In any case, what I was trying to say was that even if IFS isn’t great reductionism, it’s still a better model than a naïve conception of the mind as a unified whole.
I think there’s an important difference between something like “I got insights out of IFS” and “I think people should be taught IFS,” and it’s not obvious to me whether you’re trying to say “historically rationalists got into IFS basically by chance amplified by word-of-mouth recommendations” or “I think rationalists should start learning about this sort of stuff through IFS” or “I think people who got into this through IFS shouldn’t abandon it.”
This is clarified some by this:
The intention of my comment was descriptive rather than prescriptive; that historically, the IFS model has been popular because it’s pragmatically useful and because, despite its possible flaws, rationalists haven’t been exposed to any better models.
The sense I have from reading through the post is something like “IFS and other approaches seem to be converging, in a way that means differences between them are more subtle / more tied to the overall narrative rather than the active ingredient.” If someone is better off thinking of things as parts that have wants, then they should get the IFS-derived version; if not, then not. But this sort of reminds me of my long-standing attempt to figure out what Friston-style models are doing that PCT-style models aren’t (and vice versa), where actually the thing at play seems to be a question of “which underlying theory deserves more status?” than “what different predictions do these models make?”, in a way that’s quite difficult to resolve.
But this sort of reminds me of my long-standing attempt to figure out what Friston-style models are doing that PCT-style models aren’t (and vice versa), where actually the thing at play seems to be a question of “which underlying theory deserves more status?” than “what different predictions do these models make?”, in a way that’s quite difficult to resolve.
As far as differing predictions go, if IFS’ model of how parts need to be treated is correct, then it should not be possible to directly alter someone’s rules without any reference to parts. Yet, the fact that non-parts-oriented therapies also work is a trivial refutation of this prediction. Ergo, the idea of parts is an unnecessary addition from a theoretical point of view.
If someone is better off thinking of things as parts that have wants, then they should get the IFS-derived version; if not, then not.
Yeah, this is basically my position. I don’t have any particularly strong opinion on when exactly one is better off thinking that, though. Feels like it depends a lot on the details of their personality, as well as how interested they are in the details in the first place—e.g. if someone was only interested in getting a practical system that they could use as soon as possible, I’d probably point them to IFS. If they wanted to have a thorough understanding of what exactly they were doing and the neural basis of it, I’d give them UtEB. Or something.
IFS feels like it’s easier to just get started with using, since the process is self-guiding to an extent. So I would probably suggest anyone try out at least a couple of sessions with a facilitator, just in case they could grab low-hanging fruit that way. I do think that if people got into this via IFS and it seems to work, no reason to abandon it, though complementing it with other techniques when IFS seems to fail is probably a good idea.
I think there’s an important difference between something like “I got insights out of IFS” and “I think people should be taught IFS,” and it’s not obvious to me whether you’re trying to say “historically rationalists got into IFS basically by chance amplified by word-of-mouth recommendations” or “I think rationalists should start learning about this sort of stuff through IFS” or “I think people who got into this through IFS shouldn’t abandon it.”
This is clarified some by this:
The sense I have from reading through the post is something like “IFS and other approaches seem to be converging, in a way that means differences between them are more subtle / more tied to the overall narrative rather than the active ingredient.” If someone is better off thinking of things as parts that have wants, then they should get the IFS-derived version; if not, then not. But this sort of reminds me of my long-standing attempt to figure out what Friston-style models are doing that PCT-style models aren’t (and vice versa), where actually the thing at play seems to be a question of “which underlying theory deserves more status?” than “what different predictions do these models make?”, in a way that’s quite difficult to resolve.
As far as differing predictions go, if IFS’ model of how parts need to be treated is correct, then it should not be possible to directly alter someone’s rules without any reference to parts. Yet, the fact that non-parts-oriented therapies also work is a trivial refutation of this prediction. Ergo, the idea of parts is an unnecessary addition from a theoretical point of view.
Yeah, this is basically my position. I don’t have any particularly strong opinion on when exactly one is better off thinking that, though. Feels like it depends a lot on the details of their personality, as well as how interested they are in the details in the first place—e.g. if someone was only interested in getting a practical system that they could use as soon as possible, I’d probably point them to IFS. If they wanted to have a thorough understanding of what exactly they were doing and the neural basis of it, I’d give them UtEB. Or something.
IFS feels like it’s easier to just get started with using, since the process is self-guiding to an extent. So I would probably suggest anyone try out at least a couple of sessions with a facilitator, just in case they could grab low-hanging fruit that way. I do think that if people got into this via IFS and it seems to work, no reason to abandon it, though complementing it with other techniques when IFS seems to fail is probably a good idea.