Do you have candidates for intermediate views? Many-drafts which seem convergent, or fuzzy Cartesian theatres? (maybe graph-theoretically translating to nested subnetworks of neurons where we might say “this set is necessarily core, this larger set is semicore/core in frequent circumstances, this still larger set is usually un-core, but changeable, and outside this is nothing?)
There’s an argument that a distributed mind needs to have some sort of central executive, even if fuzzily defined, in order to make decisions about actions … just because there ultimately have one body to control …and it can’t do contradictory things, and it can’t rest in endless indecision.
Consider the Lamprey:
“How does the lamprey decide what to do? Within the lamprey basal ganglia lies a key structure called the striatum, which is the portion of the basal ganglia that receives most of the incoming signals from other parts of the brain. The striatum receives “bids” from other brain regions, each of which represents a specific action. A little piece of the lamprey’s brain is whispering “mate” to the striatum, while another piece is shouting “flee the predator” and so on. It would be a very bad idea for these movements to occur simultaneously – because a lamprey can’t do all of them at the same time – so to prevent simultaneous activation of many different movements, all these regions are held in check by powerful inhibitory connections from the basal ganglia. This means that the basal ganglia keep all behaviors in “off” mode by default. Only once a specific action’s bid has been selected do the basal ganglia turn off this inhibitory control, allowing the behavior to occur. You can think of the basal ganglia as a bouncer that chooses which behavior gets access to the muscles and turns away the rest. This fulfills the first key property of a selector: it must be able to pick one option and allow it access to the muscles.”
(Scott Alexander)
But how can a selector make a decision on the basis of multiple drafts which are themselves equally weighted? If inaction is not an option , a coin needs to be flipped.
Maybe it’s flipped in the theatre, maybe it’s cast in the homunculus, maybe there is no way of telling.
But you can tell it works that way because of things like the Necker Cube illusion...your brain, as they say, can switch between two interpretations, but can’t hover in the middle.
I think the philosophical component of the camps is binary, so intermediate views aren’t possible. On the empirical side, the problem that it’s not clear what evidence for one side over the other looks like. You kind of need to solve this first to figure out where on the spectrum a physical theory falls.
The camps as you have defined them differ on what the explanation of consciousness is, and also on what the explanandum is. The latter is much more of a binary than the former. There are maybe 11 putative explanations of mind-body relationship, ranging from eliminativism to idealism, with maybe 5 versions of dualism in the middle. But there is a fairly clear distinction between the people who think consciousness is exemplified but what they, as a subject are/have; and the people who think consciousness is a set of capacities and functions exemplified by other entities.
Looking at it that way, it’s difficult to see what your argument for camp 1 is. You don’t seem to believe you personally are an experienceless zombie, and you also don’t seem to think that camp 2 are making a semantic error in defining consciousness subjectively. And you can’t argue that camp 1 have the right definition of consciousness because they have the right ontology , since a) they don’t have a single ontology b) the right ontology depends on the right explanation depends on the right definition.
Do you have candidates for intermediate views? Many-drafts which seem convergent, or fuzzy Cartesian theatres? (maybe graph-theoretically translating to nested subnetworks of neurons where we might say “this set is necessarily core, this larger set is semicore/core in frequent circumstances, this still larger set is usually un-core, but changeable, and outside this is nothing?)
There’s an argument that a distributed mind needs to have some sort of central executive, even if fuzzily defined, in order to make decisions about actions … just because there ultimately have one body to control …and it can’t do contradictory things, and it can’t rest in endless indecision.
Consider the Lamprey:
“How does the lamprey decide what to do? Within the lamprey basal ganglia lies a key structure called the striatum, which is the portion of the basal ganglia that receives most of the incoming signals from other parts of the brain. The striatum receives “bids” from other brain regions, each of which represents a specific action. A little piece of the lamprey’s brain is whispering “mate” to the striatum, while another piece is shouting “flee the predator” and so on. It would be a very bad idea for these movements to occur simultaneously – because a lamprey can’t do all of them at the same time – so to prevent simultaneous activation of many different movements, all these regions are held in check by powerful inhibitory connections from the basal ganglia. This means that the basal ganglia keep all behaviors in “off” mode by default. Only once a specific action’s bid has been selected do the basal ganglia turn off this inhibitory control, allowing the behavior to occur. You can think of the basal ganglia as a bouncer that chooses which behavior gets access to the muscles and turns away the rest. This fulfills the first key property of a selector: it must be able to pick one option and allow it access to the muscles.”
(Scott Alexander)
But how can a selector make a decision on the basis of multiple drafts which are themselves equally weighted? If inaction is not an option , a coin needs to be flipped. Maybe it’s flipped in the theatre, maybe it’s cast in the homunculus, maybe there is no way of telling.
But you can tell it works that way because of things like the Necker Cube illusion...your brain, as they say, can switch between two interpretations, but can’t hover in the middle.
I think the philosophical component of the camps is binary, so intermediate views aren’t possible. On the empirical side, the problem that it’s not clear what evidence for one side over the other looks like. You kind of need to solve this first to figure out where on the spectrum a physical theory falls.
The camps as you have defined them differ on what the explanation of consciousness is, and also on what the explanandum is. The latter is much more of a binary than the former. There are maybe 11 putative explanations of mind-body relationship, ranging from eliminativism to idealism, with maybe 5 versions of dualism in the middle. But there is a fairly clear distinction between the people who think consciousness is exemplified but what they, as a subject are/have; and the people who think consciousness is a set of capacities and functions exemplified by other entities.
Looking at it that way, it’s difficult to see what your argument for camp 1 is. You don’t seem to believe you personally are an experienceless zombie, and you also don’t seem to think that camp 2 are making a semantic error in defining consciousness subjectively. And you can’t argue that camp 1 have the right definition of consciousness because they have the right ontology , since a) they don’t have a single ontology b) the right ontology depends on the right explanation depends on the right definition.
I fully agree with your first paragraph, but I’m confused by the second. Where am I making an argument for camp #1?