One of the points it makes is that most conceptions of religion suggest that we don’t live in a world that just gets wiped out by an x-risk for no good reason
I understand this part.
and that this would be bad.
I don’t understand this part.
X-risks wouldbe far lower under most simulation hypotheses[1]. (Not non-existent, for various reasons. Just lower.) I don’t see anyone claiming that that is a strike against simulation hypotheses. (...should it be?)
Especially[2] simulation hypotheses that assume heavily-nested simulations. Fairly simple argument goes like this: assume each universe launches >1 simulation (not necessarily concurrently). Assume there is some variation in x-risk between simulations. Simulations with lower x-risk have a higher mean amount of sub-simulation time than simulations with higher x-risk. Recurse down the tree and you very quickly have the vast majority of total simulation time in universes with little-to-no x-risk[3].
Though even under non-nested simulations I can see reasonably solid arguments that x-risks would be lower[4]. If I’m trying to do a long-term simulation of the economy, having a result that ’well, the economy (and everything else) collapsed two decades in due to a false vacuum collapse” is supremely unhelpful. (...and I’d probably try to edit and resume the simulation from the last checkpoint before the problem was noticable, for that matter.)
This argument only ‘really’ applies if both a) simulations can run more total sub-simulation time than their own ’real’time, and b) the effective decrease in x-risk from a) outweighs the x-risk of the simulation itself. That being said, a) is effectively a prerequisite of heavily-nested simulations.
That being said, I can also see arguments that it would be higher, especially if you include “the simulation being unceremoniously terminated” as an x-risk. Point remains: x-risk calculations change significantly if you accept A. X-risk calculations change significantly if you accept B. Why is this taken as a strike against A and not B?
If it would be factually true that there’s a god out there that protects us against x-risk it would be worth believing in such a god. You however can’t defend a religion that does give the impression that such a god exists with the arguments that the OP listed that make religion attractive such as providing nice rituals and allowing people to supposedly have better marriages.
I understand this part.
I don’t understand this part.
X-risks would be far lower under most simulation hypotheses[1]. (Not non-existent, for various reasons. Just lower.) I don’t see anyone claiming that that is a strike against simulation hypotheses. (...should it be?)
Especially[2] simulation hypotheses that assume heavily-nested simulations. Fairly simple argument goes like this: assume each universe launches >1 simulation (not necessarily concurrently). Assume there is some variation in x-risk between simulations. Simulations with lower x-risk have a higher mean amount of sub-simulation time than simulations with higher x-risk. Recurse down the tree and you very quickly have the vast majority of total simulation time in universes with little-to-no x-risk[3].
Though even under non-nested simulations I can see reasonably solid arguments that x-risks would be lower[4]. If I’m trying to do a long-term simulation of the economy, having a result that ’well, the economy (and everything else) collapsed two decades in due to a false vacuum collapse” is supremely unhelpful. (...and I’d probably try to edit and resume the simulation from the last checkpoint before the problem was noticable, for that matter.)
This argument only ‘really’ applies if both a) simulations can run more total sub-simulation time than their own ’real’time, and b) the effective decrease in x-risk from a) outweighs the x-risk of the simulation itself. That being said, a) is effectively a prerequisite of heavily-nested simulations.
That being said, I can also see arguments that it would be higher, especially if you include “the simulation being unceremoniously terminated” as an x-risk. Point remains: x-risk calculations change significantly if you accept A. X-risk calculations change significantly if you accept B. Why is this taken as a strike against A and not B?
If it would be factually true that there’s a god out there that protects us against x-risk it would be worth believing in such a god. You however can’t defend a religion that does give the impression that such a god exists with the arguments that the OP listed that make religion attractive such as providing nice rituals and allowing people to supposedly have better marriages.