A core part of Pearl’s paradigm is how he has defined the way to go from a causal graph to a set of observations of variables. This definition pretty much defines causality, and serves as core for further reasoning about it.
Logical causality lacks the equivalent, a way to go from a causal logical graph to a set of truth values for propositions. I have some basic solution for this problem but they are all much less powerful than what people want out of logical causality. In particular it is trivially solvable if one considers computational causality instead of logical causality.
Most people advocating for logical causality seems to disregard this approach, and instead want to define logical causality purely in terms of logical counterfactuals (whereas usually the Pearlian approach would define counterfactuals in terms of causality). I don’t see the reason to expect this to work.
I guess to simplify the objection:
A core part of Pearl’s paradigm is how he has defined the way to go from a causal graph to a set of observations of variables. This definition pretty much defines causality, and serves as core for further reasoning about it.
Logical causality lacks the equivalent, a way to go from a causal logical graph to a set of truth values for propositions. I have some basic solution for this problem but they are all much less powerful than what people want out of logical causality. In particular it is trivially solvable if one considers computational causality instead of logical causality.
Most people advocating for logical causality seems to disregard this approach, and instead want to define logical causality purely in terms of logical counterfactuals (whereas usually the Pearlian approach would define counterfactuals in terms of causality). I don’t see the reason to expect this to work.