I’m wondering where Biological Naturalism[1] falls within these two camps? It seems like sort of a “third way” in between them, and incidentally, is the explanation that I personally have found most compelling.
Here’s GPT-4′s summary:
Biological Naturalism is a theory of mind proposed by philosopher John Searle. It is a middle ground between two dominant but opposing views of the mind: materialism and dualism. Materialism suggests that the mind is completely reducible to physical processes in the brain, while dualism posits that the mind and body are distinct and separate.
Searle’s Biological Naturalism, on the other hand, asserts that while mental processes are caused by physical processes in the brain, they are not reducible to them. This means that while consciousness and other mental phenomena are rooted in the physical workings of the brain, they also have their own first-person ontology that is not captured by third-person descriptions of the brain’s workings.
Searle uses the analogy of water and H2O to explain this concept. Just as water is composed of H2O molecules but has properties (like wetness) that are not properties of individual H2O molecules, consciousness is caused by physical processes in the brain but has properties (like subjectivity) that are not properties of individual neurons or neural networks.
In other words, Biological Naturalism acknowledges the physical basis of consciousness while also recognizing that consciousness has a subjective character that is not explained by purely physical descriptions. This theory allows for the study of the mind as part of the natural biological sciences, while also acknowledging the unique properties of mental phenomena.
Setting aside how problematic of an individual Searle is, this theory has always struck me as the most cogent and has stood up to the test of time in my own ontology.
Taking it a step further into my own theorizing: I suspect consciousness is a natural feature of all systems and exists on a spectrum from very-low-consciousness systems (individual atoms, stars, clouds of gas, rocks) to very-high-consciousness systems (animals). My pet theory is that we will one day find out that everything is conscious and it’s just a matter of “how much.” Hmm, maybe this indicates I’m a Camp #2 person? I’m finding it hard to classify myself. Maybe someone else will find it easier.
Despite its name, I don’t think there’s anything in the theory that says consciousness has to arise from biological components per se, just that consciousness is a natural byproduct of at least some information processing systems, most notably the biological ones that exists in our skulls.
Wait, isn’t that just dualism with hand-waving about complexity?
The analogy of water and H2O is a good one: the property of wetness IS measurable in surface tension, viscosity, and adhesion to various surfaces. And those are absolutely caused by interactions at the level of molecules (or lower down, but definitely physics). “Wetness” is not easily CALCULABLE from first principles, but that’s a failing of us as modelers and our computational power, not a distinct category of properties.
I’m wondering where Biological Naturalism[1] falls within these two camps? It seems like sort of a “third way” in between them, and incidentally, is the explanation that I personally have found most compelling.
My take based on the summary is that it’s squarely in Camp #2.
In particular, I think this part seals the deal
This means that while consciousness and other mental phenomena are rooted in the physical workings of the brain, they also have their own first-person ontology that is not captured by third-person descriptions of the brain’s workings.
According to Camp #1, there’s nothing ontologically special about consciousness, so as soon as you give it its own ontology, you’ve decided which camp you’re in.
I’m wondering where Biological Naturalism[1] falls within these two camps? It seems like sort of a “third way” in between them, and incidentally, is the explanation that I personally have found most compelling.
Here’s GPT-4′s summary:
Setting aside how problematic of an individual Searle is, this theory has always struck me as the most cogent and has stood up to the test of time in my own ontology.
Taking it a step further into my own theorizing: I suspect consciousness is a natural feature of all systems and exists on a spectrum from very-low-consciousness systems (individual atoms, stars, clouds of gas, rocks) to very-high-consciousness systems (animals). My pet theory is that we will one day find out that everything is conscious and it’s just a matter of “how much.” Hmm, maybe this indicates I’m a Camp #2 person? I’m finding it hard to classify myself. Maybe someone else will find it easier.
Despite its name, I don’t think there’s anything in the theory that says consciousness has to arise from biological components per se, just that consciousness is a natural byproduct of at least some information processing systems, most notably the biological ones that exists in our skulls.
Wait, isn’t that just dualism with hand-waving about complexity?
The analogy of water and H2O is a good one: the property of wetness IS measurable in surface tension, viscosity, and adhesion to various surfaces. And those are absolutely caused by interactions at the level of molecules (or lower down, but definitely physics). “Wetness” is not easily CALCULABLE from first principles, but that’s a failing of us as modelers and our computational power, not a distinct category of properties.
My take based on the summary is that it’s squarely in Camp #2.
In particular, I think this part seals the deal
According to Camp #1, there’s nothing ontologically special about consciousness, so as soon as you give it its own ontology, you’ve decided which camp you’re in.