The utility generated by working is higher than that generated by many kinds of immediate fun not because we value work over fun, but because the work will, in the long term, produce more fun or other things we value (e.g, benefits to others).
I suspect there was a miscommunication. I thought that by:
the main thing that you’re going to optimizing when you have fun is how much motivation the memory of having that fun increases your working capabilities.
you meant that the purpose of, say, going to a movie would be to make us more motivated to work later. Whereas, when I go to a movie, I’m doing because I expect to enjoy the experience for itself.
The fact is that any given action can be pleasant on its own, or produce something we value, or both at the same time. It’s important to know which kind of benefit to expect from a given action, or we’ll be disappointed, but both kinds are good.
I would call “Enjoying the experience for itself” the terminal utility assigned by your utility function to you going to the movie—for most of us, fun is one of our terminal values, so a world-state in which we are having a certain intensity of fun for a certain length of time has higher utility than one in which we are having no fun, all else being equal.
The motivation-to-work that results from having fun is a source of instrumental utility because it increases the instrumental utility output of our future work (which is an attempt to optimize for future world-states in which we are having fun in the broad sense—world states with greater terminal utility.)
Now, let’s assume for a moment that the instrumental utility generated by you working for a length of time is much, much greater (ex: you’re saving the world, or a significant part of it), than the terminal utility generated by you having fun for that same length of time. If we also assume that the effect of motivation upon the instrumental utility of your work output is somehow affected by the amount of instrumental utility that each unit of your work output has, then the terminal utility granted directly by you having fun approaches zero in comparison to the instrumental utility granted by the increase in your work output as a result of motivation-caused-by-having-fun.
Of course, this conclusion is subject to the assumptions that I made earlier. If the instrumental utility generated by the work that you do doesn’t dwarf the terminal utility generated by the fun that you have, then it doesn’t apply.
I agree with this. Did I miscommunicate?
I suspect there was a miscommunication. I thought that by:
you meant that the purpose of, say, going to a movie would be to make us more motivated to work later. Whereas, when I go to a movie, I’m doing because I expect to enjoy the experience for itself.
The fact is that any given action can be pleasant on its own, or produce something we value, or both at the same time. It’s important to know which kind of benefit to expect from a given action, or we’ll be disappointed, but both kinds are good.
I’ll try to clarify:
I would call “Enjoying the experience for itself” the terminal utility assigned by your utility function to you going to the movie—for most of us, fun is one of our terminal values, so a world-state in which we are having a certain intensity of fun for a certain length of time has higher utility than one in which we are having no fun, all else being equal.
The motivation-to-work that results from having fun is a source of instrumental utility because it increases the instrumental utility output of our future work (which is an attempt to optimize for future world-states in which we are having fun in the broad sense—world states with greater terminal utility.)
Now, let’s assume for a moment that the instrumental utility generated by you working for a length of time is much, much greater (ex: you’re saving the world, or a significant part of it), than the terminal utility generated by you having fun for that same length of time. If we also assume that the effect of motivation upon the instrumental utility of your work output is somehow affected by the amount of instrumental utility that each unit of your work output has, then the terminal utility granted directly by you having fun approaches zero in comparison to the instrumental utility granted by the increase in your work output as a result of motivation-caused-by-having-fun.
Of course, this conclusion is subject to the assumptions that I made earlier. If the instrumental utility generated by the work that you do doesn’t dwarf the terminal utility generated by the fun that you have, then it doesn’t apply.
Okay, that makes sense. We agree. I just didn’t understand your assumptions the first time.