I think you’re taking the formal adoption of FDTs too literally here, or treating it as if it were the AGI case, as if humans were able to self-modify into machines fully capable of honoring commitments and then making arbitrary ones, or something? Whereas actual implementations here are pretty messy, and also they’re inscribed in the larger context of the social world.
I also don’t understand the logical time argument here as it applies to humans?
I can see in a situation where you’re starting out in fully symmetrical conditions with known source codes, or something, why you’d need to think super quick and make faster commitments. But I’m confused why that would apply to ordinary humans in ordinary spots?
Or to bring it back to the thing I actually said in more detail, Biden seems like he’s using something close to pure CDT. So someone using commitments can get Biden to do quite a lot, and thus they make lots of crazy commitments.
Whereas in a socially complex multi-polar situation, someone who was visibly making lots of crazy strong commitments super fast or something would some combination of (1) run into previous commitments made by others to treat such people poorly (2) be seen as a loose cannon and crazy actor to be put down (3) not be seen as credible because they’re still a human, sufficiently strong/fast/stupid commitments don’t work, etc.
I think the core is—you are worried about people ‘formally adopting a decision theory’ and I think that’s not what actual people ever actually do. As in, you and I both have perhaps informally adapted such policies, but that’s importantly different and does not lead to these problems in these ways. On the margin such movements are simply helpful.
(On your BTW, I literally meant that to refer to the central case of ‘what people do in general when they have non-trivial decisions, in general’ - that those without a formal policy don’t do anything coherent, and often change their answers dramatically based on social context or to avoid mild awkwardness, and so on, if I have time I’ll think about what the best examples of this would be but e.g. I’ve been writing about crazy decisions surrounding Covid for 2+ years now.)
I think you’re taking the formal adoption of FDTs too literally here, or treating it as if it were the AGI case, as if humans were able to self-modify into machines fully capable of honoring commitments and then making arbitrary ones, or something?
Actually, my worry is kind of in the opposite direction, namely that we don’t really know how FDT can or should be applied in humans, but someone with a vague understanding of FDT might “adopt FDT” and then use it to handwavingly justify some behavior or policy. For example someone might think, “FDT says that we should think as little as possible before mentally making commitments, so that’s what I’ll do.”
Or take the example of your OP, in which you invoke FDT, but don’t explain in any mathematical detail how FDT implies the conclusions you’re seemingly drawing from it.
Or to bring it back to the thing I actually said in more detail, Biden seems like he’s using something close to pure CDT. So someone using commitments can get Biden to do quite a lot, and thus they make lots of crazy commitments.
Here too, I suspect you may have only a vague understanding of the difference between CDT and FDT. Resisting threats (“crazy commitments”) is often rational even under CDT, if you’re in a repeated game (i.e., being observed by players you may face in the future). I would guess your disagreement with Biden is probably better explained by something else besides FDT vs CDT.
ETA: I also get a feeling that you have a biased perspective on the object level. If “someone using commitments can get Biden to do quite a lot”, why couldn’t Putin get Biden to promise not to admit Ukraine into NATO?
I think you’re taking the formal adoption of FDTs too literally here, or treating it as if it were the AGI case, as if humans were able to self-modify into machines fully capable of honoring commitments and then making arbitrary ones, or something? Whereas actual implementations here are pretty messy, and also they’re inscribed in the larger context of the social world.
I also don’t understand the logical time argument here as it applies to humans?
I can see in a situation where you’re starting out in fully symmetrical conditions with known source codes, or something, why you’d need to think super quick and make faster commitments. But I’m confused why that would apply to ordinary humans in ordinary spots?
Or to bring it back to the thing I actually said in more detail, Biden seems like he’s using something close to pure CDT. So someone using commitments can get Biden to do quite a lot, and thus they make lots of crazy commitments.
Whereas in a socially complex multi-polar situation, someone who was visibly making lots of crazy strong commitments super fast or something would some combination of (1) run into previous commitments made by others to treat such people poorly (2) be seen as a loose cannon and crazy actor to be put down (3) not be seen as credible because they’re still a human, sufficiently strong/fast/stupid commitments don’t work, etc.
I think the core is—you are worried about people ‘formally adopting a decision theory’ and I think that’s not what actual people ever actually do. As in, you and I both have perhaps informally adapted such policies, but that’s importantly different and does not lead to these problems in these ways. On the margin such movements are simply helpful.
(On your BTW, I literally meant that to refer to the central case of ‘what people do in general when they have non-trivial decisions, in general’ - that those without a formal policy don’t do anything coherent, and often change their answers dramatically based on social context or to avoid mild awkwardness, and so on, if I have time I’ll think about what the best examples of this would be but e.g. I’ve been writing about crazy decisions surrounding Covid for 2+ years now.)
Actually, my worry is kind of in the opposite direction, namely that we don’t really know how FDT can or should be applied in humans, but someone with a vague understanding of FDT might “adopt FDT” and then use it to handwavingly justify some behavior or policy. For example someone might think, “FDT says that we should think as little as possible before mentally making commitments, so that’s what I’ll do.”
Or take the example of your OP, in which you invoke FDT, but don’t explain in any mathematical detail how FDT implies the conclusions you’re seemingly drawing from it.
Here too, I suspect you may have only a vague understanding of the difference between CDT and FDT. Resisting threats (“crazy commitments”) is often rational even under CDT, if you’re in a repeated game (i.e., being observed by players you may face in the future). I would guess your disagreement with Biden is probably better explained by something else besides FDT vs CDT.
ETA: I also get a feeling that you have a biased perspective on the object level. If “someone using commitments can get Biden to do quite a lot”, why couldn’t Putin get Biden to promise not to admit Ukraine into NATO?