Now, you’d think that a public choice EconTalk would take the position that there are systemic flaws in our current form of government and so we need to find ways to improve our systems to remove the flaws.
Instead, Boudreaux’s position, as far as I could tell, was “Well, there are systemic flaws in democracy…so let’s educate people about them”. It’s a complete non sequitur, which I found very frustrating, because someone who understands public choice ought to be able to see the glaring flaw in this strategy. It’s like saying: “In a democracy, voters are rationally ignorant…so let’s educate voters about rational ignorance to fix it.”, or “In a democracy, concentrated interests with lower transaction costs tend to win in the political marketplace, so let’s teach people this to fix it.” I heard no mention of changing the rules so as to change these incentives. Incentives are like the laws of physics – they work whether or not you believe about them, and whether or not you know about them.
We can probably convince some intelligent people to become rationalists simply by talking to them, but many of them are of the type who’d have preferred to become rationalists anyway, even if they hadn’t known the word. If we want to raise the sanity waterline, we need to work on better incentives for rational thought.
Anybody have ideas on what might be realistically achievable rationality incentives?
Anybody have ideas on what might be realistically achievable rationality incentives?
One simple idea is to make rationality more popular, but even if that worked, it would probably just make “rationality” more popular, where “rationality” is defined as screaming that your opponents are irrational.
Another possibility is to increase elitism in government and business wrt mathematical & scientific knowledge—this wouldn’t help the public at large be rational but it would at least avoid innumerate policy-makers to a certain extent.
I think perhaps the most important thing we could do, though, would be to aspire to becoming more well-rounded humans ourselves. The trouble with rationalists is that we aren’t typically the kind of people one appreciates unless one is already a rationalist. But a genuine phronimos is a very magnetic personality, a real rolemodel, because they have all the other graces as well. A personality like, say, Stephen Lewis, promoting rationalism—now that would be a force. (Don’t get me wrong, what he has been doing is more important).
Listening to John Lee Clary the former klansman talk about how he came to lose his certainty in that ideology reminded me of this issue.
The reverend Wade Watts of whom he speaks basically eats away at his defenses by setting a moral example for him. Take heed! People will rarely judge us purely on our ideas, so in a war of rhetoric, it is also skillfully applied pathos that is needed.
I think perhaps the most important thing we could do, though, would be to aspire to becoming more well-rounded humans ourselves.
I agree with this, but the frame “well-rounded human being” seems to incorporate an assumption that something is “wrong” with rational people that is “right” with others, and I want to question that.
...”well-rounded human being” seems to incorporate an assumption that something is “wrong” with rational people that is “right” with others...
I would say, not wrong but insufficient. I like the distinction that virtue ethics makes: sophia is wisdom in the sense of thinking correctly about facts, whereas phronesis is practical wisdom; i.e., “doing the right things, to the right people, at the right time.”
Excellent post. I’m also reminded of this post that I just recently read: Change Incentives, Not Minds.
We can probably convince some intelligent people to become rationalists simply by talking to them, but many of them are of the type who’d have preferred to become rationalists anyway, even if they hadn’t known the word. If we want to raise the sanity waterline, we need to work on better incentives for rational thought.
Anybody have ideas on what might be realistically achievable rationality incentives?
One simple idea is to make rationality more popular, but even if that worked, it would probably just make “rationality” more popular, where “rationality” is defined as screaming that your opponents are irrational.
Another possibility is to increase elitism in government and business wrt mathematical & scientific knowledge—this wouldn’t help the public at large be rational but it would at least avoid innumerate policy-makers to a certain extent.
I think perhaps the most important thing we could do, though, would be to aspire to becoming more well-rounded humans ourselves. The trouble with rationalists is that we aren’t typically the kind of people one appreciates unless one is already a rationalist. But a genuine phronimos is a very magnetic personality, a real rolemodel, because they have all the other graces as well. A personality like, say, Stephen Lewis, promoting rationalism—now that would be a force. (Don’t get me wrong, what he has been doing is more important).
Listening to John Lee Clary the former klansman talk about how he came to lose his certainty in that ideology reminded me of this issue.
The reverend Wade Watts of whom he speaks basically eats away at his defenses by setting a moral example for him. Take heed! People will rarely judge us purely on our ideas, so in a war of rhetoric, it is also skillfully applied pathos that is needed.
It’s not just about being more moral, at least as morality is generally understood.
It’s also about putting morality and mental superiority into action by being funny without being mean.
And I don’t trust that the last bit happened, even though the rest of it might be true.
“Whatever you do to that chicken, I’m going to do to you” is part of an old joke, and really rather an unlikely threat.
The version I’d heard (NPR’s “A Christmas Griot” and my favorite part of the show) involved a whole chicken and kissing it on the ass.
I agree with this, but the frame “well-rounded human being” seems to incorporate an assumption that something is “wrong” with rational people that is “right” with others, and I want to question that.
I would say, not wrong but insufficient. I like the distinction that virtue ethics makes: sophia is wisdom in the sense of thinking correctly about facts, whereas phronesis is practical wisdom; i.e., “doing the right things, to the right people, at the right time.”
We can probably convince some intelligent people to want to become rationalists simply by talking to them.