I want to bring up sequence thinking and cluster thinking, which I think are useful in understanding the disagreement here. As I understand it, Duncan argues that sequence thinking is more common than cluster thinking, and you’re arguing the converse.
I think most beliefs can be put in either a cluster-thinking or a sequence-thinking framework. However, I think that (while both are important and useful) cluster thinking is generally more useful for coming up with final conclusions. For that reason, I’m suspicious of double crux, because I’m worried that it will cause people to frame their beliefs in a sequence-thinking way and feel like they should change their beliefs if some important part of their sequence was proven wrong, even though (I think) using cluster thinking will generally get you more accurate answers.
As I understand it, Duncan argues that sequence thinking is more common than cluster thinking, and you’re arguing the converse.
This looks remarkably like an attempt to identify a crux in the discussion. Assuming that you’re correct about double-cruxing being problematic due to encouraging sequence-like thinking: isn’t the quoted sentence precisely the kind of simplification that propagates such thinking? Conversely, if it’s not a simplification, doesn’t that provide (weak) evidence in favor of double-cruxing being a useful tool in addressing disagreements?
I think that sequence thinking is important and valuable (and probably undersupplied in the world in general, even while cluster thinking is undersupplied in the rationalist community in specific). However, I think both Thrasymachus and Duncan are doing cluster thinking here—like, if Duncan were convinced that cluster thinking is actually generally a better way of coming to final decisions, I expect he’d go “that’s weird, why is CFAR getting such good results from teaching double crux anyway?” not “obviously I was wrong about how good double crux is.” Identifying a single important point of disagreement isn’t a claim that it’s the only important point of disagreement.
I like this point a lot, and your model of me is accurate, at least insofar as I’m capable of simming this without actually experiencing it. For instance, I have similar thoughts about some of my cutting/oversimplifying black-or-white heuristics, which seem less good than the shades-of-gray epistemics of people around me, and yet often produce more solid results. I don’t conclude from this that those heuristics are better, but rather that I should be confused about my model of what’s going on.
that makes a ton of sense for theoretically justified reasons I don’t know how to explain yet. anyone want to collab with me on a sequence? I’m a bit blocked on 1. exactly what my goal is and 2. what I should be practicing in order to be able to write a sequence (given that I’m averse to writing post-style content right now)
Naturally, and I wasn’t claiming it was. That being said, I think that when you single out a specific point of disagreement (without mentioning any others), there is an implication that the mentioned point is, if not the only point of disagreement, then at the very least the most salient point of disagreement. Moreover, I’d argue that if Duncan’s only recourse after being swayed regarding sequence versus cluster thinking is “huh, then I’m not sure why we’re getting such good results”, then there is a sense in which sequence versus cluster thinking is the only point of disagreement, i.e. once that point is settled, Duncan has no more arguments.
(Of course, I’m speaking purely in the hypothetical here; I’m not trying to make any claims about Duncan’s actual epistemic state. This should be fairly obvious given the context of our discussion, but I just thought I’d throw that disclaimer in there.)
I want to bring up sequence thinking and cluster thinking, which I think are useful in understanding the disagreement here. As I understand it, Duncan argues that sequence thinking is more common than cluster thinking, and you’re arguing the converse.
I think most beliefs can be put in either a cluster-thinking or a sequence-thinking framework. However, I think that (while both are important and useful) cluster thinking is generally more useful for coming up with final conclusions. For that reason, I’m suspicious of double crux, because I’m worried that it will cause people to frame their beliefs in a sequence-thinking way and feel like they should change their beliefs if some important part of their sequence was proven wrong, even though (I think) using cluster thinking will generally get you more accurate answers.
This looks remarkably like an attempt to identify a crux in the discussion. Assuming that you’re correct about double-cruxing being problematic due to encouraging sequence-like thinking: isn’t the quoted sentence precisely the kind of simplification that propagates such thinking? Conversely, if it’s not a simplification, doesn’t that provide (weak) evidence in favor of double-cruxing being a useful tool in addressing disagreements?
I think that sequence thinking is important and valuable (and probably undersupplied in the world in general, even while cluster thinking is undersupplied in the rationalist community in specific). However, I think both Thrasymachus and Duncan are doing cluster thinking here—like, if Duncan were convinced that cluster thinking is actually generally a better way of coming to final decisions, I expect he’d go “that’s weird, why is CFAR getting such good results from teaching double crux anyway?” not “obviously I was wrong about how good double crux is.” Identifying a single important point of disagreement isn’t a claim that it’s the only important point of disagreement.
I like this point a lot, and your model of me is accurate, at least insofar as I’m capable of simming this without actually experiencing it. For instance, I have similar thoughts about some of my cutting/oversimplifying black-or-white heuristics, which seem less good than the shades-of-gray epistemics of people around me, and yet often produce more solid results. I don’t conclude from this that those heuristics are better, but rather that I should be confused about my model of what’s going on.
that makes a ton of sense for theoretically justified reasons I don’t know how to explain yet. anyone want to collab with me on a sequence? I’m a bit blocked on 1. exactly what my goal is and 2. what I should be practicing in order to be able to write a sequence (given that I’m averse to writing post-style content right now)
Naturally, and I wasn’t claiming it was. That being said, I think that when you single out a specific point of disagreement (without mentioning any others), there is an implication that the mentioned point is, if not the only point of disagreement, then at the very least the most salient point of disagreement. Moreover, I’d argue that if Duncan’s only recourse after being swayed regarding sequence versus cluster thinking is “huh, then I’m not sure why we’re getting such good results”, then there is a sense in which sequence versus cluster thinking is the only point of disagreement, i.e. once that point is settled, Duncan has no more arguments.
(Of course, I’m speaking purely in the hypothetical here; I’m not trying to make any claims about Duncan’s actual epistemic state. This should be fairly obvious given the context of our discussion, but I just thought I’d throw that disclaimer in there.)
Oh, hmm, this is Good Point Also.