Fortunately, the evolutionary iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma where the agents mutate can completely avoid entering the Molochian regime. I have prepared a post draft which I shared with the OP’s author.
Thanks for the comment and for sharing your drafts—feel free to DM regarding possible collaboration. I agree: there are number of ways in which the Molochian regime can be avoided in evolutionary models, including memory of past games (iterated prisoner’s dilemma) and introducing spatial structure. And one of the benefits of seeing Moloch in these terms is that these models of the ‘evolution of cooperation’ become applicable to issues associated with Moloch like AI governance. I was planning to cover this in later posts in the sequence :)
Fortunately, the evolutionary iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma where the agents mutate can completely avoid entering the Molochian regime. I have prepared a post draft which I shared with the OP’s author.
Thanks for the comment and for sharing your drafts—feel free to DM regarding possible collaboration. I agree: there are number of ways in which the Molochian regime can be avoided in evolutionary models, including memory of past games (iterated prisoner’s dilemma) and introducing spatial structure. And one of the benefits of seeing Moloch in these terms is that these models of the ‘evolution of cooperation’ become applicable to issues associated with Moloch like AI governance. I was planning to cover this in later posts in the sequence :)