It also seems to involve exaggerating and/or downplaying one’s own preferences.
There’s a large portion of auction theory/mechanism design specifically designed to avoid this problem. The “you cut the cake, I choose the pieces” is a simple example. I’ve tried to implement some of these types of solutions in previous group houses and organizations, and there’s often a large initial hurdle to overcome, some of which just outright failed.
However, enough has succeeded that I think it’s worth trying to more explicitly work game theoretically optimal decision procedures into communities and organizations, and worth familiarizing yourself with the existing tools out there for this sort of thing.
There’s a large portion of auction theory/mechanism design specifically designed to avoid this problem. The “you cut the cake, I choose the pieces” is a simple example. I’ve tried to implement some of these types of solutions in previous group houses and organizations, and there’s often a large initial hurdle to overcome, some of which just outright failed.
However, enough has succeeded that I think it’s worth trying to more explicitly work game theoretically optimal decision procedures into communities and organizations, and worth familiarizing yourself with the existing tools out there for this sort of thing.
I’m interested in hearing more details about that.