Whether morality is an objective property of the universe
Thats running together two claims—the epistemic claim that there are moral truths, and the ontological claim that moral value is a property of the universe (as opposed to be something more like a logical truth).
If morality were objective, it would have to be conceivable that the statement “George’s actions were wrong and he deserves to be punished” would be true even if every human in the world were of the opinion, “George’s actions seem fine to me, perhaps even laudable”.
That’s not such a high bar. Our ancestors accepted things like slavery and the subordination of women , which we now.deplore—we think they were universally wrong.
Thus, a subjective morality is strongly preferable to an objective one!
That doesn’t follow, since nihilism, error theory, etc. are possible answers...which means you need to positively argue for (some form of subjectivism) , not.just argue against objectivism.
That’s because, by definition, it is about what we humans want.
No it isnt.
Would we prefer to be told by some third party what we should do, even if it is directly contrary to our own deeply held sense of morality?
If we are rational , we prefer to believe what is true. So we would defer to an omega if there were moral truths, and if we trusted it to know them. Just as rational people defer to scientists and mathematicians. And.of course, objective morality doesn’t have to be based on commandment theory in the first place.
We humans have a lot to be proud of: by thinking it through and arguing amongst ourselves, we have advanced morality hugely
How do you know? Moral subjectivism implies any moral stance is as good as any other...any stance is rendered true (or true-for-the-person) just by believing it. But moral progress is only defineable against an objective standard. That’s one of the arguments for moral objectivism.
So why are we all so afraid of admitting that, yes, morality is subjective?
You are characterizing objectivists as being emotion driven...but a selection of dry arguments can be found in the literature, which you should have read before writing the OP.
Subjective does not mean arbitrary.
Yes it does. Individual level subjectivism is the claim that simply having a moral stance.makes it correct.
Subjective does not mean that anyone’s opinion is “just as good”. Most humans are in broad agreement on almost all of the basics of morality. After all “people are the same wherever you go”. Most law codes overlap strongly, such that we can readily live in a foreign country with only minor adjustment for local customs. A psychopathic child killer’s opinion is not regarded as “just as good” by most of us, and if we decide morality by a broad consensus — and that, after all, is how we do decide morality — then we arrive at strong communal moral codes.
That’s favouring group level subjectivism over individual subjectivism. But similar problems apply: the group can declare any arbitrary thing to be morally right. You can fix that problem.by regarding group level morality as an evolutionary adaptation , so that well adapted.ethics is sort-of-true a s poorly adapted ethics is sort-of-false… but then you are most of the way to objectivism.
Our moral sense is one of a number of systems developed by evolution to do a job:
That doesn’t support the claim that morality is subjective, only the claim.that it is natural. Some kinds of objectivism are supernaturalistic but not all.
Human intuition that morality is objective is really the only argument
There are also a bunch of pragmatic arguments , like the need to justify punish ments, the need to define moral progress, etc.
A K-selected species would have very different morality from an r-selected species
I agree! But that shows morality isn’t universal—not that it isn’t objective facts. Objective facts can be local. Objective morality can vary with anything except moral stances.
Its clearly the case that different kinds of society—rich versus poor, nomads versus agricultrualists—have different kinds of de facto ethics.
Many attempts at establishing an objective morality try to argue from considerations of human well-being. OK, but who decided that human well-being is what is important? We did!
That’s a rather minimal amount of subjectivism. Everything downstream of that can be objective , so its really a compromise position. (Harris’s theory, which you seem to have in mind here , fails at being a completely objective theory, whilst succeeding in being a mostly objective theory).
But, if you want to arrive at an objective morality you now need a scheme for aggregating the well-beings of many creatures onto some objective scale, such that you can read off what you “should” do and how you “should” balance the competing interests of different people.
No, objective morality doesn’t have to be universalistic.
Many attempts at establishing an objective morality try to argue from considerations of human well-being. OK, but who decided that human well-being is what is important? We did!
That’s a rather minimal amount of subjectivism. Everything downstream of that can be objective , so its really a compromise position
It’s also possible (and I think very probable) that “ethical” means something like “conducive to well-being”. Similar to how “tree” means something like “plant with a central wooden trunk”. Imagine someone objecting: “OK, but who decided that trees need to have a wooden trunk? We did!” That’s true in some weak sense (though nobody really “decided” that “tree” refers to trees), but it doesn’t mean it’s subjective whether or not trees have a wooden trunk.
Though I think the meaning of “ethical” is a bit different, as it doesn’t just take well-being into account but also desires. The various forms of theories in normative ethics (e.g. the numerous theories of utilitarianism, or Extrapolated Volition) can be viewed as attempts to analyze what terms like “ethics” or “good” mean exactly.
That in itself isn’t a good definition , because it doesn’t distinguish ethics from, e.g. Medicine...and it doesn’t tell you whose well being. De facto people are ethically obliged to do things which against their well being and refrain from doing some things which promote their own wellbeing...I can’t rob people to pay my medical bills. (People also receive objective punishments, which makes an objective approach domestics justifiable).
Though I think the meaning of “ethical” is a bit different, as it doesn’t just take well-being into account but also desires
Whose desires? Why?
The various forms of theories in normative ethics (e.g. the numerous theories of utilitarianism, or Extrapolated Volition) can be viewed as attempts to analyze what terms like “ethics” or “good” mean exactly.
That in itself isn’t a good definition , because it doesn’t distinguish ethics from, e.g. Medicine...and it doesn’t tell you whose well being. De facto people are ethically obliged to do things which against their well being and refrain from doing some things which promote their own wellbeing...I can’t rob people to pay my medical bills.
Promoting your own well-being only would be egoism, while ethics seems to be more similar to altruism.
Whose desires?
I guess of all beings that are conscious. Perhaps relative to their degree of consciousness. Though those are all questions which actual theories in normative ethics try to answer.
Why?
Not sure what this is asking for, but if it is “why is this analysis correct rather than another, or none?”—because of the meaning of the involved term. (Compare “why not count bushes as “trees” as well?”—“because that would be talking about something else”)
The various forms of theories in normative ethics (e.g. the numerous theories of utilitarianism, or Extrapolated Volition) can be viewed as attempts to analyze what terms like “ethics” or “good” mean exactly.
They could also be seen as attempts to find different denotations of a term with shared connotation.
This doesn’t reflect the actual methodology, where theories are judged in thought experiments on whether they satisfy our intuitive, pre-theoretical concepts. That’s the same as in other areas of philosophy where conceptual analysis is performed.
Promoting your own well-being only would be egoism, while ethics seems to be more similar to altruism
Well, yes. (You don’t have to start from.a tabular area , and then proceed in baby steps, since there is a lot of prior art)
because of the meaning of the involved term
But “desires” is not how “ethics” is defined in standard dictionaries or philosophy. It’s not “the” definition.
This doesn’t reflect the actual methodology, where theories are judged in thought experiments on whether they satisfy our intuitive, pre-theoretical concepts
That’s irrelevant. Rival theories still need shared connotation.
Thats running together two claims—the epistemic claim that there are moral truths, and the ontological claim that moral value is a property of the universe (as opposed to be something more like a logical truth).
That’s not such a high bar. Our ancestors accepted things like slavery and the subordination of women , which we now.deplore—we think they were universally wrong.
That doesn’t follow, since nihilism, error theory, etc. are possible answers...which means you need to positively argue for (some form of subjectivism) , not.just argue against objectivism.
No it isnt.
If we are rational , we prefer to believe what is true. So we would defer to an omega if there were moral truths, and if we trusted it to know them. Just as rational people defer to scientists and mathematicians. And.of course, objective morality doesn’t have to be based on commandment theory in the first place.
How do you know? Moral subjectivism implies any moral stance is as good as any other...any stance is rendered true (or true-for-the-person) just by believing it. But moral progress is only defineable against an objective standard. That’s one of the arguments for moral objectivism.
You are characterizing objectivists as being emotion driven...but a selection of dry arguments can be found in the literature, which you should have read before writing the OP.
Yes it does. Individual level subjectivism is the claim that simply having a moral stance.makes it correct.
That’s favouring group level subjectivism over individual subjectivism. But similar problems apply: the group can declare any arbitrary thing to be morally right. You can fix that problem.by regarding group level morality as an evolutionary adaptation , so that well adapted.ethics is sort-of-true a s poorly adapted ethics is sort-of-false… but then you are most of the way to objectivism.
That doesn’t support the claim that morality is subjective, only the claim.that it is natural. Some kinds of objectivism are supernaturalistic but not all.
There are also a bunch of pragmatic arguments , like the need to justify punish ments, the need to define moral progress, etc.
I agree! But that shows morality isn’t universal—not that it isn’t objective facts. Objective facts can be local. Objective morality can vary with anything except moral stances.
Its clearly the case that different kinds of society—rich versus poor, nomads versus agricultrualists—have different kinds of de facto ethics.
That’s a rather minimal amount of subjectivism. Everything downstream of that can be objective , so its really a compromise position. (Harris’s theory, which you seem to have in mind here , fails at being a completely objective theory, whilst succeeding in being a mostly objective theory).
No, objective morality doesn’t have to be universalistic.
It’s also possible (and I think very probable) that “ethical” means something like “conducive to well-being”. Similar to how “tree” means something like “plant with a central wooden trunk”. Imagine someone objecting: “OK, but who decided that trees need to have a wooden trunk? We did!” That’s true in some weak sense (though nobody really “decided” that “tree” refers to trees), but it doesn’t mean it’s subjective whether or not trees have a wooden trunk.
Though I think the meaning of “ethical” is a bit different, as it doesn’t just take well-being into account but also desires. The various forms of theories in normative ethics (e.g. the numerous theories of utilitarianism, or Extrapolated Volition) can be viewed as attempts to analyze what terms like “ethics” or “good” mean exactly.
That in itself isn’t a good definition , because it doesn’t distinguish ethics from, e.g. Medicine...and it doesn’t tell you whose well being. De facto people are ethically obliged to do things which against their well being and refrain from doing some things which promote their own wellbeing...I can’t rob people to pay my medical bills. (People also receive objective punishments, which makes an objective approach domestics justifiable).
Whose desires? Why?
They could also be seen as attempts to find different denotations of a term with shared connotation. Disagreement , as opposed to talking-past, requires some commonality
(And utilitarianism is a terrible theory of obligation, a standard objection which its rationalist admirers have no novel response to).
Promoting your own well-being only would be egoism, while ethics seems to be more similar to altruism.
I guess of all beings that are conscious. Perhaps relative to their degree of consciousness. Though those are all questions which actual theories in normative ethics try to answer.
Not sure what this is asking for, but if it is “why is this analysis correct rather than another, or none?”—because of the meaning of the involved term. (Compare “why not count bushes as “trees” as well?”—“because that would be talking about something else”)
This doesn’t reflect the actual methodology, where theories are judged in thought experiments on whether they satisfy our intuitive, pre-theoretical concepts. That’s the same as in other areas of philosophy where conceptual analysis is performed.
Well, yes. (You don’t have to start from.a tabular area , and then proceed in baby steps, since there is a lot of prior art)
But “desires” is not how “ethics” is defined in standard dictionaries or philosophy. It’s not “the” definition.
That’s irrelevant. Rival theories still need shared connotation.