Do you remember that conversation we had (I think maybe Carl Shulman was also present? IDK) a few years ago about roughly this topic? At the lodge? Key words: Solomonoff induction, solipsistic phenomenal idealism.
I think the bold claim I’d make now is that anyone who isn’t a realist about qualia doesn’t have a viable epistemology yet; all our standard epistemological theories (bayesianism, solomonoff induction, etc.) imply realism about qualia.
Perhaps, though, this just means we need new epistemological theories. But I’d want to see independent evidence for this, because the standard arguments against qualia realism are bogus.
(Also it’s been a year since I thought about this at all, and years since I seriously thought about it, so… if someone comments with a compelling objection I won’t be too surprised. And IIRC there were some arguments we discussed in that conversation that were making me unhappy with qualia realism, making me wish for new epistemological theories instead.)
I do remember that conversation, though I’m a bit hazy on the details of the argument you presented. Let me know if there’s a write-up/summary somewhere, or if you create one in future.
Do you remember that conversation we had (I think maybe Carl Shulman was also present? IDK) a few years ago about roughly this topic? At the lodge? Key words: Solomonoff induction, solipsistic phenomenal idealism.
I think the bold claim I’d make now is that anyone who isn’t a realist about qualia doesn’t have a viable epistemology yet; all our standard epistemological theories (bayesianism, solomonoff induction, etc.) imply realism about qualia.
Perhaps, though, this just means we need new epistemological theories. But I’d want to see independent evidence for this, because the standard arguments against qualia realism are bogus.
(Also it’s been a year since I thought about this at all, and years since I seriously thought about it, so… if someone comments with a compelling objection I won’t be too surprised. And IIRC there were some arguments we discussed in that conversation that were making me unhappy with qualia realism, making me wish for new epistemological theories instead.)
I do remember that conversation, though I’m a bit hazy on the details of the argument you presented. Let me know if there’s a write-up/summary somewhere, or if you create one in future.