There are two false assumptions in the above:
1) that the universe runs on physical laws does not mean it necessarily runs on deterministic laws.
2) Following from that, since laws are not necessarily deterministic, libertarian free will, does not necessarily involve overriding them. Libertarian free will could be found within an indeterministic (but otherwise throughly physical and material) universe.
My understanding is that the standard dilemma for libertarian free will is that your decisions seem to have to ground out in randomness or determinism, so I don’t think indeterministic laws save the concept.
That is the standard objection and I (unusually) think it can be resisted. To say the least, if you are going to claim to have “the” answer”, you have to thoroughly consider all the alternatives.
I’d think that, given that’s the standard objection, and it includes the case of indeterminism, you’d want to say more than just that indeterminism saves libertarian free will.
More to the point—would you mind giving a definition of what it is that you mean by ‘libertarian free will’? I’ve never heard it coherently stated.
“Free Will is defined as “the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances”.
The Copernican principle, “humans are not the center of the universe,” does contradict 2, though, if you agree that ordinary randomness, e.g. measuring an electron, does not have free will. And the Copernican principle is just a restatement of Occam’s razor when the competing explanations are “there is a universal physical law” and “there is a law that specifically targets humans.”
I do not see what you mean by the Copernican Principle. Perhaps you imagine that someone has said only humans have FW. I have not.,
A naturalistic libertarian can concede that indeterministic electrons don’t have free will, just as a compatibilist can concede that deterministic electrons don’t have FW. Neither thinks (in)determinism is a sufficient condition of FW.
True, but I am saying that if randomness is not enough to have free will (does a nondeterministic chinese room have free will?), then you would either need to replicate a compatibilist argument for how humans have free will, or have some extra laws that specify high-level concepts like free will (a.k.a. “magic”).
No. I need an incompatibilist argument. I need randomness plus something to be necessary for FW, and I need the something extra to be naturalistic. And I have them, too.
A non deterministic CR, or other AI, could have FW, if programmed correctly. That’s a consequence of naturalism.
There are two false assumptions in the above: 1) that the universe runs on physical laws does not mean it necessarily runs on deterministic laws.
2) Following from that, since laws are not necessarily deterministic, libertarian free will, does not necessarily involve overriding them. Libertarian free will could be found within an indeterministic (but otherwise throughly physical and material) universe.
My understanding is that the standard dilemma for libertarian free will is that your decisions seem to have to ground out in randomness or determinism, so I don’t think indeterministic laws save the concept.
That is the standard objection and I (unusually) think it can be resisted. To say the least, if you are going to claim to have “the” answer”, you have to thoroughly consider all the alternatives.
I’d think that, given that’s the standard objection, and it includes the case of indeterminism, you’d want to say more than just that indeterminism saves libertarian free will.
More to the point—would you mind giving a definition of what it is that you mean by ‘libertarian free will’? I’ve never heard it coherently stated.
“Free Will is defined as “the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances”.
Oh. Well, that’s fine then. I usually think of libertarian free will as including internal circumstances as well.
The Copernican principle, “humans are not the center of the universe,” does contradict 2, though, if you agree that ordinary randomness, e.g. measuring an electron, does not have free will. And the Copernican principle is just a restatement of Occam’s razor when the competing explanations are “there is a universal physical law” and “there is a law that specifically targets humans.”
I do not see what you mean by the Copernican Principle. Perhaps you imagine that someone has said only humans have FW. I have not.,
A naturalistic libertarian can concede that indeterministic electrons don’t have free will, just as a compatibilist can concede that deterministic electrons don’t have FW. Neither thinks (in)determinism is a sufficient condition of FW.
True, but I am saying that if randomness is not enough to have free will (does a nondeterministic chinese room have free will?), then you would either need to replicate a compatibilist argument for how humans have free will, or have some extra laws that specify high-level concepts like free will (a.k.a. “magic”).
No. I need an incompatibilist argument. I need randomness plus something to be necessary for FW, and I need the something extra to be naturalistic. And I have them, too.
A non deterministic CR, or other AI, could have FW, if programmed correctly. That’s a consequence of naturalism.
Huh, I accidentally posted this. I thought I’d deleted it as true but irrelevant.
Ah, yeah, I was wrong.