I think this example actually demonstrates why most deontological bars do in fact depend on intent. I agree “thou shalt not kill” is commonly used because of how snappy it is, but I don’t think people realistically treat it as a literal deontological bar. For example, people do things that have some probabilistic chance of causing the death of others all the time (driving, utilizing products that cause harmful exposures, etc.), yet people don’t usually act as if this is deontologically barred. Presumably they would argue “that’s not really killing”, and in a sense I agree. When people think about the deontological prohibition against killing, they usually mean something closer to thou shalt not murder, where “murder” means intentional unjustified (i.e. not in proportional self-defense) killing. In order for the deontological bar to really have meaning, we need to import some notion of intent, or at least some additional context/assumptions, exactly as is the case for the examples in my post. In this sense, “thou shalt not kill” is actually extremely unclear, but in a way that is hard to recognize sometimes. I think the view I offer actually substantially improves clarity, and this clarity is a leading reason why people should utilize this approach more often.
sorry—it seems that what is happening here is you are arguing against deontological bars being useful as ways to organize society. that’s a perfectly reasonable thing to argue. i haven’t thought about it deeply, but i suspect i agree with you.
like, in this case, we’re starting with a hard rule (“do not murder”), and then toning it down with all of these questions of intent/proportionality/circumstance. then you say “doesn’t that make it better?”
yes! yes it does. it makes it a better rule. a society that follows the nuanced version will—i suspect—be more aligned and prosperous than one that follows the hard line.
we have made it a better rule by relaxing one particular constraint: that it should be a deontological bar.
I’m not arguing against deontological bars? I’m just saying that common deontological bars often have elements of intent inherent in what is acutally barred. So in the murder example, I agree that there should be and many people follow a deontological bar against murder, but that murder (as it is often defined and is generally thought of colloquially) requires intentional killing. Its not a question of whether the line is hard or soft, its a question of what is actually barred. Do you agree that when people speak of a deontological bar against killing, they really mean something more like what I have called “murder”?
I think this example actually demonstrates why most deontological bars do in fact depend on intent. I agree “thou shalt not kill” is commonly used because of how snappy it is, but I don’t think people realistically treat it as a literal deontological bar. For example, people do things that have some probabilistic chance of causing the death of others all the time (driving, utilizing products that cause harmful exposures, etc.), yet people don’t usually act as if this is deontologically barred. Presumably they would argue “that’s not really killing”, and in a sense I agree. When people think about the deontological prohibition against killing, they usually mean something closer to thou shalt not murder, where “murder” means intentional unjustified (i.e. not in proportional self-defense) killing. In order for the deontological bar to really have meaning, we need to import some notion of intent, or at least some additional context/assumptions, exactly as is the case for the examples in my post. In this sense, “thou shalt not kill” is actually extremely unclear, but in a way that is hard to recognize sometimes. I think the view I offer actually substantially improves clarity, and this clarity is a leading reason why people should utilize this approach more often.
sorry—it seems that what is happening here is you are arguing against deontological bars being useful as ways to organize society. that’s a perfectly reasonable thing to argue. i haven’t thought about it deeply, but i suspect i agree with you.
like, in this case, we’re starting with a hard rule (“do not murder”), and then toning it down with all of these questions of intent/proportionality/circumstance. then you say “doesn’t that make it better?”
yes! yes it does. it makes it a better rule. a society that follows the nuanced version will—i suspect—be more aligned and prosperous than one that follows the hard line.
we have made it a better rule by relaxing one particular constraint: that it should be a deontological bar.
I’m not arguing against deontological bars? I’m just saying that common deontological bars often have elements of intent inherent in what is acutally barred. So in the murder example, I agree that there should be and many people follow a deontological bar against murder, but that murder (as it is often defined and is generally thought of colloquially) requires intentional killing. Its not a question of whether the line is hard or soft, its a question of what is actually barred. Do you agree that when people speak of a deontological bar against killing, they really mean something more like what I have called “murder”?