This comment is moving us in the right direction. From an epistemic standpoint all a theory is is a function of some set of observation sentences (propositions about our own sensory experiences) to another set of observation sentences. This debate is merely about the best way to describe the function labeled “quantum mechanics” which takes observations about certain experimental circumstances as a domain and observations about certain experimental outcomes as a range. There are very likely an infinite number of cognitive expressions of this function.
Our problem is that there is no consensus on a Method of Theoretical Interpretation. It is relatively easy to pick the better of two theories when we have inductive evidence distinguishing them. But there is a lot of confusion about how to choose between functionally identical expressions of a theory. We have a number of candidates for criteria but those criteria have yet to be satisfactorily explicated and the relations between the criteria and the relative importance of each remain wholly undefined. Parsimony, Generality, Verifiability, Falsifiability, “cognitive intuitivity” (a human’s ability to grasp the theory), pragmatic usability etc. are all things various parties want taken into account.
In some debates over theory interpretation one interpretation might win according to all these criteria and the debate will end. But when the outcome is less straightforward it isn’t clear to me what the best way forward is. The argument in favor of MWI seems to be that it is better than single-world interpretations on grounds of parsimony and generality. This seems right to me, though I think this conclusion depends on a particular understanding of these criteria which might not be universally agreed upon (i.e. why doesn’t positing the existence of lot of worlds we can’t have causal connections to count as multiplying entities?). On the other hand, it still might be the case that something like the Copenhagen interpretation is easier to comprehend and yields more fruitful theorizing. Until a particular interpretation has been determined to be definitively better than the rest or until a General Method of Theoretical Interpretation is agreed to the best option seems to be interpretive pluralism.
However, Eliezer (or rather Everett) has a strong philosophical case: So far in the history of science, more beautiful theories tended to be more correct as well.
If this is true, why doesn’t this count as straight-forward induction? It certainly looks like induction and if it is, why is this a philosophical rather than scientific case? Also, if we think CI and MWI make the same predictions what does it mean to say “tended to be more correct”? Doesn’t that require experimental evidence falsifying one of the interpretations at a later date?
If this is true, why doesn’t this count as straight-forward induction? It certainly looks like induction and if it is, why is this a philosophical rather than scientific case? Also, if we think CI and MWI make the same predictions what does it mean to say “tended to be more correct”? Doesn’t that require experimental evidence falsifying one of the interpretations at a later date?
It is not scientific induction, since you can’t measure elegance quantitatively. However scientists have subjective intuition based on the successes and failures of past other physical theories. This is what I meant by “philosophical edge”.
Doesn’t elegance reduce to how elegant scientists feel the theory is? Can’t we quantify the opinions of scientists regarding how elegant some theory is? Or if elegance isn’t reduce-able that way then isn’t the correlation between correctness and elegance really a correlation between correctness and perceived elegance anyway?
What do you mean by subjective intuition? Are you distinguishing it from objective intuition?
I feel like I’m coming off like that jackass Socrates, but everyone seems to be taking loaded, technical terms for granted and applying them sloppily.
Sorry, I just tried to emphasize the subjective nature of intuition.
You can quantify the opinions of scientists to measure elegance, but I don’t think it’s a good idea: It would just further enforce groupthink at the expense of originality, IMO.
This comment is moving us in the right direction. From an epistemic standpoint all a theory is is a function of some set of observation sentences (propositions about our own sensory experiences) to another set of observation sentences. This debate is merely about the best way to describe the function labeled “quantum mechanics” which takes observations about certain experimental circumstances as a domain and observations about certain experimental outcomes as a range. There are very likely an infinite number of cognitive expressions of this function.
Our problem is that there is no consensus on a Method of Theoretical Interpretation. It is relatively easy to pick the better of two theories when we have inductive evidence distinguishing them. But there is a lot of confusion about how to choose between functionally identical expressions of a theory. We have a number of candidates for criteria but those criteria have yet to be satisfactorily explicated and the relations between the criteria and the relative importance of each remain wholly undefined. Parsimony, Generality, Verifiability, Falsifiability, “cognitive intuitivity” (a human’s ability to grasp the theory), pragmatic usability etc. are all things various parties want taken into account.
In some debates over theory interpretation one interpretation might win according to all these criteria and the debate will end. But when the outcome is less straightforward it isn’t clear to me what the best way forward is. The argument in favor of MWI seems to be that it is better than single-world interpretations on grounds of parsimony and generality. This seems right to me, though I think this conclusion depends on a particular understanding of these criteria which might not be universally agreed upon (i.e. why doesn’t positing the existence of lot of worlds we can’t have causal connections to count as multiplying entities?). On the other hand, it still might be the case that something like the Copenhagen interpretation is easier to comprehend and yields more fruitful theorizing. Until a particular interpretation has been determined to be definitively better than the rest or until a General Method of Theoretical Interpretation is agreed to the best option seems to be interpretive pluralism.
If this is true, why doesn’t this count as straight-forward induction? It certainly looks like induction and if it is, why is this a philosophical rather than scientific case? Also, if we think CI and MWI make the same predictions what does it mean to say “tended to be more correct”? Doesn’t that require experimental evidence falsifying one of the interpretations at a later date?
It is not scientific induction, since you can’t measure elegance quantitatively. However scientists have subjective intuition based on the successes and failures of past other physical theories. This is what I meant by “philosophical edge”.
You can formally via Kolmogorov complexity.
Doesn’t elegance reduce to how elegant scientists feel the theory is? Can’t we quantify the opinions of scientists regarding how elegant some theory is? Or if elegance isn’t reduce-able that way then isn’t the correlation between correctness and elegance really a correlation between correctness and perceived elegance anyway?
What do you mean by subjective intuition? Are you distinguishing it from objective intuition?
I feel like I’m coming off like that jackass Socrates, but everyone seems to be taking loaded, technical terms for granted and applying them sloppily.
Sorry, I just tried to emphasize the subjective nature of intuition.
You can quantify the opinions of scientists to measure elegance, but I don’t think it’s a good idea: It would just further enforce groupthink at the expense of originality, IMO.