I do not see what you mean by the Copernican Principle. Perhaps you imagine that someone has said only humans have FW. I have not.,
A naturalistic libertarian can concede that indeterministic electrons don’t have free will, just as a compatibilist can concede that deterministic electrons don’t have FW. Neither thinks (in)determinism is a sufficient condition of FW.
True, but I am saying that if randomness is not enough to have free will (does a nondeterministic chinese room have free will?), then you would either need to replicate a compatibilist argument for how humans have free will, or have some extra laws that specify high-level concepts like free will (a.k.a. “magic”).
No. I need an incompatibilist argument. I need randomness plus something to be necessary for FW, and I need the something extra to be naturalistic. And I have them, too.
A non deterministic CR, or other AI, could have FW, if programmed correctly. That’s a consequence of naturalism.
I do not see what you mean by the Copernican Principle. Perhaps you imagine that someone has said only humans have FW. I have not.,
A naturalistic libertarian can concede that indeterministic electrons don’t have free will, just as a compatibilist can concede that deterministic electrons don’t have FW. Neither thinks (in)determinism is a sufficient condition of FW.
True, but I am saying that if randomness is not enough to have free will (does a nondeterministic chinese room have free will?), then you would either need to replicate a compatibilist argument for how humans have free will, or have some extra laws that specify high-level concepts like free will (a.k.a. “magic”).
No. I need an incompatibilist argument. I need randomness plus something to be necessary for FW, and I need the something extra to be naturalistic. And I have them, too.
A non deterministic CR, or other AI, could have FW, if programmed correctly. That’s a consequence of naturalism.
Huh, I accidentally posted this. I thought I’d deleted it as true but irrelevant.
Ah, yeah, I was wrong.