Any faction that manages to pull off a regime change will profit if it can install itself as the new rules of Russia with or without the pipeline.
Blowing up Russian infrastructure is likely unpopular with a good portion of the Russian elite and it can be easily argued that it’s treason by Putin to do so. If powerful people in the Russian elite think that Putin felt the need to blow up Russian infrastructure to reduce the chances of a coup, that’s a signal of weakness.
It’s unclear to me what you expect Putin’s preferred policy outcome to be. I would expect him to want a ceasefire with Russia keeping the territory it currently holds. Having the pipeline means that there’s more room for negotiation especially if gas shortage really hurts in winter.
Any faction that manages to pull off a regime change will profit if it can install itself as the new rules of Russia with or without the pipeline.
The point is that the faction can credibly promise everyone more resources/etc. than Putin can, rather than just a different distribution of resources (“don’t worry, you’ll be one of the monkeys on the winning team, I promise”), because Putin insists on burning state capacity and money, which could be spent on banditry, on failed attempts at rebuilding the Soviet Union. It’s always good to be on the inside of a coup, yes, but why give potential enemies a natural incentive to dispose of you, if you’re not going to turn back on the oil any time soon?
Blowing up Russian infrastructure is likely unpopular with a good portion of the Russian elite and it can be easily argued that it’s treason by Putin to do so. If powerful people in the Russian elite think that Putin felt the need to blow up Russian infrastructure to reduce the chances of a coup, that’s a signal of weakness.
Putin is a dictator; he has a direct line to the special branch of his intelligence services that handles secret operations. He would of course have kept this operation a secret from his direct inferiors, and as I said, the fact that it’s been so long without any nation state being definitively accused raises my suspicion that it was done with a remarkable lack of insider knowledge for a government. Otherwise why hasn’t a spy given the game up yet?
I will admit that the fact that he has to blow up his own infrastructure without the knowledge of the rest of his government makes this considerably more risky, but it’s not obviously a stupid play, and it seems to have worked if that’s the case.
Even if other people within the Russian elite don’t have direct knowledge, they have a much better model of Putin than we do.
Imagine the conversation between two people in the Russian elite:
Alice: What do you think, did Putin blow up the pipeline?
Bob: I don’t know for certain, but with him, you never know...
Alice: Yes, the other day he did XYZ which was really crazy...
Bob: What motivation do you think he could have?
Alice: I think he’s afraid of a coup because of YZX.
Bob: It’s right for him to fear that because of ZYX.
Neither Alice nor Bob committed treason by saying anything they said but they managed to build shared knowledge that makes it easier to agree to do a coup together.
The point is that the faction can credibly promise everyone more resources/etc. than Putin can, rather than just a different distribution of resources (“don’t worry, you’ll be one of the monkeys on the winning team, I promise”)
Getting rid of Putin likely involves more than just getting rid of Putin, a lot of other people that are currently in power will lose their power as well. People who currently have power by virtue of having shown loyalty to Putin over decades have a good chance to lose that power even if more resources are available.
Making a deal to get rid of the Western sanctions and stop the costly war already allows credibly promising that there are more resources to be distributed.
It’s always good to be on the inside of a coup, yes, but why give potential enemies a natural incentive to dispose of you, if you’re not going to turn back on the oil any time soon?
The pipeline provides leverage for negotiations with Germany. It also allows for more room to navigate in case, Russia needs the money to buy the loyalty of whoever is hurt by the war. With money, it’s easy to pay unemployed workers at car factories their salaries. Having that option available is useful for scenarios where he actually needs the money.
Otherwise why hasn’t a spy given the game up yet?
Intelligence agencies generally are not in the habit of wanting to give information to the public. I don’t think you can deduce much from secret services not sharing information with the public.
Any faction that manages to pull off a regime change will profit if it can install itself as the new rules of Russia with or without the pipeline.
Blowing up Russian infrastructure is likely unpopular with a good portion of the Russian elite and it can be easily argued that it’s treason by Putin to do so. If powerful people in the Russian elite think that Putin felt the need to blow up Russian infrastructure to reduce the chances of a coup, that’s a signal of weakness.
It’s unclear to me what you expect Putin’s preferred policy outcome to be. I would expect him to want a ceasefire with Russia keeping the territory it currently holds. Having the pipeline means that there’s more room for negotiation especially if gas shortage really hurts in winter.
The point is that the faction can credibly promise everyone more resources/etc. than Putin can, rather than just a different distribution of resources (“don’t worry, you’ll be one of the monkeys on the winning team, I promise”), because Putin insists on burning state capacity and money, which could be spent on banditry, on failed attempts at rebuilding the Soviet Union. It’s always good to be on the inside of a coup, yes, but why give potential enemies a natural incentive to dispose of you, if you’re not going to turn back on the oil any time soon?
Putin is a dictator; he has a direct line to the special branch of his intelligence services that handles secret operations. He would of course have kept this operation a secret from his direct inferiors, and as I said, the fact that it’s been so long without any nation state being definitively accused raises my suspicion that it was done with a remarkable lack of insider knowledge for a government. Otherwise why hasn’t a spy given the game up yet?
I will admit that the fact that he has to blow up his own infrastructure without the knowledge of the rest of his government makes this considerably more risky, but it’s not obviously a stupid play, and it seems to have worked if that’s the case.
Even if other people within the Russian elite don’t have direct knowledge, they have a much better model of Putin than we do.
Imagine the conversation between two people in the Russian elite:
Alice: What do you think, did Putin blow up the pipeline?
Bob: I don’t know for certain, but with him, you never know...
Alice: Yes, the other day he did XYZ which was really crazy...
Bob: What motivation do you think he could have?
Alice: I think he’s afraid of a coup because of YZX.
Bob: It’s right for him to fear that because of ZYX.
Neither Alice nor Bob committed treason by saying anything they said but they managed to build shared knowledge that makes it easier to agree to do a coup together.
Getting rid of Putin likely involves more than just getting rid of Putin, a lot of other people that are currently in power will lose their power as well. People who currently have power by virtue of having shown loyalty to Putin over decades have a good chance to lose that power even if more resources are available.
Making a deal to get rid of the Western sanctions and stop the costly war already allows credibly promising that there are more resources to be distributed.
The pipeline provides leverage for negotiations with Germany. It also allows for more room to navigate in case, Russia needs the money to buy the loyalty of whoever is hurt by the war. With money, it’s easy to pay unemployed workers at car factories their salaries. Having that option available is useful for scenarios where he actually needs the money.
Intelligence agencies generally are not in the habit of wanting to give information to the public. I don’t think you can deduce much from secret services not sharing information with the public.