Most terms have multiple definitions. Probability/possibility can be thought of as a subjective , ignorance based thing...or as a basic feature of the universe.
“Free will” has multiple definitions, too. So you cant necessarily support any particular version of FW with any particular definition of probability/ possibility.
To reiterate this crucial point: probabilities are statements about you, not statements about the world
Not a fact. Ignorance, or Knightian uncertainty, can be part of the whole mishmash of probability, but it’s existence doesn’t prove the nonexistence of real, in-the-territory possibilities. Determinism is not a physical fact.
But there is also a meaningful subjective statement about the world, an objective statement about our knowledge of the world, that the coin has a 50% chance of heads and a 50% chance of tail
What’s that got to do with free will?
If you see free will as an ability to steer to a future that you want to happen, and away from other possible futures …as an ability to effect or change things …subjective uncertainty is no help at all.
To put it another way, if free will is an inherent capacity of some entities, then they are not going to acquire it as a result of your own incapacity.
Other definitions of free will are possible...but it’s already known that compatibilist FW is compatible with the determinism you are assuming.
The probability stuff is meant as an analogy to see the place that our knowledge can have in our description of reality, not as directly implying free will. It’s saying “free will is like this” not “this premise leads to the conclusion that free will exists”.
I definitely agree that free will has multiple definitions, and certainly there are some definitions by which free will just doesn’t exist. The point I try to make in the piece is that this is a useful definition of free will, not that it’s the only possible one. I try to object to the objection that a compatibilist definition doesn’t add anything useful to our understanding of the world, but not to the idea that no other definition is coherent. I don’t think I say anywhere that free will exists under any definition of free will, only that this definition is a good one that captures meaningful things about the world.
I regret a little the initial comments I made introducing the piece, I was just trying to imply that while we’ve all seen the same arguments about free will over and over people might find a new nuance here. I certainly don’t think I invented compatibilism. I just think there’s a slightly new perspective by looking from this analogy to probability to understand a little more clearly why compatibilism works.
Anyway, thanks for your comment, I think I mostly agree with everything. I suppose I’m probably a little extreme in my views on probability, though.
Free will isn’t unconditionally like this, because everything you have said is conditional on determinism , which is not known to be true. So there is no need to abandon the incompatibilist definition. Or assume that there can only be one definition.
However, as this is a response to the comment that I think made clear the reasons why I would agree, maybe I’m missing something important.
Maybe my error is related to the fact, which you correctly point out, that my article assumes that determinism is true and asks, “if determinism is true, can we still have free will?”. It seems to me that determinism only strengthens the incompatibilist position, which is why the article uses it as a framework. But it sounds like you’re saying there is at least some way in which if determinism isn’t true this can strengthen the incompatibilist viewpoint?
Indeterminism being false would allow libertarian free will to be possible. Libertarian free will is the poor relation in lesswrong thinking, usually dismissed without argument. And it can co exist with compatibilist free will.
I think you mean “determinism being false...”, the rest of your comment makes sense in that context.
In which case I think you’re saying, if determinism is false, libertarian free will would be possible. And since that’s true, when I suggest that we should define free will in relation to our (lack of) knoweldge about the world, I’m dismissing the possibly better definition given by a libertarian free will perspective.
Is that right?
If so I think that’s right. I do think there are arguments against libertarian free will that hold even if determinism is false, but I don’t make any such arguments in the post, it doesn’t address the question of the validity of libertarian free will at all, and to the extent that I want to make a positive claim with the piece, that is probably a flaw. I’ll consider making a minor edit to the substack version of the article that at least mentions this, though I probably won’t try to make the argument against libertarian free will as the piece is already long enough as it is.
Thanks for pointing this out, I did legitimately miss that.
(And if I misunderstood your point and you were saying something else please let me know!)
Most terms have multiple definitions. Probability/possibility can be thought of as a subjective , ignorance based thing...or as a basic feature of the universe.
“Free will” has multiple definitions, too. So you cant necessarily support any particular version of FW with any particular definition of probability/ possibility.
Not a fact. Ignorance, or Knightian uncertainty, can be part of the whole mishmash of probability, but it’s existence doesn’t prove the nonexistence of real, in-the-territory possibilities. Determinism is not a physical fact.
What’s that got to do with free will? If you see free will as an ability to steer to a future that you want to happen, and away from other possible futures …as an ability to effect or change things …subjective uncertainty is no help at all.
To put it another way, if free will is an inherent capacity of some entities, then they are not going to acquire it as a result of your own incapacity.
Other definitions of free will are possible...but it’s already known that compatibilist FW is compatible with the determinism you are assuming.
The probability stuff is meant as an analogy to see the place that our knowledge can have in our description of reality, not as directly implying free will. It’s saying “free will is like this” not “this premise leads to the conclusion that free will exists”.
I definitely agree that free will has multiple definitions, and certainly there are some definitions by which free will just doesn’t exist. The point I try to make in the piece is that this is a useful definition of free will, not that it’s the only possible one. I try to object to the objection that a compatibilist definition doesn’t add anything useful to our understanding of the world, but not to the idea that no other definition is coherent. I don’t think I say anywhere that free will exists under any definition of free will, only that this definition is a good one that captures meaningful things about the world.
I regret a little the initial comments I made introducing the piece, I was just trying to imply that while we’ve all seen the same arguments about free will over and over people might find a new nuance here. I certainly don’t think I invented compatibilism. I just think there’s a slightly new perspective by looking from this analogy to probability to understand a little more clearly why compatibilism works.
Anyway, thanks for your comment, I think I mostly agree with everything. I suppose I’m probably a little extreme in my views on probability, though.
Free will isn’t unconditionally like this, because everything you have said is conditional on determinism , which is not known to be true. So there is no need to abandon the incompatibilist definition. Or assume that there can only be one definition.
I think I agree with this.
However, as this is a response to the comment that I think made clear the reasons why I would agree, maybe I’m missing something important.
Maybe my error is related to the fact, which you correctly point out, that my article assumes that determinism is true and asks, “if determinism is true, can we still have free will?”. It seems to me that determinism only strengthens the incompatibilist position, which is why the article uses it as a framework. But it sounds like you’re saying there is at least some way in which if determinism isn’t true this can strengthen the incompatibilist viewpoint?
Indeterminism being false would allow libertarian free will to be possible. Libertarian free will is the poor relation in lesswrong thinking, usually dismissed without argument. And it can co exist with compatibilist free will.
I think you mean “determinism being false...”, the rest of your comment makes sense in that context.
In which case I think you’re saying, if determinism is false, libertarian free will would be possible. And since that’s true, when I suggest that we should define free will in relation to our (lack of) knoweldge about the world, I’m dismissing the possibly better definition given by a libertarian free will perspective.
Is that right?
If so I think that’s right. I do think there are arguments against libertarian free will that hold even if determinism is false, but I don’t make any such arguments in the post, it doesn’t address the question of the validity of libertarian free will at all, and to the extent that I want to make a positive claim with the piece, that is probably a flaw. I’ll consider making a minor edit to the substack version of the article that at least mentions this, though I probably won’t try to make the argument against libertarian free will as the piece is already long enough as it is.
Thanks for pointing this out, I did legitimately miss that.
(And if I misunderstood your point and you were saying something else please let me know!)