I guess “atoms can amount to qualia” was misleading, but I meant that you can describe human qualia using atoms, and that description would be as correct, as describing rock as heap of atoms would, and more complete than “I am seeing red”. The switch to “consciousness” was to prevent conflating specific qualia, that are not fundamental, with quale of universe.
But neither claim is a prediction of physics, anyway.
Only in the same sense that “rocks are atoms” is not a prediction of physics.
Panpsychism standardly states that all entities have irreducibly mental properties.
Panpsychism that works (Russelian monism or whatever you want to call the one from http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf) states that all entities have one property that you can call mental—existence—and there is only one entity, because that is how actual physics works. And that property is also implicitly present in physicalism.
If dual aspect says that physical description is complete, even though you can describe things differently, then physics predicts that and you don’t need dual aspect. Is it says that physical description is incomplete, then I disagree and want to know what’s its objection to the kind of panpsychism I’m talking about.
Well, no, in practice you can’t describe a specific quale by describing a specific configuration of atoms (as in Mary’s Room). If you could, there would be no hard problem.
and that description would be as correct, as describing rock as heap of atoms would,
You can give microphysical explanation of a rock , once you input “rock” as a human concept. The same does not work for “red”.
The switch to “consciousness” was to prevent conflating specific qualia, that are not fundamental, with quale of universe.
Whats the quale of the universe?
states that all entities have one property that you can call mental—existence—and there is only one entity, because that is how actual physics works.
I didn’t notice either idea being mentioned in the paper you linked.
Also, Chalmers seems conflicted about whether panpsychism is physicalism.
“In particular, constitutive Russellian
panpsychism is incompatible with narrow physicalism, but it is a form of broad physicalism. ”
If dual aspect says that physical description is complete, even though you can describe things differently, then physics predicts that and you don’t need dual aspect
For what? Physics can allow you to predict external.events, but predicts nothing about how things seem to you.
Dual aspect theory allows you to account for consciousness, without dismissing it ,and without embracing full dualism with its attendant problems.
You can give microphysical explanation of a rock , once you input “rock” as a human concept. The same does not work for “red”.
It does work if on the last step where someone will say “but these firing neurons are not actually my seeing of red!” you also input arguments for panpsychism. They are the same kind of explanation, so panpsychism can in principle solve the hard problem. So if you disagree you have to disagree with something specific about panpsychism.
Well, no, in practice you can’t describe a specific quale by describing a specific configuration of atoms (as in Mary’s Room). If you could, there would be no hard problem.
So now that you can, yes, the hard problem is solved.
Whats the quale of the universe?
I mean that actual physics doesn’t include fundamental division of universe into parts, so the most precise description of qualia is description of the quale of the universe. And that description is the same as physical description of the state of the universe. Or do you want me to say things that would result in non-verbal thoughts/feelings in you that you would judge as similar to the state of universe? Because that would depend on your judgement.
I guess “atoms can amount to qualia” was misleading, but I meant that you can describe human qualia using atoms, and that description would be as correct, as describing rock as heap of atoms would, and more complete than “I am seeing red”. The switch to “consciousness” was to prevent conflating specific qualia, that are not fundamental, with quale of universe.
Only in the same sense that “rocks are atoms” is not a prediction of physics.
Panpsychism that works (Russelian monism or whatever you want to call the one from http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf) states that all entities have one property that you can call mental—existence—and there is only one entity, because that is how actual physics works. And that property is also implicitly present in physicalism.
If dual aspect says that physical description is complete, even though you can describe things differently, then physics predicts that and you don’t need dual aspect. Is it says that physical description is incomplete, then I disagree and want to know what’s its objection to the kind of panpsychism I’m talking about.
Well, no, in practice you can’t describe a specific quale by describing a specific configuration of atoms (as in Mary’s Room). If you could, there would be no hard problem.
You can give microphysical explanation of a rock , once you input “rock” as a human concept. The same does not work for “red”.
Whats the quale of the universe?
I didn’t notice either idea being mentioned in the paper you linked.
Also, Chalmers seems conflicted about whether panpsychism is physicalism.
“In particular, constitutive Russellian panpsychism is incompatible with narrow physicalism, but it is a form of broad physicalism. ”
For what? Physics can allow you to predict external.events, but predicts nothing about how things seem to you. Dual aspect theory allows you to account for consciousness, without dismissing it ,and without embracing full dualism with its attendant problems.
How is that conflicted when broad physicalism is physicalism?
Right, sorry, it was another one where it’s called cosmopsychism: http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf.
It does work if on the last step where someone will say “but these firing neurons are not actually my seeing of red!” you also input arguments for panpsychism. They are the same kind of explanation, so panpsychism can in principle solve the hard problem. So if you disagree you have to disagree with something specific about panpsychism.
So now that you can, yes, the hard problem is solved.
I mean that actual physics doesn’t include fundamental division of universe into parts, so the most precise description of qualia is description of the quale of the universe. And that description is the same as physical description of the state of the universe. Or do you want me to say things that would result in non-verbal thoughts/feelings in you that you would judge as similar to the state of universe? Because that would depend on your judgement.