There’s an argument that a distributed mind needs to have some sort of central executive, even if fuzzily defined, in order to make decisions about actions … just because there ultimately have one body to control …and it can’t do contradictory things, and it can’t rest in endless indecision.
Consider the Lamprey:
“How does the lamprey decide what to do? Within the lamprey basal ganglia lies a key structure called the striatum, which is the portion of the basal ganglia that receives most of the incoming signals from other parts of the brain. The striatum receives “bids” from other brain regions, each of which represents a specific action. A little piece of the lamprey’s brain is whispering “mate” to the striatum, while another piece is shouting “flee the predator” and so on. It would be a very bad idea for these movements to occur simultaneously – because a lamprey can’t do all of them at the same time – so to prevent simultaneous activation of many different movements, all these regions are held in check by powerful inhibitory connections from the basal ganglia. This means that the basal ganglia keep all behaviors in “off” mode by default. Only once a specific action’s bid has been selected do the basal ganglia turn off this inhibitory control, allowing the behavior to occur. You can think of the basal ganglia as a bouncer that chooses which behavior gets access to the muscles and turns away the rest. This fulfills the first key property of a selector: it must be able to pick one option and allow it access to the muscles.”
(Scott Alexander)
But how can a selector make a decision on the basis of multiple drafts which are themselves equally weighted? If inaction is not an option , a coin needs to be flipped.
Maybe it’s flipped in the theatre, maybe it’s cast in the homunculus, maybe there is no way of telling.
But you can tell it works that way because of things like the Necker Cube illusion...your brain, as they say, can switch between two interpretations, but can’t hover in the middle.
There’s an argument that a distributed mind needs to have some sort of central executive, even if fuzzily defined, in order to make decisions about actions … just because there ultimately have one body to control …and it can’t do contradictory things, and it can’t rest in endless indecision.
Consider the Lamprey:
“How does the lamprey decide what to do? Within the lamprey basal ganglia lies a key structure called the striatum, which is the portion of the basal ganglia that receives most of the incoming signals from other parts of the brain. The striatum receives “bids” from other brain regions, each of which represents a specific action. A little piece of the lamprey’s brain is whispering “mate” to the striatum, while another piece is shouting “flee the predator” and so on. It would be a very bad idea for these movements to occur simultaneously – because a lamprey can’t do all of them at the same time – so to prevent simultaneous activation of many different movements, all these regions are held in check by powerful inhibitory connections from the basal ganglia. This means that the basal ganglia keep all behaviors in “off” mode by default. Only once a specific action’s bid has been selected do the basal ganglia turn off this inhibitory control, allowing the behavior to occur. You can think of the basal ganglia as a bouncer that chooses which behavior gets access to the muscles and turns away the rest. This fulfills the first key property of a selector: it must be able to pick one option and allow it access to the muscles.”
(Scott Alexander)
But how can a selector make a decision on the basis of multiple drafts which are themselves equally weighted? If inaction is not an option , a coin needs to be flipped. Maybe it’s flipped in the theatre, maybe it’s cast in the homunculus, maybe there is no way of telling.
But you can tell it works that way because of things like the Necker Cube illusion...your brain, as they say, can switch between two interpretations, but can’t hover in the middle.