This is obvious, because you and the copy will reach the same decision.
Only if you reject the idea of free will and there are no environmental microvariations.
That justification implicitly assumes that you and your copy as (somewhat) antagonistic
No, it doesn’t need to be antagonistic, just independent. Also, it’s part of the PD setup, not assumed by the twins justification.
Your main point is fair, though—this version of copy-of-you PD and Newcomb’s problem if it’s predictor is equivalent to copying you are similar.
Only if you reject the idea of free will and there are no environmental microvariations.
No, it doesn’t need to be antagonistic, just independent. Also, it’s part of the PD setup, not assumed by the twins justification.
Your main point is fair, though—this version of copy-of-you PD and Newcomb’s problem if it’s predictor is equivalent to copying you are similar.