Feedback should work in a predictable fashion: Stakeholders and Actors are limited computational agents so cannot evaluate complex mechanisms.
I think the problem is somewhat the opposite of that. Many of the Stakeholders and the Actors are smarter than the person setting the feedback. They’ll take advantage of what he doesn’t know about his own feedback system.
If funge is transferable to money, there is an issue, Actors might simply get money and then use that as an incentive for people, so that they will never have to give funge to someone (and potentially create a competitor for them).
That only is a problem if funge is transferable to money but money is not tranferable to funge. For all intents and purposes, that is impossible.
Feedback should work in a predictable fashion: Stakeholders and Actors are limited computational agents so cannot evaluate complex mechanisms.
I think the problem is somewhat the opposite of that. Many of the Stakeholders and the Actors are smarter than the person setting the feedback. They’ll take advantage of what he doesn’t know about his own feedback system.
Stakeholders are the ones giving feedback, so they need to know what effect their feedback will have. But yep that is a problem, Actors in general being more motivated to game the system than Stakeholders police it.
That only is a problem if funge is transferable to money but money is not tranferable to funge. For all intents and purposes, that is impossible.
Hadn’t thought of that. It does depend somewhat on the number of Actors within an organisation. The more, the larger the chance you can find one willing to sell funge (for a reasonable amount, so no monopolies or cartels). So it goes within the checks and balances desideratum.
It does depend somewhat on the number of Actors within an organisation.
If there’s no one selling funge, then it’s the same as money and funge being nontransferrable. If someone is selling his funge to pay you in money, you can just be the one he’s selling his funge to.
Actors might simply get money and then use that as an incentive for people, so that they will never have to give funge to someone
If they’re selling their funge to get the money, then they are giving funge to someone.
If there’s no one selling funge, then it’s the same as money and funge being nontransferrable. If someone is selling his funge to pay you in money, you can just be the one he’s selling his funge to.
The organisation might have an income, such as donations for a charity. One Resource within the organisation will be control of this income stream. So you can convert funge to money by bidding on this Resource, this just sinks the funge without giving it to a person.
This seems like a good sketch of the endgame for histocracy, my own pie-in-the-sky organizational scheme. If you start with people voluntarily transitioning management of a resource they own to an open histocratic system with themselves as the judges, and then iterate and nest and stuff, you get something like this in the limit. I hadn’t been able to envision it quite as elegantly as you do here.
So fails the checks and balances desideratum. Checks and balances can be achieved somewhat by adding in more Resources that can be controlled by multiple Actors.
What is empirical evidence that checks and balances work as people assume they should in organizations?
Possibly. I admit there is an organisational overhead to checks and balances. I also tend to think of the system as an isolated one, which means I don’t tend to consider things like prosecuting someone for theft if they just gut the organisation and run off with the money. Which I probably should. Having people sign a contract saying they won’t intefere with or marginalise the market when gaining control of ultimate power would assuage some of my concerns.
What is empirical evidence that checks and balances work as people assume they should in organizations?
The continued stability of the liberal democracy rule set? One would assume that some past leaders would have liked to have remained in power and might have rewritten the rules to allow them to do so if they could have done.
Having people sign a contract saying they won’t intefere with or marginalise the market when gaining control of ultimate power would assuage some of my concerns.
Which authority judges whether someone is engaging into the behavior of intefering with or marginalising the market?
What is empirical evidence that checks and balances work as people assume they should in organizations?
Nothing works exactly as people assume it should.
If you look at the US it however seems quite clear to me that power is distributed among multiple people. Nixon lost power through impeachment.
The US Supreme court frequently invalidates laws that congress passes.
Multiple actors need to agree to get some things done.
Can you give an example of an existing organization that could be rearranged to use control markets and specify what its stakeholders, feedback, actors, and resources would be?
Is this description helpful? If not I’ll try and get a better description done tomorrow evening at some point. Although not having done it means I’m not sure exactly how to best break up a system into resources.
Okay lets take the UK house of commons, as I am familiar with it.
In its current form:
Resource: A seat for a constituency
Actor: An MP or a prospective MP
Stakeholder: A voter
Feedback: A vote
Resource changing methodology: Tallying the votes
You could use a naive mapping and only change the feedback to be funge and the resource changing methodology to be an auction.
So what would this look like? MPs would try and convince their constituency they were doing a good job, so they get a positive return on their seat. The MPs could pay non-MPs in funge to help them think up good schemes to improve the lives of their constituency or at least make them thinks things were getting better. The non-MPs would thus get capital later on to make bids for their own seats. MPs could make trades of funge between them to get them to help each other out in getting laws passed. These trades would be public (as would bidding histories).
I think the problem is somewhat the opposite of that. Many of the Stakeholders and the Actors are smarter than the person setting the feedback. They’ll take advantage of what he doesn’t know about his own feedback system.
That only is a problem if funge is transferable to money but money is not tranferable to funge. For all intents and purposes, that is impossible.
Stakeholders are the ones giving feedback, so they need to know what effect their feedback will have. But yep that is a problem, Actors in general being more motivated to game the system than Stakeholders police it.
Hadn’t thought of that. It does depend somewhat on the number of Actors within an organisation. The more, the larger the chance you can find one willing to sell funge (for a reasonable amount, so no monopolies or cartels). So it goes within the checks and balances desideratum.
If there’s no one selling funge, then it’s the same as money and funge being nontransferrable. If someone is selling his funge to pay you in money, you can just be the one he’s selling his funge to.
If they’re selling their funge to get the money, then they are giving funge to someone.
The organisation might have an income, such as donations for a charity. One Resource within the organisation will be control of this income stream. So you can convert funge to money by bidding on this Resource, this just sinks the funge without giving it to a person.
This seems like a good sketch of the endgame for histocracy, my own pie-in-the-sky organizational scheme. If you start with people voluntarily transitioning management of a resource they own to an open histocratic system with themselves as the judges, and then iterate and nest and stuff, you get something like this in the limit. I hadn’t been able to envision it quite as elegantly as you do here.
Looks interesting. Will have to read it properly at some point. Any plans to test it in the real world? Or how you might encourage people to test it?
Feature not bug? ;)
What is empirical evidence that checks and balances work as people assume they should in organizations?
Possibly. I admit there is an organisational overhead to checks and balances. I also tend to think of the system as an isolated one, which means I don’t tend to consider things like prosecuting someone for theft if they just gut the organisation and run off with the money. Which I probably should. Having people sign a contract saying they won’t intefere with or marginalise the market when gaining control of ultimate power would assuage some of my concerns.
The continued stability of the liberal democracy rule set? One would assume that some past leaders would have liked to have remained in power and might have rewritten the rules to allow them to do so if they could have done.
Which authority judges whether someone is engaging into the behavior of intefering with or marginalising the market?
The same authority that decides whether people are engaging in anti-competitive behaviour currently: The courts of law.
They probably wouldn’t be very good at it, but it provides some disincentive which isn’t there in the more abstract models I think about.
Nothing works exactly as people assume it should. If you look at the US it however seems quite clear to me that power is distributed among multiple people. Nixon lost power through impeachment.
The US Supreme court frequently invalidates laws that congress passes.
Multiple actors need to agree to get some things done.
Can you give an example of an existing organization that could be rearranged to use control markets and specify what its stakeholders, feedback, actors, and resources would be?
Is this description helpful? If not I’ll try and get a better description done tomorrow evening at some point. Although not having done it means I’m not sure exactly how to best break up a system into resources.
Okay lets take the UK house of commons, as I am familiar with it.
In its current form:
Resource: A seat for a constituency
Actor: An MP or a prospective MP
Stakeholder: A voter
Feedback: A vote
Resource changing methodology: Tallying the votes
You could use a naive mapping and only change the feedback to be funge and the resource changing methodology to be an auction.
So what would this look like? MPs would try and convince their constituency they were doing a good job, so they get a positive return on their seat. The MPs could pay non-MPs in funge to help them think up good schemes to improve the lives of their constituency or at least make them thinks things were getting better. The non-MPs would thus get capital later on to make bids for their own seats. MPs could make trades of funge between them to get them to help each other out in getting laws passed. These trades would be public (as would bidding histories).
Make sense?