I find it unpleasant that you always bring your hobbyhorse in, but in an “abstract” way that doesn’t allow discussing the actual object level question.
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That’s understandable, but I hope it’s also understandable that I find it unpleasant that our standard Bayesian philosophy-of-language somehow got politicized (!?), such that my attempts to do correct epistemology are perceived as attacking people?!
I note that this isn’t a denial of the accusation that you’re bringing up a hobbyhorse, disguised by abstraction. It sounds more like a defense of discussing a political specific by means of abstraction. I’ve noted in at least some of your posts that I don’t find your abstractions very compelling without examples, and I that I don’t much care for the examples I can think of to reify your abstractions.
It’s at times like this that I’m happy I’m not part of a “rationalist community” that includes repetitive indirection of political fights along with denial that that’s what they are. But I wish you’d keep it off less wrong.
On the next level down, your insistence that words have consistent meaning and categories are real and must be consistent across usages (including both context changes and internal reasoning vs external communication) seems a blind spot. I don’t know if it’s caused by the examples you’re choosing (and not sharing), or if the reverse is true.
It sounds more like a defense of discussing a political specific by means of abstraction.
Zack said:
Like, maybe statistics is part of the common interest of many causes, such that, as a matter of local validity, you should assess arguments about statistics on their own merits in the context that those arguments are presented, without worrying about how those arguments might or might not be applied in other contexts?
What, realistically, do you expect the atheist—or the racist, or me—to do? Am I supposed to just passively accept that all of my thoughts about epistemology are tainted and unfit for this forum, because I happen to be interested in applying epistemology to other topics (on a separate website, under a pseudonym)?
Which isn’t saying specifics should be discussed by discussing abstracts, it says abstracts should be discussed, even when part of the motivation for discussing the abstract is specific. Like, people should be able to collaborate on statistics textbooks even if they don’t agree with their co-authors’ specific applications of statistics to their non-statistical domains. (It would be pretty useless to discuss abstracts if there we no specific motivations, after all...)
Right. At least some abstract topics should be discussed, and part of the discussion is which, if any, specifics might be exemplary of such abstractions. Other abstract topics should be avoided, if the relevant examples are politically-charged and the abstraction doesn’t easily encompass other points of view.
Choosing to discuss abstracts primarily which happen to support a specific position, without disclosing that tie, is not OK. It’s discussing the specific in the guise of the abstract. I can’t be sure that’s what Zack is doing, but that’s how it appears from my outsider viewpoint.
Other abstract topics should be avoided, if the relevant examples are politically-charged and the abstraction doesn’t easily encompass other points of view.
Why?
Choosing to discuss abstracts primarily which happen to support a specific position, without disclosing that tie, is not OK.
How exactly does this differ from, “if the truth is on the wrong side politically, so much the worse for the truth”? Should we limit ourselves to abstract discussions that don’tconstrain our anticipations on things we care about?
How exactly does this differ from, “if the truth is on the wrong side politically, so much the worse for the truth”?
It differs in that there is no truth involved. The entire conversation is about which models and ontologies are best, without specifying what purpose they’re serving. The abstraction is avoiding talking about any actual truth (what predictions will be made, and how the bets will be resolved), while asserting that it improves some abstract concept of truth.
I’ve noted in at least some of your posts that I don’t find your abstractions very compelling without examples, and I that I don’t much care for the examples I can think of to reify your abstractions.
I agree that it’s reasonable for readers to expect authors to provide examples, which is why I do in fact provide examples. What do you want from me, exactly??
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I note that this isn’t a denial of the accusation that you’re bringing up a hobbyhorse, disguised by abstraction. It sounds more like a defense of discussing a political specific by means of abstraction. I’ve noted in at least some of your posts that I don’t find your abstractions very compelling without examples, and I that I don’t much care for the examples I can think of to reify your abstractions.
It’s at times like this that I’m happy I’m not part of a “rationalist community” that includes repetitive indirection of political fights along with denial that that’s what they are. But I wish you’d keep it off less wrong.
On the next level down, your insistence that words have consistent meaning and categories are real and must be consistent across usages (including both context changes and internal reasoning vs external communication) seems a blind spot. I don’t know if it’s caused by the examples you’re choosing (and not sharing), or if the reverse is true.
Zack said:
Which isn’t saying specifics should be discussed by discussing abstracts, it says abstracts should be discussed, even when part of the motivation for discussing the abstract is specific. Like, people should be able to collaborate on statistics textbooks even if they don’t agree with their co-authors’ specific applications of statistics to their non-statistical domains. (It would be pretty useless to discuss abstracts if there we no specific motivations, after all...)
Right. At least some abstract topics should be discussed, and part of the discussion is which, if any, specifics might be exemplary of such abstractions. Other abstract topics should be avoided, if the relevant examples are politically-charged and the abstraction doesn’t easily encompass other points of view.
Choosing to discuss abstracts primarily which happen to support a specific position, without disclosing that tie, is not OK. It’s discussing the specific in the guise of the abstract. I can’t be sure that’s what Zack is doing, but that’s how it appears from my outsider viewpoint.
Why?
How exactly does this differ from, “if the truth is on the wrong side politically, so much the worse for the truth”? Should we limit ourselves to abstract discussions that don’t constrain our anticipations on things we care about?
It differs in that there is no truth involved. The entire conversation is about which models and ontologies are best, without specifying what purpose they’re serving. The abstraction is avoiding talking about any actual truth (what predictions will be made, and how the bets will be resolved), while asserting that it improves some abstract concept of truth.
“Where to Draw the Boundaries?” includes examples about dolphins, geographic and political maps, poison, heaps of sand, and job titles. In the comment section, I gave more examples about Scott Alexander’s critique of neoreactionary authors, Müllerian mimickry in snakes, chronic fatigue syndrome, and accent recognition.
I agree that it’s reasonable for readers to expect authors to provide examples, which is why I do in fact provide examples. What do you want from me, exactly??