“can p-zombies exist?”, which can eventually be answered by AI research and cognitive sciences
Wait, what?
I agree it’s a good example, but I think it’s a good example that many philosophical distinctions (whether you call them approach, model, or position) are linguistic and definitional rather than factual debates or predictions of future experiences.
The whole point of the p-zombies (and the earlier chinese room) thought experiment is that there is no test or measurement which can distinguish whether some not-you entity is conscious. No research or science can resolve it—it’s purely about whether something non-physical exists.
The whole point of the p-zombies (and the earlier chinese room) thought experiment is that there is no test or measurement which can distinguish whether some not-you entity is conscious. No research or science can resolve it—it’s purely about whether something non-physical exists.
Yudkowsky’s argument about consciousness, as I understand it, is:
There is some cognitive experience that we have that we label ‘consciousness’, and seems to be a listener that also speaks. Because it is heard in-universe, it must be generated in-universe, because we define the boundaries of our universe causally.
We can imagine that there is a listener that cannot speak—i.e., there is some audience somewhere listening to our mental life and experiencing things, but this audience has no causal interaction with the universe that our bodies live in.
It is a category error to combine the two into one concept, and there cannot be, in principle, an in-universe difference between p-zombies and conscious people.
So if we discover the in-universe generator for the cognitive experience we label consciousness, then the question of whether or not there are other universes listening in on us becomes way less interesting, and obviously distinct from the question of “why do I feel like I’m experiencing things?” AI research and cognitive sciences can plausibly discover that generator in the material universe, which means we no longer need to rely on an immaterial universe to provide cognitive experience.
We can imagine that there is a listener that cannot speak—i.e., there is some audience somewhere listening to our mental life and experiencing things, but this audience has no causal interaction with the universe that our bodies live in.
It is very unclear what that means. The overall thrust seems to be trying to say something about consciousness by saying something about p-zombies by saying something about epiphenomenalism. But epiphenomenalism is a one way cuausal interaction..the “listener” has to be on the end of a causal chain coming form whaterver it is listening too.
There is some cognitive experience that we have that we label ‘consciousness’, and seems to be a listener that also speaks. Because it is heard in-universe, it must be generated in-universe, because we define the boundaries of our universe causally.
What does “we define the boundaries of our universe causally” mean? Does it mean everything has a cause , or an effect or both , or what?
What does “we define the boundaries of our universe causally” mean? Does it mean everything has a cause , or an effect or both , or what?
In this context, everything “inside the universe” has an effect, directly or indirectly, on other things in the universe. This means being ‘in the same universe’ isn’t a symmetric relationship—if A and B can both affect C, but not be affected by C or each other, C perceives the universe as containing all three of them, and A and B both perceive the universe as only containing themselves.
In this context, everything “inside the universe” has an effect, directly or indirectly, on other things in the universe. This means being ‘in the same universe’ isn’t a symmetric relationship—if A and B can both affect C, but not be affected by C or each other, C perceives the universe as containing all three of them, and A and B both perceive the universe as only containing themselves.
Let’s suppose that C means epiphenomenal consciousness. Now consider:
There is some cognitive experience that we have that we label ‘consciousness’, and seems to be a listener that also speaks. Because it is heard in-universe, it must be generated in-universe, because we define the boundaries of our universe causally.
But consciousness is heard by itself. All the above suggests is that consciousness would perceive a physical universe, ie its universe would contain both itself and matter, wand that is consistent with what is perceived. If consciousness is an epihenomenal dangler, then , by the above, it wouldn’t be in the universe as it appears to A and B, taken as physical events. But that just restates what epiphenomenalism state...it’s not a contradiciton to anything.
PS: Not a sincere believer in epiphenomenalism. Just pointing out that you can’t argue against epiphenomenalism by pointing out that it is epiphenomenalism.
But that just restates what epiphenomenalism state...it’s not a contradiciton to anything.
It is a contradiction to the claim that epiphenomenal consciousness is why in-universe bodies discuss the experience of consciousness. That has to be done by phenomenal consciousness, and that strikes me as the only interesting sort of consciousness.
It is a contradiction to the claim that epiphenomenal consciousness is why in-universe bodies discuss the experience of consciousness.
Which would be more significant if epiphenomenalists made that claim. Actually, they don’t, they bite the bullet about the issue. But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
That has to be done by phenomenal consciousness, and that strikes me as the only interesting sort of consciousness.
Phenomenal consciousness contrasts with access consciousness, not epiphomenal consciousness.
But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
If so, I would expect this to come up in one of lukeprog’s posts on how LW philosophy is close to positions held in mainstream philosophy, like this one, but I didn’t check the whole sequence, and in this case absence of evidence is only weak evidence of absence. What well-known and succinct treatment do you have in mind?
“The most powerful argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self contradictory: If we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then we know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then we should not have any knowledge about the mind, as it does not affect anything physical. [9]”—WP
“Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)”—SEP
Wait, what?
I agree it’s a good example, but I think it’s a good example that many philosophical distinctions (whether you call them approach, model, or position) are linguistic and definitional rather than factual debates or predictions of future experiences.
The whole point of the p-zombies (and the earlier chinese room) thought experiment is that there is no test or measurement which can distinguish whether some not-you entity is conscious. No research or science can resolve it—it’s purely about whether something non-physical exists.
Yudkowsky’s argument about consciousness, as I understand it, is:
There is some cognitive experience that we have that we label ‘consciousness’, and seems to be a listener that also speaks. Because it is heard in-universe, it must be generated in-universe, because we define the boundaries of our universe causally.
We can imagine that there is a listener that cannot speak—i.e., there is some audience somewhere listening to our mental life and experiencing things, but this audience has no causal interaction with the universe that our bodies live in.
It is a category error to combine the two into one concept, and there cannot be, in principle, an in-universe difference between p-zombies and conscious people.
So if we discover the in-universe generator for the cognitive experience we label consciousness, then the question of whether or not there are other universes listening in on us becomes way less interesting, and obviously distinct from the question of “why do I feel like I’m experiencing things?” AI research and cognitive sciences can plausibly discover that generator in the material universe, which means we no longer need to rely on an immaterial universe to provide cognitive experience.
It is very unclear what that means. The overall thrust seems to be trying to say something about consciousness by saying something about p-zombies by saying something about epiphenomenalism. But epiphenomenalism is a one way cuausal interaction..the “listener” has to be on the end of a causal chain coming form whaterver it is listening too.
What does “we define the boundaries of our universe causally” mean? Does it mean everything has a cause , or an effect or both , or what?
In this context, everything “inside the universe” has an effect, directly or indirectly, on other things in the universe. This means being ‘in the same universe’ isn’t a symmetric relationship—if A and B can both affect C, but not be affected by C or each other, C perceives the universe as containing all three of them, and A and B both perceive the universe as only containing themselves.
This sequence has more.
Let’s suppose that C means epiphenomenal consciousness. Now consider:
But consciousness is heard by itself. All the above suggests is that consciousness would perceive a physical universe, ie its universe would contain both itself and matter, wand that is consistent with what is perceived. If consciousness is an epihenomenal dangler, then , by the above, it wouldn’t be in the universe as it appears to A and B, taken as physical events. But that just restates what epiphenomenalism state...it’s not a contradiciton to anything.
PS: Not a sincere believer in epiphenomenalism. Just pointing out that you can’t argue against epiphenomenalism by pointing out that it is epiphenomenalism.
It is a contradiction to the claim that epiphenomenal consciousness is why in-universe bodies discuss the experience of consciousness. That has to be done by phenomenal consciousness, and that strikes me as the only interesting sort of consciousness.
Which would be more significant if epiphenomenalists made that claim. Actually, they don’t, they bite the bullet about the issue. But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
Phenomenal consciousness contrasts with access consciousness, not epiphomenal consciousness.
If so, I would expect this to come up in one of lukeprog’s posts on how LW philosophy is close to positions held in mainstream philosophy, like this one, but I didn’t check the whole sequence, and in this case absence of evidence is only weak evidence of absence. What well-known and succinct treatment do you have in mind?
“The most powerful argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self contradictory: If we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then we know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then we should not have any knowledge about the mind, as it does not affect anything physical. [9]”—WP
“Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)”—SEP
Thanks!