Every time that a man who is not an absolute fool presents you with a question he considers very problematic after giving it careful thought, distrust those quick answers that come to the mind of someone who has considered it only briefly or not at all. These answers are usually simplistic views lacking in consistency, which explain nothing, or which do not bear examination.
-- Joseph de Maistre (St. Petersburg Dialogues, No. 7)
It doesn’t seem at all uncommon for someone from domain A to present a problem and for someone from domain B to immediately reply “Oh, we have just the perfect tool for that in my field!”.
I have on numerous occasions presented problems to others, after giving them careful thought, and had them reply instantly with the correct answer. Usually the next question is “why didn’t I think of that?” which sometimes has an obvious answer and sometimes doesn’t.
My favorite remains Eliezer asking me the question “why don’t you just use log likelihood?” I still don’t have a good answer to why I needed the question!
I don’t think that de Maistre’s “quick answers” category is supposed to include answers based on sound expertise.
People are often confused about questions to which an expert in the relevant area will give a quick and reliably correct answer. However, an expert capable of answering a technical question competently is not someone who has “considered [the question] only briefly or not at all”: he is in fact someone who has spent a great deal of time and effort (along with possessing the necessary talent) on understanding a broad class of questions that subsumes the one being asked.
This gives, by implication, a detector for absolute folly: the condition of believing that something is a very problematic question, when in fact it has a quick, consistent, explanatory answer available to those who have considered it only briefly or not at all.
It doesn’t necessarily follow that it’s a highly accurate detector, though. If only a small minority of reasonable people are in this condition, while complete fools are commonly in this condition but their number is still much smaller than this minority of reasonable people, then the above quote would be true and yet your proposed test would be very weak.
A fascinating question would be how strong this test actually is, and how it varies with different subjects.
In my experience this is true given a definition of “complete fool” that encompasses a majority of the population, provided the person supplying quick answers isn’t also a fool.
Some years ago I would have agreed with you, but nowadays I believe this attitude is mistaken. In most cases, quick answers will at least miss some important aspects of the problem. I think de Maistre is quite right to emphasize that it’s safe to rely on quick answers only when the person raising the concern is otherwise known to be extremely foolish.
-- Joseph de Maistre (St. Petersburg Dialogues, No. 7)
[citation needed]
It doesn’t seem at all uncommon for someone from domain A to present a problem and for someone from domain B to immediately reply “Oh, we have just the perfect tool for that in my field!”.
A lot of things don’t seem too uncommon
What’s missing is indication that the physicist is wrong. Cows are spheres, right?
The quote suggests that most of the time when Person B says that, they’re wrong.
I have on numerous occasions presented problems to others, after giving them careful thought, and had them reply instantly with the correct answer. Usually the next question is “why didn’t I think of that?” which sometimes has an obvious answer and sometimes doesn’t.
My favorite remains Eliezer asking me the question “why don’t you just use log likelihood?” I still don’t have a good answer to why I needed the question!
I don’t think that de Maistre’s “quick answers” category is supposed to include answers based on sound expertise.
People are often confused about questions to which an expert in the relevant area will give a quick and reliably correct answer. However, an expert capable of answering a technical question competently is not someone who has “considered [the question] only briefly or not at all”: he is in fact someone who has spent a great deal of time and effort (along with possessing the necessary talent) on understanding a broad class of questions that subsumes the one being asked.
This gives, by implication, a detector for absolute folly: the condition of believing that something is a very problematic question, when in fact it has a quick, consistent, explanatory answer available to those who have considered it only briefly or not at all.
It doesn’t necessarily follow that it’s a highly accurate detector, though. If only a small minority of reasonable people are in this condition, while complete fools are commonly in this condition but their number is still much smaller than this minority of reasonable people, then the above quote would be true and yet your proposed test would be very weak.
A fascinating question would be how strong this test actually is, and how it varies with different subjects.
In my experience this is true given a definition of “complete fool” that encompasses a majority of the population, provided the person supplying quick answers isn’t also a fool.
Some years ago I would have agreed with you, but nowadays I believe this attitude is mistaken. In most cases, quick answers will at least miss some important aspects of the problem. I think de Maistre is quite right to emphasize that it’s safe to rely on quick answers only when the person raising the concern is otherwise known to be extremely foolish.
Related xkcd.
I actually expected to see this one.
They are all variations on the same theme, aren’t they?