Not sure that is the standard theory: it was “around here” that I saw described the strategy of accepting low offers at reduced odds.
Essentially give them the choice of “100% chance of $5, or somewhat less than (5/6) chance of $6, or less than (5/7) chance of $7, etc”
That way the other party can’t expect to benefit by deviating from what you deem a fair division, but you’re also not destroying all the expected value available, in retaliation to an unfair offer.
Which will also more gracefully handle differences of opinion about the value being divided or the ‘fair’ midpoint, in cases where it’s less clear cut than just dividing $10 by two.
If we use the word “threat” to encompass any possibility of declining the offer, then you reduce the game to having only two solutions: either total capitulation, or some kind of use of threats.
I think it’s more useful to draw more distinctions. Whereby one can negotiate (including the possibility of that negotiation resulting in no-deal) or otherwise have your actions be contingent on their offer, without calling it a “threat”.
Probabilistic acceptance at least lacks the element of spite that leads to senseless destruction of value.
I definitely agree that probabilistic rejection is a reasonable and useful strategy. I’m not saying it isn’t, I’m saying that the standard “don’t give in to threats” maxim seems to say people shouldn’t tolerate it. That puts two standard elements of our zeitgiest in conflict with each other, and I’m looking for a resolution.
If we say that rejection (even probabilistic rejection) in the Ultimatum Game is reasonable and other agents should negotiate around your tendency to do it, and we say nothing about why this doesn’t meet the definition of a threat when it prima facie seems to, then we’re saying agents should sometimes give in to threats, which we usually say they never should.
Not sure that is the standard theory: it was “around here” that I saw described the strategy of accepting low offers at reduced odds.
Essentially give them the choice of “100% chance of $5, or somewhat less than (5/6) chance of $6, or less than (5/7) chance of $7, etc”
That way the other party can’t expect to benefit by deviating from what you deem a fair division, but you’re also not destroying all the expected value available, in retaliation to an unfair offer.
Which will also more gracefully handle differences of opinion about the value being divided or the ‘fair’ midpoint, in cases where it’s less clear cut than just dividing $10 by two.
Well sure, but isn’t that still a threat?
If we use the word “threat” to encompass any possibility of declining the offer, then you reduce the game to having only two solutions: either total capitulation, or some kind of use of threats.
I think it’s more useful to draw more distinctions. Whereby one can negotiate (including the possibility of that negotiation resulting in no-deal) or otherwise have your actions be contingent on their offer, without calling it a “threat”.
Probabilistic acceptance at least lacks the element of spite that leads to senseless destruction of value.
I definitely agree that probabilistic rejection is a reasonable and useful strategy. I’m not saying it isn’t, I’m saying that the standard “don’t give in to threats” maxim seems to say people shouldn’t tolerate it. That puts two standard elements of our zeitgiest in conflict with each other, and I’m looking for a resolution.
If we say that rejection (even probabilistic rejection) in the Ultimatum Game is reasonable and other agents should negotiate around your tendency to do it, and we say nothing about why this doesn’t meet the definition of a threat when it prima facie seems to, then we’re saying agents should sometimes give in to threats, which we usually say they never should.