Let me turn your question around. If your utility function puts value in the mere existence of people, regardless of how they interact with the larger world, doesn’t that mean having babies is as wonderful as killing people is terrible? Is somebody with 12 kids a hero?
I’m actually pretty sure some people who have had 12 kids are heroes or at least very altruistic when objectively analysed.
Many many people that made great contributions have come from large families of overachievers. Genetics and upbringing matter a lot. And productivity gains made by lets say 6 of the kids can easily overshadow anything that one individual could have done (even when adjusted for the fact that the kids start contributing later).
However overall if we look at the world today, the vast majority of people having 12 kids aren’t heroes.
If this is really what you really believe, as opposed to merely a fake utility function, the as far as I’m concerned you may as well be a pebble sorter or a baby eater.
It can’t be an accident that the rhetorical form your disagreement took is a dehumanization of your opponent. Just saying …
Also, I want to point out that the moral issues are nowhere near as clear-cut as you (and Kant) seem to think. Even if you axiomatically assert that people have terminal value, you still need to explain why people have that value, whereas trees (for example) do not. And also clarify the boundaries of that protected class “people”. (Does it include fetuses, conceptuses, persons cryonically frozen, HeLa cultures, etc.?)
Is it possible to answer these questions without once veering into the realm of instrumental values?
Also, I want to point out that the moral issues are nowhere near as clear-cut as you (and Kant) seem to think. Even if you axiomatically assert that people have terminal value, you still need to explain why people have that value, whereas trees (for example) do not. And also clarify the boundaries of that protected class “people”. (Does it include fetuses, conceptuses, persons cryonically frozen, HeLa cultures, etc.?)
What if I were to ask the same question about why society should be valued?
Is it possible to answer these questions without once veering into the realm of instrumental values?
If you keep trying to justify values instrumentally, you’ll wind up in an infinite regress.
Maybe what I would discover instead, if I actually charted out my value structure, that all of the things I value exist in an interlocking network that doesn’t ground out in any special real, true, honest-to-goodness, fundamental, basic, not-dependent-on-anything, terminal values.
While I’m not committed to the absence of terminal values, I consider the possibility plausible, and I don’t find the “well, there’s got to be something at the bottom of the stack!” argument for their presence convincing.
Absolutely true. Was responding to the last bit of your comment and ended up completely disregarding your greater context… sorry.
This is a bit of a hobbyhorse of mine at the moment, especially since so much of the discussion about ethics here seems predicated on the existence of terminal values that can’t be interpreted in terms of anything else.
Maybe what I would discover instead, if I actually charted out my value structure, that all of the things I value exist in an interlocking network that doesn’t ground out in any special real, true, honest-to-goodness, fundamental, basic, not-dependent-on-anything, terminal values.
It sounds like your value structure represents (hazily specified) terminal values.
What if I were to ask the same question about why society should be valued?
Then you would probably be asking a good question.
As a Humean, who bases his moral philosophy on rational self-interest, I would answer that ‘society’ is simply a shorthand for all of the other rational agents who might react positively or negatively to my actions. As such, society is not something that should be ‘valued’ as such, but it is something that a prudent self-interested person will want to take into account.
But I’m sure that people (I’m sure there are some) who actually value society without valuing individual persons—those people would find your question difficult to answer.
Actually I don’t think infanticide is as universally evil as its cracked up to be.
Don’t get me wrong judging by my personal ethics infaticide is wrong and once we will have artificial uterus’s and genetic therapy abortion will also be wrong on about the same order of magnitude.
But going by general human behavior rather than specific ethical systems both infanticide and abortion where generally accepted far more than today. Not only that the specific notion that something magical happens when a organism passes through the birth canal making it worthy of moral consideration seems to be a very modern and Eurocentric thing.
These moral sentiments are emotions [...] caused by contemplating the person or action to be evaluated without regard to our self-interest, and from a common or general perspective [...]
Regarding Eugene’s point about terminal value, I agree with the following clarification: the primary reason murder is wrong is because it deprives somebody of the rest of their life.
This still allows us to distinguish between murder and failure to create new lives, provided that we see a difference between someone who already exists and someone who merely might exist.
If this is really what you really believe, as opposed to merely a fake utility function, then as far as I’m concerned you may as well be a pebble sorter or a baby eater.
Are you saying that this then would no longer be a question of figuring out how to best satisfy our moral principles, but a difference in moral principles themselves?
Information can be used to change a moral position because you can discover that something does or doesn’t satisfy your moral principles. But in theory, information shouldn’t change your moral principles—they are independent of facts and logical justification.
If a fetus has innate intrinsic value, then wouldn’t that be a moral principle? People might argue in pro-life debates that the fetus has value because it is human, or because it has potential, or reason X, or reason Y, but perhaps none of these reasons are the real reason, because the value of a fetus isn’t derivative. In which case, this would explain something to me about the apparent lack of logic when people discuss pro-life arguments. People could be making the mistake that morality has ‘reasons’ and that moral principles can be justified via argument. When all they really need to say is that the life of a baby is sacred.
(By the way the lack of logic I was referring to is that some subset of pro-life proponents, that many of my family members happen to represent, argue sincerely that fetuses should be protected because human life is sacred, but then they support fighting in wars. They will argue that soldiers make a choice, and another people or culture are threatening our way of life, etc, but these seem like after-the-fact excuses. Logically, the bottom line is not that human life must be protected, no matter what. So it doesn’t matter that fetuses are ‘human’. It would make sense that it only matters that they’re human babies.)
So do you believe that people only have no terminal value and instrumental value only in so far as they benefit society?
If this is really what you really believe, as opposed to merely a fake utility function, the as far as I’m concerned you may as well be a pebble sorter or a baby eater.
Let me turn your question around. If your utility function puts value in the mere existence of people, regardless of how they interact with the larger world, doesn’t that mean having babies is as wonderful as killing people is terrible? Is somebody with 12 kids a hero?
Or a serial killer with a large family? “Sure he might have killed 3 people—but he’s a father of 5!”
I’m actually pretty sure some people who have had 12 kids are heroes or at least very altruistic when objectively analysed.
Many many people that made great contributions have come from large families of overachievers. Genetics and upbringing matter a lot. And productivity gains made by lets say 6 of the kids can easily overshadow anything that one individual could have done (even when adjusted for the fact that the kids start contributing later).
However overall if we look at the world today, the vast majority of people having 12 kids aren’t heroes.
It can’t be an accident that the rhetorical form your disagreement took is a dehumanization of your opponent. Just saying …
Also, I want to point out that the moral issues are nowhere near as clear-cut as you (and Kant) seem to think. Even if you axiomatically assert that people have terminal value, you still need to explain why people have that value, whereas trees (for example) do not. And also clarify the boundaries of that protected class “people”. (Does it include fetuses, conceptuses, persons cryonically frozen, HeLa cultures, etc.?)
Is it possible to answer these questions without once veering into the realm of instrumental values?
What if I were to ask the same question about why society should be valued?
If you keep trying to justify values instrumentally, you’ll wind up in an infinite regress.
Not necessarily.
Maybe what I would discover instead, if I actually charted out my value structure, that all of the things I value exist in an interlocking network that doesn’t ground out in any special real, true, honest-to-goodness, fundamental, basic, not-dependent-on-anything, terminal values.
While I’m not committed to the absence of terminal values, I consider the possibility plausible, and I don’t find the “well, there’s got to be something at the bottom of the stack!” argument for their presence convincing.
That still doesn’t answer the question of why that value structure as opposed to some other.
Absolutely true. Was responding to the last bit of your comment and ended up completely disregarding your greater context… sorry.
This is a bit of a hobbyhorse of mine at the moment, especially since so much of the discussion about ethics here seems predicated on the existence of terminal values that can’t be interpreted in terms of anything else.
It sounds like your value structure represents (hazily specified) terminal values.
It doesn’t sound that way to me, so if you unpack it I’d be interested.
Then you would probably be asking a good question.
As a Humean, who bases his moral philosophy on rational self-interest, I would answer that ‘society’ is simply a shorthand for all of the other rational agents who might react positively or negatively to my actions. As such, society is not something that should be ‘valued’ as such, but it is something that a prudent self-interested person will want to take into account.
But I’m sure that people (I’m sure there are some) who actually value society without valuing individual persons—those people would find your question difficult to answer.
Two points.
1:
Why is this any less arbitrary?
2:
So if I handed you a baby and offered you $10 to kill it, assuming no one else would ever find out, would you do it?
If the answer is some variation on “no, because I would feel bad about it”, I can throw in a pill that keeps you from feeling bad about it.
The scenario in 2 is too implausable to be useful, in my opinion.
w! Definitely a w.
I don’t understand the reference to w. What does that letter have to do with the context?
The homophone is broken.
Oh! Throw in a pill, not through in. I got it.
Thanks, Fixed.
You are not making points. You are issuing challenges.
I’m not sure I understand the question. You are not asking why I would value my own interests, are you?
I respectfully decline the challenge.
Actually I don’t think infanticide is as universally evil as its cracked up to be.
Don’t get me wrong judging by my personal ethics infaticide is wrong and once we will have artificial uterus’s and genetic therapy abortion will also be wrong on about the same order of magnitude.
But going by general human behavior rather than specific ethical systems both infanticide and abortion where generally accepted far more than today. Not only that the specific notion that something magical happens when a organism passes through the birth canal making it worthy of moral consideration seems to be a very modern and Eurocentric thing.
Hume wouldn’t be a Humean if rational self-interest were the standard. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy writes:
Regarding Eugene’s point about terminal value, I agree with the following clarification: the primary reason murder is wrong is because it deprives somebody of the rest of their life.
This still allows us to distinguish between murder and failure to create new lives, provided that we see a difference between someone who already exists and someone who merely might exist.
Are you saying that this then would no longer be a question of figuring out how to best satisfy our moral principles, but a difference in moral principles themselves?
Information can be used to change a moral position because you can discover that something does or doesn’t satisfy your moral principles. But in theory, information shouldn’t change your moral principles—they are independent of facts and logical justification.
If a fetus has innate intrinsic value, then wouldn’t that be a moral principle? People might argue in pro-life debates that the fetus has value because it is human, or because it has potential, or reason X, or reason Y, but perhaps none of these reasons are the real reason, because the value of a fetus isn’t derivative. In which case, this would explain something to me about the apparent lack of logic when people discuss pro-life arguments. People could be making the mistake that morality has ‘reasons’ and that moral principles can be justified via argument. When all they really need to say is that the life of a baby is sacred.
(By the way the lack of logic I was referring to is that some subset of pro-life proponents, that many of my family members happen to represent, argue sincerely that fetuses should be protected because human life is sacred, but then they support fighting in wars. They will argue that soldiers make a choice, and another people or culture are threatening our way of life, etc, but these seem like after-the-fact excuses. Logically, the bottom line is not that human life must be protected, no matter what. So it doesn’t matter that fetuses are ‘human’. It would make sense that it only matters that they’re human babies.)