms for granted and applying them sloppily.
Sorry, I just tried to emphasize the subjective nature of intuition.
You can quantify the opinions of scientists to measure elegance, but I don’t think it’s a good idea: It would just further enforce groupthink at the expense of originality, IMO.
Theories are for a big part about insight, are tools for looking at the world, and simplicity is a major factor for their usability. What gets selected by usability doesn’t necessarily give a good picture of truth.
Come on, you don’t seriously believe that in physics simplicity always wins over correctness?
If you look at physicists, they work in both directions:
Make better approximations
Develop more complete theories
And physicists clearly distinguish between the above two.
Would you seriously believe that e.g. Kepler’s model of planetary orbits survived rather than that of Ptolemy just because his was simpler or because it was closer to truth?
Nothing wins over (the necessary extent of) correctness, but what wins within correctness is simple not because simplicity is necessary for correctness, but because it’s easier to work with (and often easier to find too).
There is a good rational reason why simpler theories are more probably true: they are less probably tuned for the already existing evidence.
For example: Even if Ptolemy’s circles made predictions that were equally predictive within that era’s achievable precision of measurement. Those circles were tailored for that specific situation. Even if Kepler’s law was quite ad hoc, Its simplicity could indicate that it had more substance, since it was not tuned to the given evidence in such a cumbersome way.
Could you give an example of something simple that won over something equally correct, because it was easier to work with or find?
Special relativity, winning over the add-hoc rules of time dilation and length/mass transformations that were known beforehand (and essentially predicted the same thing).
Special relativity is an example of an equally correct theory winning over an earlier, somewhat entrenched theory, but I’m not sure how it won. When it first appeared, many people declared it obvious, some claiming that this was good, some bad. It was still unpopular when Einstein won the Nobel prize. One possibility is that it won because of his eminence, eg, because of the photo-electric effect, which is an extremely poor reason. The obvious answer is that it won because of GR. I guess that probably constitutes an example of winning because of usability.
I’m a little concerned about how we draw lines between theories, but I suppose that would apply to any answer to the question.
It was the best theory to explain the results of the Michaelson-Morley experiments.
Saying that relativity is “the best theory” is not very different from saying that it won. Stuart says that it won because it was simpler than Lorentz contractions. It was not widely believed to be the best theory in 1915. What happened between then and now? Was it obviously better and the old guard just had to die? Or did something else that happened, like the Nobel or GR change people’s minds?
I’m not sure that Lorentz’s transformations were more ad hoc than Einstein’s, though Minkowski’s were a definite improvement. If Einstein’s principle lead to Minkowski’s work, that’s good, and meets Vladimir’s usability criterion; and probably counts as simplicity.
Lorentz contractions are special relativity. My understanding was that Einstein’s great role was unifying and putting under one roof the various add-hoc results.
While I fundamentally disagree with your claims I don’t object to you making them. I do note that the validity of Eliezer’s argument is not something that I’m claiming here. There are plenty of other comments (including others of mine) where this would be a more relevant reply.
My reply was mostly triggered by this sentence;
However, I’d be really curious which specific claim don’t you agree with.
This is one of those times where ‘agreeing to disagree’ would save some frustration, but here is a list.
If Eliezer’s claims are wrong his position is irrational, not merely an aesthetic preference. The “MW is more aesthetic” is a common position (as well as a politically appealing one) but Eliezer has made arguments that are quite clearly not aesthetic in nature.
Is that what the dragon in your garage told you?
I’d be surprised. I’d expect to have to wait till a generation (at least) died off or retired for that to occur on something that so violates entrenched intuitions. Even more so once a teaching tradition forms.
I also disagree with the embedded claim supported by the appeal to authority. I suspect our disagreement there could be traced to what we consider qualifies as ‘objective’.
Thanks for the reply. I found it much more interesting than frustrating.
I also have to admit that I generally tend to believe scientific authority on scientific matters, at least in mathematics and natural sciences. Could be a defect of mine.
OTOH, In my reading, Eliezer never argued that there is a clear mathematical flaw in the classical theory of QM. (besides the ugly and ad hoc nature of the state reduction, which still does not make the theory mathematically unsound).
No implication of fallacious appeal intended. Just a reference to the claim that you didn’t literally make.
I also rely on scientific expertise in scientific matters but have a different prediction on what it would take for new information on significant topics to become undisputed. It is possible that we also select scientific authorities in different manner. I tend to actively discount for the contributions of social dominance to scientific authority when I’m selecting expert opinions where there is disagreement.
I like the idea of de-emphasising distracting labels such as ‘Many Worlds’ and just sticking with the math and calling it QM. There are the (Born, etc.) equations behind quantum mechanics with which we can make our predictions and that’s that.
I assert that adding a claim such as ‘most of the information in the function is removed in way that allows the math to still work’ is an objective scientific mistake that is not merely aesthetic. I think you disagree with me there. Similar reasoning would also claim that including a mathematically irrelevant garage dragon in a theory makes it objectively unsound science. Likewise on ‘there gazillions of fairies who hack the quantum state constantly to make it follow Born predictions’.
My positivist personality disagrees, my Platonic personality agrees with you.
I would even go as far as saying that the ad-hoc state-reduction performed at seemingly arbitrary points is clearly a technical (not just philosophical) defect of the classical view.
On the other hand, the incompleteness of the MW description (not accounting for Born probabilities) is an even more serious practical issue (for the time being): it does not allow us to make any quantitative predictions. If we inject the Born “fairies”, back to the theory then we will arrive at the same problem as the classical formalism.
So I’d agree to some extent with the OP, that the most probable future resolution of the problem will be some brand new even more elegant math which will be more satisfactory than any of the above two options.
More details on just how those born probabilities work is the area of physics I would most like answers on. It could greatly clarify the foundations of my utility function!
(PS: Downvote of parent not by me.)