Is the idea that the Zen master has preferences, but does not experience the frustration[1] of those preferences as (emotionally) frustrating?
I believe this is in fact the deal here. I think this is the sort of thing in eastern philosophy (and I guess Stoicism too?) that are famously hard to grok.
(I do think we can delve into the details here and find something that legibly makes sense. In the past I’ve found it difficult to have this sort of conversation with you, because you seem to start with such a high prior that “it’s just nonsense that we’re confused about” as opposed to an outlook you don’t yet understand, that getting to the useful bits of the conversation doesn’t feel very rewarding.)
I’m willing to have this conversation, of course, but in this particular case I think it might actually be a moot point.
I’m entirely willing to accept, for the sake of argument, that such “zen masters” as described in this subthread (which, as we’re tentatively assuming, is the sort of thing Jacob had in mind) do indeed exist. Well, then wouldn’t describing such an individual as “not an angry person” be correct? (Incomplete, perhaps; imprecise, maybe; but basically on-target—yes?)
I mean, the original point was that the idea of the FAE / correspondence bias was missing something, that it didn’t capture the point Jacob made in this comment. This objection only makes sense, however, if “whether one does, or does not, have bad days” is not—unlike “is an angry person or not”—a dispositional property of the individual, but is instead something else (like what?—well, that was my question…).
But if the “zen masters” whom we’ve described in this subthread “don’t have bad days” precisely because they’re a certain sort of person. So Jacob’s objection doesn’t make sense after all.
In other words, by bringing up the “zen master” example, Jacob seems to be arguing (contra this comment) for an (at least partly) dispositional view of behavior after all—something like: “Alice kicked the vending machine because she experienced a series of misfortunes today and isn’t a zen master [and thus we may describe her as having ‘had a bad day’] and is an angry person; Bob didn’t kick the vending machine, despite having experienced a series of misfortunes today and also not being a zen master [and thus also having had what may be described as ‘a bad day’] because he isn’t an angry person; Carol didn’t kick the vending machine despite experiencing a series of misfortunes today because she is a zen master [and thus has not had anything which we may describe as ‘a bad day’]; Dave didn’t kick the vending machine because he has no reason to do so.”
What this doesn’t seem like, however, is any sort of move beyond a situational account of behavior, toward something which is neither situational nor dispositional. That is what was implied, but no such thing is in evidence.
(Of course, it’s entirely possible I’ve misunderstood or mischaracterized something at some point in my account.)
What this doesn’t seem like, however, is any sort of move beyond a situational account of behavior, toward something which is neither situational nor dispositional.
Do accounts that are neither situational nor dispositional exist? What would that even look like?
I don’t see where Jacob promised such an account. I do see where he explains to you, that FAE is not a wrong explanation, but he finds his own more accurate.
It seems to me, from the third-person view, that the disagreements in this comment thread are quite simple, and you might be overreacting to them.
I believe this is in fact the deal here. I think this is the sort of thing in eastern philosophy (and I guess Stoicism too?) that are famously hard to grok.
(I do think we can delve into the details here and find something that legibly makes sense. In the past I’ve found it difficult to have this sort of conversation with you, because you seem to start with such a high prior that “it’s just nonsense that we’re confused about” as opposed to an outlook you don’t yet understand, that getting to the useful bits of the conversation doesn’t feel very rewarding.)
I’m willing to have this conversation, of course, but in this particular case I think it might actually be a moot point.
I’m entirely willing to accept, for the sake of argument, that such “zen masters” as described in this subthread (which, as we’re tentatively assuming, is the sort of thing Jacob had in mind) do indeed exist. Well, then wouldn’t describing such an individual as “not an angry person” be correct? (Incomplete, perhaps; imprecise, maybe; but basically on-target—yes?)
I mean, the original point was that the idea of the FAE / correspondence bias was missing something, that it didn’t capture the point Jacob made in this comment. This objection only makes sense, however, if “whether one does, or does not, have bad days” is not—unlike “is an angry person or not”—a dispositional property of the individual, but is instead something else (like what?—well, that was my question…).
But if the “zen masters” whom we’ve described in this subthread “don’t have bad days” precisely because they’re a certain sort of person. So Jacob’s objection doesn’t make sense after all.
In other words, by bringing up the “zen master” example, Jacob seems to be arguing (contra this comment) for an (at least partly) dispositional view of behavior after all—something like: “Alice kicked the vending machine because she experienced a series of misfortunes today and isn’t a zen master [and thus we may describe her as having ‘had a bad day’] and is an angry person; Bob didn’t kick the vending machine, despite having experienced a series of misfortunes today and also not being a zen master [and thus also having had what may be described as ‘a bad day’] because he isn’t an angry person; Carol didn’t kick the vending machine despite experiencing a series of misfortunes today because she is a zen master [and thus has not had anything which we may describe as ‘a bad day’]; Dave didn’t kick the vending machine because he has no reason to do so.”
What this doesn’t seem like, however, is any sort of move beyond a situational account of behavior, toward something which is neither situational nor dispositional. That is what was implied, but no such thing is in evidence.
(Of course, it’s entirely possible I’ve misunderstood or mischaracterized something at some point in my account.)
Do accounts that are neither situational nor dispositional exist? What would that even look like?
I don’t see where Jacob promised such an account. I do see where he explains to you, that FAE is not a wrong explanation, but he finds his own more accurate.
It seems to me, from the third-person view, that the disagreements in this comment thread are quite simple, and you might be overreacting to them.