You are perhaps interpreting his interactive dualism as substance dualism
You seem to be nitpicking definitions. Let’s try to grasp the substance. Eliezer was initially distinguishing between two types of dualism:
Where consciousness is causally ineffective
Where consciousness has causal effects
His Zombie post were about the first one. This post is about the second one.
If you want to talk about some sub-type of the second that manages to evade the argument in this post—be my guest.
The point of arguing for zombies is to argue for non physicalism. Zombies are not the only way to argue for nonphysicalism. Assuming non physicalism to argue against zombies is therefore a pointless way of arguing for physicalism.
I’m not sure what this has to do with the citation.
You seem to be arguing that interactive dualism must be disguised physicalism.
It’s not yet an argument, just a vibe according to which we can arrive to one. The actual argument is presented further below.
But that can be disproved by putting forward a non arbitrary criterion of the physical and non physical, as we shall see.
A non-arbitrary criterion would indeed be helpful for rescuing Zombie argument from this particular critique. But merely saying the word “subjective” doesn’t help much. You need to actually prove that such subjective things exist in a sense where they are not also objective and have a method to discern whether a particular thing is subjective or objective in this sense. Otherwise, one can just say that electrons are “subjective” and we are back to square one.
“Physics” doesnt mean “the only way the world could possible be”. Physics focuses on objective (because results need to be confirmed by multiple scientists) and quantifiable (because physics uses maths as its language). If it happen to be the case that there is something in the universe that is subjective or unquantifiable,then physics can’t get a grip on it.
I think you are confusing physics-map and physics-territory here. For the sake of Zombie-argument we care about the territory—the actual way the matter in the universe behave, regardless of our epistemological limitations.
Imagine a fully materialistic universe strictly following some laws, which are such that no agent from inside the universe is able to fully comprehend them. Would you say that it is enough to declare that such universe is dualistic in nature, even if there are no qualia involved?
And Chalmers has a version of this argument, in The Conscious Mind...he characterises the physical as the structural/functional.
I would appreciate if you present this argument here or in a separate post, showing how it refutes my point, instead of simply proclaiming it. With a proper definition of “functional” and “structural” in this context, of course.
It’s actually contradiction, not falsehood.
Naturally, falsehoods being true is a contradiction.
Recent discussion:
Sadly I’m not able to access Astral Codex now, so if you posted something relevant there in the comments—I would appreciate if you re-posted it here.
A non-arbitrary criterion would indeed be helpful for rescuing Zombie argument from this particular critique. But merely saying the word “subjective” doesn’t help much. You need to actually prove that such subjective things exist in a sense where they are not also objective
No side of the argument has a proof , in the maths sense. To show that physicalism isn’t necessarily true, I only need to show there is some plausibility to the existence of intrinsic subjectivity.
and have a method to discern whether a particular thing is subjective or objective in this sense. Otherwise, one can just say that electrons are “subjective” and we are back to square one.
There is debate on the subject because everyone has prima facie evidence that they are some kind of self,they are self aware, they have their own unique perceptions, and so on. It wasn’t invented out of nothing.
I think you are confusing physics-map and physics-territory here. For the sake of Zombie-argument we care about the territory—the actual way the matter in the universe behave, regardless of our epistemological limitations.
What we care about us one thing, what we know another. We have no access to the ontologically physical except via our maps.
Would you say that it is enough to declare that such universe is dualistic in nature, even if there are no qualia involved?
I’m not saying dualism is necessarily true, I’m saying physicalism isn’t necessarily true. The one is not a corollary of the other.
I would appreciate if you present this argument here or in a separate post, showing how it refutes my point, instead of simply proclaiming it. With a proper definition of “functional” and “structural” in this context, of course.
What’s the problem? If you argument is that
substance dualism is disguised physicalism in the absence of a demarcation between the mental and physical, well there’s your demarcation. Or are you sratating that “structural” and “functional” are meaningless terms?
Naturally, falsehoods being true is a contradiction.
To something. Falsehoods contradict truths, truths contraduct falsehoods. That doesnt mean all falsehoods are self contradictions. You can learn logic.
To show that physicalism isn’t necessarily true, I only need to show there is some plausibility to the existence of intrinsic subjectivity.
I’m not saying dualism is necessarily true, I’m saying physicalism isn’t necessarily true. The one is not a corollary of the other.
Okay, I think we have a long-going misunderstanding here, so let’s try to clear it once and for all.
We are, in fact, both in agreement that physicalism is not necessary true. Likewise, we are in agreement that dualism is also not necessary true.
Now consider these two statements:
Weak Zombie Argument: Zombies are conceivable, therefore physicalism is not necessary true
Strong Zombie Argument: Zombies are conceivable therefore physicalism is necessary false
I think the confusion that goes on between the two of us, is that when I say “Zombie Argument” I mean the strong one, while when you say “Zombie Argument”, you mean the weak one. If you agree that Strong Zombie Argument is wrong, then there is in fact, no substantial disagreement between the two of us on this matter!
You seem to be nitpicking definitions. Let’s try to grasp the substance. Eliezer was initially distinguishing between two types of dualism:
Where consciousness is causally ineffective
Where consciousness has causal effects
His Zombie post were about the first one. This post is about the second one.
If you want to talk about some sub-type of the second that manages to evade the argument in this post—be my guest.
I’m not sure what this has to do with the citation.
It’s not yet an argument, just a vibe according to which we can arrive to one. The actual argument is presented further below.
A non-arbitrary criterion would indeed be helpful for rescuing Zombie argument from this particular critique. But merely saying the word “subjective” doesn’t help much. You need to actually prove that such subjective things exist in a sense where they are not also objective and have a method to discern whether a particular thing is subjective or objective in this sense. Otherwise, one can just say that electrons are “subjective” and we are back to square one.
I think you are confusing physics-map and physics-territory here. For the sake of Zombie-argument we care about the territory—the actual way the matter in the universe behave, regardless of our epistemological limitations.
Imagine a fully materialistic universe strictly following some laws, which are such that no agent from inside the universe is able to fully comprehend them. Would you say that it is enough to declare that such universe is dualistic in nature, even if there are no qualia involved?
I would appreciate if you present this argument here or in a separate post, showing how it refutes my point, instead of simply proclaiming it. With a proper definition of “functional” and “structural” in this context, of course.
Naturally, falsehoods being true is a contradiction.
Sadly I’m not able to access Astral Codex now, so if you posted something relevant there in the comments—I would appreciate if you re-posted it here.
No side of the argument has a proof , in the maths sense. To show that physicalism isn’t necessarily true, I only need to show there is some plausibility to the existence of intrinsic subjectivity.
There is debate on the subject because everyone has prima facie evidence that they are some kind of self,they are self aware, they have their own unique perceptions, and so on. It wasn’t invented out of nothing.
What we care about us one thing, what we know another. We have no access to the ontologically physical except via our maps.
I’m not saying dualism is necessarily true, I’m saying physicalism isn’t necessarily true. The one is not a corollary of the other.
What’s the problem? If you argument is that substance dualism is disguised physicalism in the absence of a demarcation between the mental and physical, well there’s your demarcation. Or are you sratating that “structural” and “functional” are meaningless terms?
To something. Falsehoods contradict truths, truths contraduct falsehoods. That doesnt mean all falsehoods are self contradictions. You can learn logic.
Okay, I think we have a long-going misunderstanding here, so let’s try to clear it once and for all.
We are, in fact, both in agreement that physicalism is not necessary true. Likewise, we are in agreement that dualism is also not necessary true.
Now consider these two statements:
Weak Zombie Argument: Zombies are conceivable, therefore physicalism is not necessary true
Strong Zombie Argument: Zombies are conceivable therefore physicalism is necessary false
I think the confusion that goes on between the two of us, is that when I say “Zombie Argument” I mean the strong one, while when you say “Zombie Argument”, you mean the weak one. If you agree that Strong Zombie Argument is wrong, then there is in fact, no substantial disagreement between the two of us on this matter!
So, are we in agreement here?