The hard problem is, why is there any consciousness at all? Even if consciousness is somehow tied to “recursive self-modeling”, you haven’t explained why there should be any feelings or qualia or subjectivity in something that models itself.
Beyond that, there is the question, what exactly counts as self-modelling? You’re assuming some kind of physicalism I guess, so, explain to me what combination of physical properties counts as “modelling”. Under what conditions can we say that a physical system is modelling something? Under what conditions can we say that a physical system is modelling itself?
Beyond all that, there’s also the problem of qualic properties. Let’s suppose we associate color experience with brain activity. Brain activity actually consists of ions rushing through membrane ion gates, and so forth. Where in the motion of molecules, is there anything like a perceived color? This all seems to imply dualism. There might be rules governing which experience is associated with which physical brain state, but it still seems like we’re talking about two different things connected by a rule, rather than just one thing.
You ask: Even if the brain models itself, why should that feel like anything? Why isn’t it just plain old computation?
A system that looks at itself creates a “point of view.” When the brain models the world and also itself inside that world, it automatically creates a kind of “center of perspective.” That center is what we call a subject. That’s what happens when a system treats some information as belonging to the system. How the border of the system is drawn differs, body, brain, mind differs, but the reference will always be a form of “mine.”
The brain can’t see how its own processes work (unless you are an advanced meditator maybe). So when a signal passes through that self-model, the system can’t break it down; it just receives a simplified or compressed state. That opaque state is what the system calls “what it feels like.”
Why isn’t this just a zombie misrepresenting itself? The distinction between “representation of feeling” and “actual feeling” is a dualist mistake. The rainbow is there even if it is not a material arc. To represent something as a felt, intrinsic state just is to have the feeling.
The hard problem is, why is there any consciousness at all? Even if consciousness is somehow tied to “recursive self-modeling”, you haven’t explained why there should be any feelings or qualia or subjectivity in something that models itself.
Beyond that, there is the question, what exactly counts as self-modelling? You’re assuming some kind of physicalism I guess, so, explain to me what combination of physical properties counts as “modelling”. Under what conditions can we say that a physical system is modelling something? Under what conditions can we say that a physical system is modelling itself?
Beyond all that, there’s also the problem of qualic properties. Let’s suppose we associate color experience with brain activity. Brain activity actually consists of ions rushing through membrane ion gates, and so forth. Where in the motion of molecules, is there anything like a perceived color? This all seems to imply dualism. There might be rules governing which experience is associated with which physical brain state, but it still seems like we’re talking about two different things connected by a rule, rather than just one thing.
You ask: Even if the brain models itself, why should that feel like anything? Why isn’t it just plain old computation?
A system that looks at itself creates a “point of view.” When the brain models the world and also itself inside that world, it automatically creates a kind of “center of perspective.” That center is what we call a subject. That’s what happens when a system treats some information as belonging to the system. How the border of the system is drawn differs, body, brain, mind differs, but the reference will always be a form of “mine.”
The brain can’t see how its own processes work (unless you are an advanced meditator maybe).
So when a signal passes through that self-model, the system can’t break it down; it just receives a simplified or compressed state. That opaque state is what the system calls “what it feels like.”
Why isn’t this just a zombie misrepresenting itself? The distinction between “representation of feeling” and “actual feeling” is a dualist mistake. The rainbow is there even if it is not a material arc. To represent something as a felt, intrinsic state just is to have the feeling.