It is a contradiction to the claim that epiphenomenal consciousness is why in-universe bodies discuss the experience of consciousness.
Which would be more significant if epiphenomenalists made that claim. Actually, they don’t, they bite the bullet about the issue. But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
That has to be done by phenomenal consciousness, and that strikes me as the only interesting sort of consciousness.
Phenomenal consciousness contrasts with access consciousness, not epiphomenal consciousness.
But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
If so, I would expect this to come up in one of lukeprog’s posts on how LW philosophy is close to positions held in mainstream philosophy, like this one, but I didn’t check the whole sequence, and in this case absence of evidence is only weak evidence of absence. What well-known and succinct treatment do you have in mind?
“The most powerful argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self contradictory: If we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then we know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then we should not have any knowledge about the mind, as it does not affect anything physical. [9]”—WP
“Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)”—SEP
Which would be more significant if epiphenomenalists made that claim. Actually, they don’t, they bite the bullet about the issue. But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
Phenomenal consciousness contrasts with access consciousness, not epiphomenal consciousness.
If so, I would expect this to come up in one of lukeprog’s posts on how LW philosophy is close to positions held in mainstream philosophy, like this one, but I didn’t check the whole sequence, and in this case absence of evidence is only weak evidence of absence. What well-known and succinct treatment do you have in mind?
“The most powerful argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self contradictory: If we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then we know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then we should not have any knowledge about the mind, as it does not affect anything physical. [9]”—WP
“Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)”—SEP
Thanks!