Yes, but EY’s statement implies that all (1, 2, 3) must be true for reciprocity to be strategic. There are iterated contexts where 1 and/or 2 do not hold (for example, a CDT agent playing iterated prisoner’s dilemma against a simple tit-for-tat bot).
I think I agree with your comment except for the “but.” AFAICT it doesn’t contradict mine? In your parenthetical scenario, #3 also does not hold—the CDT agent has no negotiating power against the tit-for-tat bot.
I am not. I am only saying that #3 is sufficient to cover all iterative interactions where one player’s actions meaningfully alter the others’ outcomes.
Yes, but EY’s statement implies that all (1, 2, 3) must be true for reciprocity to be strategic. There are iterated contexts where 1 and/or 2 do not hold (for example, a CDT agent playing iterated prisoner’s dilemma against a simple tit-for-tat bot).
I think I agree with your comment except for the “but.” AFAICT it doesn’t contradict mine? In your parenthetical scenario, #3 also does not hold—the CDT agent has no negotiating power against the tit-for-tat bot.
This confuses me. Are you saying the CDT agent does not have “the ability to alter outcomes of future interactions”?
I am not. I am only saying that #3 is sufficient to cover all iterative interactions where one player’s actions meaningfully alter the others’ outcomes.