Surely the last thing on anyone’s mind, having been persuaded they’re in the presence of Omega in real life, is whether or not to give $100 :)
I like the No-mega idea (it’s similar to a refutation of Pascal’s wager by invoking contrary gods), but I wouldn’t raise my expectation for the number of No-mega encounters I’ll have by very much upon encountering a solitary Omega.
Generalizing No-mega to include all sorts of variants that reward stupid or perverse behavior (are there more possible God-likes that reward things strange and alien to us?), I’m not in the least bit concerned.
I suppose it’s just a good argument not to make plans for your life on the basis of imagined God-like beings. There should be as many gods who, when pleased with your action, intervene in your life in a way you would not consider pleasant, and are pleased at things you’d consider arbitrary, as those who have similar values they’d like us to express, and/or actually reward us copacetically.
I wouldn’t raise my expectation for the number of No-mega encounters I’ll have by very much upon encountering a solitary Omega.
You don’t have to. Both Omega and No-mega decide based on what your intentions were before seeing any supernatural creatures. If right now you say “I would give money to Omega if I met one”—factoring in all belief adjustments you would make upon seeing it—then you should say the reverse about No-mega, and vice versa.
ETA: Listen, I just had a funny idea. Now that we have this nifty weapon of “exploding counterfactuals”, why not apply it to Newcomb’s Problem too? It’s an improbable enough scenario that we can make up a similarly improbable No-mega that would reward you for counterfactual two-boxing. Damn, this technique is too powerful!
By not believing No-mega is probable just because I saw an Omega, I mean that I plan on considering such situations as they arise on the basis that only the types of godlike beings I’ve seen to date (so far, none) exist. I’m inclined to say that I’ll decide in the way that makes me happiest, provided I believe that the godlike being is honest and really can know my precommitment.
I realize this leaves me vulnerable to the first godlike huckster offering me a decent exclusive deal; I guess this implies that I think I’m much more likely to encounter 1 godlike being than many.
Surely the last thing on anyone’s mind, having been persuaded they’re in the presence of Omega in real life, is whether or not to give $100 :)
I like the No-mega idea (it’s similar to a refutation of Pascal’s wager by invoking contrary gods), but I wouldn’t raise my expectation for the number of No-mega encounters I’ll have by very much upon encountering a solitary Omega.
Generalizing No-mega to include all sorts of variants that reward stupid or perverse behavior (are there more possible God-likes that reward things strange and alien to us?), I’m not in the least bit concerned.
I suppose it’s just a good argument not to make plans for your life on the basis of imagined God-like beings. There should be as many gods who, when pleased with your action, intervene in your life in a way you would not consider pleasant, and are pleased at things you’d consider arbitrary, as those who have similar values they’d like us to express, and/or actually reward us copacetically.
You don’t have to. Both Omega and No-mega decide based on what your intentions were before seeing any supernatural creatures. If right now you say “I would give money to Omega if I met one”—factoring in all belief adjustments you would make upon seeing it—then you should say the reverse about No-mega, and vice versa.
ETA: Listen, I just had a funny idea. Now that we have this nifty weapon of “exploding counterfactuals”, why not apply it to Newcomb’s Problem too? It’s an improbable enough scenario that we can make up a similarly improbable No-mega that would reward you for counterfactual two-boxing. Damn, this technique is too powerful!
By not believing No-mega is probable just because I saw an Omega, I mean that I plan on considering such situations as they arise on the basis that only the types of godlike beings I’ve seen to date (so far, none) exist. I’m inclined to say that I’ll decide in the way that makes me happiest, provided I believe that the godlike being is honest and really can know my precommitment.
I realize this leaves me vulnerable to the first godlike huckster offering me a decent exclusive deal; I guess this implies that I think I’m much more likely to encounter 1 godlike being than many.