Note that “the world” is either a reference, or it doesn’t mean anything. So the question of how it is a reference is critical for determining what it means to say there is a world. As Wittgenstein noted, “That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent.”
Regarding water, your description moves the question to what it means for the H20 model to be true. True of what? Of water. It doesn’t make sense to say the model is true without reference to whatever phenomenon/entity/etc is being described by the model.
From a pre-chemistry perspective, models that don’t explain pre-chemistry phenomena are effectively talking about a fictional world (non-overlapping with observations, objects, etc), not the real one.
Note that “the world” is either a reference, or it doesn’t mean anything
That is false. Neither “vampire” nor “werewolf” refer successfully to anything,but they still mean (Sinn, sense) different things.
Regarding water, your description moves the question to what it means for the H20 model to be true. True of what? Of water
True of our pretheoretic notion of water. Fortunately,we don’t have to obtain omniscient knowledge of the way things really are in order to be able to communicate at all.
From a pre-chemistry perspective, models that don’t explain pre-chemistry phenomena are effectively talking about a fictional world (non-overlapping with observations, objects, etc), not the real one
There’s an important difference between wrong theory and no theory. People could ask for water at times when there was no theory.
either “vampire” nor “werewolf” refer successfully to anything
In the sense I’m talking about, references need not have referents, hence “the nearest vampire” may be a valid reference.
Anyway, in this case it would be generally taken to be the case that the world exists, so there isn’t a problem with failure to refer.
True of our pretheoretic notion of water.
Yes, which doesn’t have a physicalist definition. I don’t think we’re disagreeing about the need for a philosophy that can ontologize both phenomena that do and don’t have physical definitions, and bridge between them. Donald Hobson seemed to be saying that the uncertainty can be expressed using a physicalist ontology.
People could ask for water at times when there was no theory.
I agree with this, my point is that it isn’t meaningful to say H20 theory is true independent of the theory’s connections with already-known-about phenomena such as pre-chemistry water.
Note that “the world” is either a reference, or it doesn’t mean anything. So the question of how it is a reference is critical for determining what it means to say there is a world. As Wittgenstein noted, “That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent.”
Regarding water, your description moves the question to what it means for the H20 model to be true. True of what? Of water. It doesn’t make sense to say the model is true without reference to whatever phenomenon/entity/etc is being described by the model.
From a pre-chemistry perspective, models that don’t explain pre-chemistry phenomena are effectively talking about a fictional world (non-overlapping with observations, objects, etc), not the real one.
That is false. Neither “vampire” nor “werewolf” refer successfully to anything,but they still mean (Sinn, sense) different things.
True of our pretheoretic notion of water. Fortunately,we don’t have to obtain omniscient knowledge of the way things really are in order to be able to communicate at all.
There’s an important difference between wrong theory and no theory. People could ask for water at times when there was no theory.
In the sense I’m talking about, references need not have referents, hence “the nearest vampire” may be a valid reference.
Anyway, in this case it would be generally taken to be the case that the world exists, so there isn’t a problem with failure to refer.
Yes, which doesn’t have a physicalist definition. I don’t think we’re disagreeing about the need for a philosophy that can ontologize both phenomena that do and don’t have physical definitions, and bridge between them. Donald Hobson seemed to be saying that the uncertainty can be expressed using a physicalist ontology.
I agree with this, my point is that it isn’t meaningful to say H20 theory is true independent of the theory’s connections with already-known-about phenomena such as pre-chemistry water.
I don’t know who you are think is doing that.