I have a strong intuition that this isn’t how it works:
When I have a positive experience, it is readily apparent to me that the experience is positive, and no amount of argument can convince me that actually I didn’t enjoy myself.
Suppose I did something that I quite enjoyed, and then Omega came up to me and said “actually somebody else last week (or a simulation of you, or whatever) already experienced those exact same qualia, so your qualia weren’t that valuable.” I’d say, sorry Omega, that is wrong, my experience was good regardless of whether it had already happened before. I know it was good because I directly experienced its goodness.
The OP isn’t making any claim like this; the question isn’t whether any particular experience has value in-and-of-itself, but is only making a claim about the correct way to evaluate the total utility in a world with multiple experience.
By analogy, consider special relativity: If a train is moving at 0.75c relative to the ground, and a passenger on the train throws a ball forward at 0.5c, then that means the ball is moving at 0.91c relative to the ground. But there is no reference frame in which the ball is “really” moving at 0.16c.
Or, more pertinently, suppose we have two identical simulations playing out at the same time. Each one contributes zero marginal utility to a world in which the other one exists (and might be told this by Omega), but that doesn’t mean that the two of them together have zero utility.
I don’t really understand what you’re saying about the relativity point. Also, I’m not trying to say the “correct” way to value things is my way, I’m saying that my way is my way, and I don’t think doubling up the transistors is going to do anything that it is coherent to care about.
This isn’t what I’m saying, and indeed the thing you have laid out is not at all how it works. I’m saying that that thing is good, but I’m saying that the good thing doesn’t happen any less if you shut off one of the computers next to the other, that exact same thing still happens. It’s not that one instance devalues the other, it’s that they are the same object and removing one instantiation, under some conditions, doesn’t make your good experience any less real in any way that means anything.
If instead you’re talking about qualia happening in a different world than the one you’re in, then this is in fact even less what I’m saying and is obviously valuable from my perspective.
I have a strong intuition that this isn’t how it works:
When I have a positive experience, it is readily apparent to me that the experience is positive, and no amount of argument can convince me that actually I didn’t enjoy myself.
Suppose I did something that I quite enjoyed, and then Omega came up to me and said “actually somebody else last week (or a simulation of you, or whatever) already experienced those exact same qualia, so your qualia weren’t that valuable.” I’d say, sorry Omega, that is wrong, my experience was good regardless of whether it had already happened before. I know it was good because I directly experienced its goodness.
The OP isn’t making any claim like this; the question isn’t whether any particular experience has value in-and-of-itself, but is only making a claim about the correct way to evaluate the total utility in a world with multiple experience.
By analogy, consider special relativity: If a train is moving at 0.75c relative to the ground, and a passenger on the train throws a ball forward at 0.5c, then that means the ball is moving at 0.91c relative to the ground. But there is no reference frame in which the ball is “really” moving at 0.16c.
Or, more pertinently, suppose we have two identical simulations playing out at the same time. Each one contributes zero marginal utility to a world in which the other one exists (and might be told this by Omega), but that doesn’t mean that the two of them together have zero utility.
I don’t really understand what you’re saying about the relativity point. Also, I’m not trying to say the “correct” way to value things is my way, I’m saying that my way is my way, and I don’t think doubling up the transistors is going to do anything that it is coherent to care about.
This isn’t what I’m saying, and indeed the thing you have laid out is not at all how it works. I’m saying that that thing is good, but I’m saying that the good thing doesn’t happen any less if you shut off one of the computers next to the other, that exact same thing still happens. It’s not that one instance devalues the other, it’s that they are the same object and removing one instantiation, under some conditions, doesn’t make your good experience any less real in any way that means anything.
If instead you’re talking about qualia happening in a different world than the one you’re in, then this is in fact even less what I’m saying and is obviously valuable from my perspective.