I think the philosophical component of the camps is binary, so intermediate views aren’t possible. On the empirical side, the problem that it’s not clear what evidence for one side over the other looks like. You kind of need to solve this first to figure out where on the spectrum a physical theory falls.
The camps as you have defined them differ on what the explanation of consciousness is, and also on what the explanandum is. The latter is much more of a binary than the former. There are maybe 11 putative explanations of mind-body relationship, ranging from eliminativism to idealism, with maybe 5 versions of dualism in the middle. But there is a fairly clear distinction between the people who think consciousness is exemplified but what they, as a subject are/have; and the people who think consciousness is a set of capacities and functions exemplified by other entities.
Looking at it that way, it’s difficult to see what your argument for camp 1 is. You don’t seem to believe you personally are an experienceless zombie, and you also don’t seem to think that camp 2 are making a semantic error in defining consciousness subjectively. And you can’t argue that camp 1 have the right definition of consciousness because they have the right ontology , since a) they don’t have a single ontology b) the right ontology depends on the right explanation depends on the right definition.
I think the philosophical component of the camps is binary, so intermediate views aren’t possible. On the empirical side, the problem that it’s not clear what evidence for one side over the other looks like. You kind of need to solve this first to figure out where on the spectrum a physical theory falls.
The camps as you have defined them differ on what the explanation of consciousness is, and also on what the explanandum is. The latter is much more of a binary than the former. There are maybe 11 putative explanations of mind-body relationship, ranging from eliminativism to idealism, with maybe 5 versions of dualism in the middle. But there is a fairly clear distinction between the people who think consciousness is exemplified but what they, as a subject are/have; and the people who think consciousness is a set of capacities and functions exemplified by other entities.
Looking at it that way, it’s difficult to see what your argument for camp 1 is. You don’t seem to believe you personally are an experienceless zombie, and you also don’t seem to think that camp 2 are making a semantic error in defining consciousness subjectively. And you can’t argue that camp 1 have the right definition of consciousness because they have the right ontology , since a) they don’t have a single ontology b) the right ontology depends on the right explanation depends on the right definition.
I fully agree with your first paragraph, but I’m confused by the second. Where am I making an argument for camp #1?