The Copernican principle, “humans are not the center of the universe,” does contradict 2, though, if you agree that ordinary randomness, e.g. measuring an electron, does not have free will. And the Copernican principle is just a restatement of Occam’s razor when the competing explanations are “there is a universal physical law” and “there is a law that specifically targets humans.”
I do not see what you mean by the Copernican Principle. Perhaps you imagine that someone has said only humans have FW. I have not.,
A naturalistic libertarian can concede that indeterministic electrons don’t have free will, just as a compatibilist can concede that deterministic electrons don’t have FW. Neither thinks (in)determinism is a sufficient condition of FW.
True, but I am saying that if randomness is not enough to have free will (does a nondeterministic chinese room have free will?), then you would either need to replicate a compatibilist argument for how humans have free will, or have some extra laws that specify high-level concepts like free will (a.k.a. “magic”).
No. I need an incompatibilist argument. I need randomness plus something to be necessary for FW, and I need the something extra to be naturalistic. And I have them, too.
A non deterministic CR, or other AI, could have FW, if programmed correctly. That’s a consequence of naturalism.
The Copernican principle, “humans are not the center of the universe,” does contradict 2, though, if you agree that ordinary randomness, e.g. measuring an electron, does not have free will. And the Copernican principle is just a restatement of Occam’s razor when the competing explanations are “there is a universal physical law” and “there is a law that specifically targets humans.”
I do not see what you mean by the Copernican Principle. Perhaps you imagine that someone has said only humans have FW. I have not.,
A naturalistic libertarian can concede that indeterministic electrons don’t have free will, just as a compatibilist can concede that deterministic electrons don’t have FW. Neither thinks (in)determinism is a sufficient condition of FW.
True, but I am saying that if randomness is not enough to have free will (does a nondeterministic chinese room have free will?), then you would either need to replicate a compatibilist argument for how humans have free will, or have some extra laws that specify high-level concepts like free will (a.k.a. “magic”).
No. I need an incompatibilist argument. I need randomness plus something to be necessary for FW, and I need the something extra to be naturalistic. And I have them, too.
A non deterministic CR, or other AI, could have FW, if programmed correctly. That’s a consequence of naturalism.
Huh, I accidentally posted this. I thought I’d deleted it as true but irrelevant.
Ah, yeah, I was wrong.