I think we need to be careful not to mush together metaphysics and epistemics. A conceptual mystery, a felt lack of explanation—these are epistemic problems. That’s not sufficient reason to infer distinct metaphysical categories.
It’s nonetheless the best reason. The amount of times you should add new ontological categories isn’t zero, ever—even if you shouldn’t also add a category every time you are confused. Physicists were not wrong to add the nuclear forces to gravity and electromagnetism.
Unfortunately, there is no simple algorithm to tell you when you should add categories.
Particular camp #2 philosophers sometimes have arguments that try to go from these epistemic premises, plus additional premises, to a metaphysical divide between mental and physical properties. Those arguments fail,
Do they? Camp #1 is generally left with denialism about qualia (including illusionism), or promissory physicalism, neither of which is hugely attractive. Regarding promissory physicalism, it’s a subjective judgement, not a proof , that we will have a full reductive explanation of consciousness one day, so it is quite cheeky to call the other camp “wrong” because they have a subjective judgement that we won’t.
Fair point about the experience itself vs its description. But note that all the controversy is about the descriptions.
No, it’s about the implications. People are quite explicit that they don’t want to believe in qualia becasue they don’t want to have to believe in epiphenomenalism, zombies, non physical properties, etc..
Of course, rejecting evidence because it doesn’t fit a theory is the opposite of rationality.
In general, you can also just hold that consciousness is a different way to look at the same process, which is sometimes called dual-aspect monism, and that’s physicalist, too.
Well, materialist—it doesn’t require immaterial substances or non physical properties, but it also denies that all facts are physical facts, contra strong physicalism.
I don’t see DANM as a radical third option to the two camps, I see it as the lightweight or minimalist position in camp #2.
It’s nonetheless the best reason. The amount of times you should add new ontological categories isn’t zero, ever—even if you shouldn’t also add a category every time you are confused. Physicists were not wrong to add the nuclear forces to gravity and electromagnetism.
Unfortunately, there is no simple algorithm to tell you when you should add categories.
Do they? Camp #1 is generally left with denialism about qualia (including illusionism), or promissory physicalism, neither of which is hugely attractive. Regarding promissory physicalism, it’s a subjective judgement, not a proof , that we will have a full reductive explanation of consciousness one day, so it is quite cheeky to call the other camp “wrong” because they have a subjective judgement that we won’t.
No, it’s about the implications. People are quite explicit that they don’t want to believe in qualia becasue they don’t want to have to believe in epiphenomenalism, zombies, non physical properties, etc..
Of course, rejecting evidence because it doesn’t fit a theory is the opposite of rationality.
Well, materialist—it doesn’t require immaterial substances or non physical properties, but it also denies that all facts are physical facts, contra strong physicalism.
I don’t see DANM as a radical third option to the two camps, I see it as the lightweight or minimalist position in camp #2.