Free will isn’t unconditionally like this, because everything you have said is conditional on determinism , which is not known to be true. So there is no need to abandon the incompatibilist definition. Or assume that there can only be one definition.
However, as this is a response to the comment that I think made clear the reasons why I would agree, maybe I’m missing something important.
Maybe my error is related to the fact, which you correctly point out, that my article assumes that determinism is true and asks, “if determinism is true, can we still have free will?”. It seems to me that determinism only strengthens the incompatibilist position, which is why the article uses it as a framework. But it sounds like you’re saying there is at least some way in which if determinism isn’t true this can strengthen the incompatibilist viewpoint?
Indeterminism being false would allow libertarian free will to be possible. Libertarian free will is the poor relation in lesswrong thinking, usually dismissed without argument. And it can co exist with compatibilist free will.
I think you mean “determinism being false...”, the rest of your comment makes sense in that context.
In which case I think you’re saying, if determinism is false, libertarian free will would be possible. And since that’s true, when I suggest that we should define free will in relation to our (lack of) knoweldge about the world, I’m dismissing the possibly better definition given by a libertarian free will perspective.
Is that right?
If so I think that’s right. I do think there are arguments against libertarian free will that hold even if determinism is false, but I don’t make any such arguments in the post, it doesn’t address the question of the validity of libertarian free will at all, and to the extent that I want to make a positive claim with the piece, that is probably a flaw. I’ll consider making a minor edit to the substack version of the article that at least mentions this, though I probably won’t try to make the argument against libertarian free will as the piece is already long enough as it is.
Thanks for pointing this out, I did legitimately miss that.
(And if I misunderstood your point and you were saying something else please let me know!)
Free will isn’t unconditionally like this, because everything you have said is conditional on determinism , which is not known to be true. So there is no need to abandon the incompatibilist definition. Or assume that there can only be one definition.
I think I agree with this.
However, as this is a response to the comment that I think made clear the reasons why I would agree, maybe I’m missing something important.
Maybe my error is related to the fact, which you correctly point out, that my article assumes that determinism is true and asks, “if determinism is true, can we still have free will?”. It seems to me that determinism only strengthens the incompatibilist position, which is why the article uses it as a framework. But it sounds like you’re saying there is at least some way in which if determinism isn’t true this can strengthen the incompatibilist viewpoint?
Indeterminism being false would allow libertarian free will to be possible. Libertarian free will is the poor relation in lesswrong thinking, usually dismissed without argument. And it can co exist with compatibilist free will.
I think you mean “determinism being false...”, the rest of your comment makes sense in that context.
In which case I think you’re saying, if determinism is false, libertarian free will would be possible. And since that’s true, when I suggest that we should define free will in relation to our (lack of) knoweldge about the world, I’m dismissing the possibly better definition given by a libertarian free will perspective.
Is that right?
If so I think that’s right. I do think there are arguments against libertarian free will that hold even if determinism is false, but I don’t make any such arguments in the post, it doesn’t address the question of the validity of libertarian free will at all, and to the extent that I want to make a positive claim with the piece, that is probably a flaw. I’ll consider making a minor edit to the substack version of the article that at least mentions this, though I probably won’t try to make the argument against libertarian free will as the piece is already long enough as it is.
Thanks for pointing this out, I did legitimately miss that.
(And if I misunderstood your point and you were saying something else please let me know!)